Letters to the editor

Thursday, 2 February 2012

I write in defence of advocates representing mentally ill clients. I am concerned that your article promulgates the common perception that lawyers see mental health advocacy as an ‘easy ride’ in comparison with advocacy in other fields.

My colleagues and I have deliberately chosen this field in order to protect the rights of vulnerable clients at a time when they need most protection. We would rather use our skills and training to defend these people’s rights than work, for example, in the corporate arena. Those representing clients at mental health tribunals should be supported and encouraged in their work, not criticised for flawed advocacy.

In fact, many mental health lawyers are highly trained in the skill of advocacy and often have to practise the art of cross-examination in difficult circumstances extending far beyond the remit of the law. This also includes caseworkers who may not (yet) be qualified as lawyers, but are experienced in mental health law advocacy.

These advocates are knowledgeable about mental health law and experts at handling complex medical, social and practical issues in the context of a hearing.

The best of them assimilate all these matters into legal argument in order to achieve the best outcome for their client in relation to the Mental Health Act. They show that it is possible to produce sound legal argument on behalf of someone who may be of unsound mind.

Anne-Marie Elliott, Blavo and Co, London, WC1



Monday, 2 January 2012

We need to fight back against HSBC over its conveyancing panel policy. Upon learning of its decision I emailed our business manager, who replied that it was just as big a shock to him as it was to me, since it was the first he had heard about it.

I am pleased to note the Law Society will terminate all association with the HSBC group. It may well be too little too late, but I have no doubt that it is a decision all solicitors who have any pride left in their profession will follow. Our individual balances will no doubt be relatively insignificant, but the withdrawal of all our joint balances in a short period will surely cause ripples. It will also serve as a warning to other institutions that may be considering treating our profession in such a contemptuous manner.
Refusing to sign LRID Forms is another tool we should not forget.

Surinder Singh, Manak Manak Solicitors, Orpington



Thursday, 2 February 2012

In his article on HSBC and conveyancing, Jonathan Smithers rightly says that solicitors may take steps to steer clients away from HSBC.

He may be too young to remember the days when Abbey National had an even more limited panel of solicitors and repeatedly refused to expand it. The result (in a booming property market) was that solicitors invariably advised clients not to go to Abbey for a mortgage and took such steps as were open to them to ensure that funds which were under their control did not get invested with Abbey National.

I for one will now be advising clients to go nowhere near HSBC. Indeed, partly as a result of HSBC’s policy, one substantial property client of mine has already made the decision to move from HSBC to another bank.

Richard C Male, Male & Wagland, Potters Bar



Thursday, 2 February 2012

Feeling in masochistic mood, I filed my tax return on a recent Sunday morning and applied online for the new SRA practising certificate in the afternoon.

Despite its shaky start, the online registration was fairly smooth. There were difficulties on the fee-earner page, which a number of people have encountered, as it did not clearly say to search for the name and then on the right click on that fee-earner to confirm their details. The system also wanted me to state when I ceased to hold client money, but I have never held it, so in order to progress I had to say I stopped holding it the day I started my practice. It took me over an hour to complete the form, which is longer than usual with the paper version. I am the only person in my firm.

The fee was less than last year. Let us hope reductions continue and cuts are made. I was disappointed that, at the end, the system would not let me pay by debit or credit card, although supposedly that is an option. I tried many times, but only a blank page which should have been WorldPay came up. So, unlike the paper system, I will have to return to the issue to pay an invoice shortly when one is available. One advantage of recent problems is that instead of paying in October, we have had a three-month delay in having to pay!

Page one had a disheartening ‘it's’ for ‘its’ and a page near the end contained a sentence which would not have been out of place in a list of examples of the worst use of prepositions; but overall it is not too bad.

Susan Singleton,Singletons, Pinner



Thursday, 2 February 2012

John Edwards, who wrote in January, will be reassured to know that the common occurrence of cases swapping between courts is one the Crown Prosecution Service has planned for in the new digital world.

Prosecutors working in the same courthouse will download the case files for every courtroom in the building for that day. This is a quick, efficient process and means that each prosecutor has the information necessary to prosecute any of the cases taking place that day, including those passed between courtrooms.

David Jones, programme director, CJS Efficiency Programme, Crown Prosecution Service



Thursday, 2 February 2012

The impression given by Masood Ahmed in his commentary on the 2011 case of Rolf v De Guerin (see [2012] Gazette, 19 January, 13) is that any small builder who attempts to resist an entirely unmeritorious claim by defending it in court rather than submitting to mediation will find himself penalised in costs.

This conclusion is overstated. Contrary to Mr Ahmed’s summary, the defendant in Rolf did not ‘win at trial’. Rix LJ, giving judgment in the Court of Appeal, held that ‘Mrs Rolf was the overall winner, but only just’, emerging with a (low) percentage of what she had claimed. More to the point, the claimant and the defendant had each conducted their respective cases in a topsy-turvy way; the claimant (who started as a litigant in person but was represented at trial) making successive amendments to her claims, the defendant (who started with representation but fought the trial in person) warding off most of them by a line of argument which he had not pleaded nor relied upon at any stage until giving evidence at trial.

The normal costs outcome in such flawed circumstances - where neither side has put in a substantive case which the judge could accept - would, I suggest, be for no order, so the appeal court’s decision to quash an award in the defendant’s favour was hardly novel. Rix LJ did go on in his judgment to review previous cases on mediation including Dunnett v Railtrack PLC and Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust, making weighty pronouncements on the virtues of ADR in the context of small buildings disputes, and dangling the threat of costs penalties for litigants who ignore them.

But bad cases make bad law. What about a case which has sound legal merits, is argued cogently from the start and succeeds wholly at trial? Is the successful proponent of that case to be penalised because he failed to respond positively to an invitation to mediate from an opponent whose case has no merit?

It may take a brave litigant to refuse ADR in the light of Rolf, but there is still, I believe, a place for robust insistence on trial rather than mediation, and for costs following the event.

Hugh Sullivan, litigation partner, RadcliffesLeBrasseur, London, SW1



Thursday, 2 February 2012

In Law Society v LSC et al [2010] EWHC 2550 (Admin) the court acknowledged that solicitors working in the Family Court were ‘a band of skilled and dedicated lawyers working for little reward’.

Your edition of 12 January records the entry into administration of Jewels, a firm foremost in the provision of services in this area. The sole director blames this melancholy event on late payments by the LSC. I am sure he is right.

Our experience as a firm dealing nationally with complex care proceedings is proving exactly similar. Conversations with other legal aid lawyers reveal that many have not received payments from the LSC for months. The situation is intolerable.

It must be obvious to all but the most naive that some secret direction has been issued by the government to the LSC to reduce by any means possible the sums to be paid to the dedicated and hardworking (not to say long-suffering) practitioners
who try their hardest to deliver legal services in one of the most difficult, challenging and important areas of law.

The devices adopted by the LSC have included reductions in amounts once allowed; rejections of major claims for the most miniscule of reasons; and disallowance of items that their declared policy says are allowable. Many would describe such tactics as sharp practice.

This unheralded change in policy has led to a reduction in our LSC income approaching 30%. It compounds the pre-existing scandal of lamentable rates of remuneration and the creaking administration of payments. If it continues, more excellent firms will fail, leaving a vulnerable section of our community without the expertise they desperately need to deal with the visceral issues connected with the potential loss of their children.

Is this what is meant by sharing public funds to achieve greater fairness in society?

William Bache, William Bache & Co, Salisbury



Thursday, 2 February 2012

The Gazette of 19 January contained two separate items that can be usefully linked: one a call to help the public, the other a warning of how such help can be turned against us.

Grania Langdon-Down’s article on the difficulties of managing civil litigation with an increasing number of litigants in person reports the suggestion of the Civil Justice Council that legal professionals ‘sell small amounts of their time or take on one or two defined pieces of work in the course of a case’.

When I started in practice nearly 40 years ago, I considered offering litigants in person exactly that. A drop-in service, open evenings and Saturday mornings, in a welcoming shopfront office stocked with all the court leaflets, ‘how to...’ guides and typing facilities - and with me on hand to give free 15-minute advice on how best to present their case. I was not doing it to get business - the cases would be low-value - but as a service to the community and to the court.

A perusal of the solicitors liability sections in Cordery on Solicitors convinced me that my offer of help would be abused. No matter how much one might stress to the litigant in person that one was offering only a well-intentioned guide to presentation of documents and witnesses, and general comments about procedure, even if one got them to sign a disclaimer accepting that limitation, it was all too likely that a losing litigant would claim that I should have advised them further and better, and that insurers and the courts would hold me liable.

Which is precisely what seems to have happened in Padden v Bevan Ashford, judging from the report of the case in the Court of Appeal. There is a distressed client; two local firms refuse to help; the client finally sees a newly qualified solicitor for 15 minutes’ free advice; the client is advised not to sign over her interest in the matrimonial home to her husband but does so nevertheless; the client sues the solicitor.

I do not make any comment on the correctness of the decision in that case, which has been remitted for retrial.

My point is a general one: that the law on solicitors’ liability tends to impose the same absolute standard of care, whether we are giving an anxious member of the public general off-the-cuff comments intended to explain and reassure, or advising a multinational on cutting-edge commercial work in consultation with a silk.

Until insurers and judges recognise that the two are very different, it is unsurprising if solicitors decline the invitation of the Civil Justice Council to offer ‘dip in, dip out’ help to litigants in person. Our advice would necessarily be limited; our liability might not.

John Baird, Southport



Thursday, 2 February 2012

So the Civil Justice Council suggests that one way of dealing with the problems caused to the administration of civil justice by untutored litigants in person is for practitioners to sell them small amounts of legal advice, and gives as an example a firm that charges £7 for 5 minutes.

I wonder how practical this will be after the Court of Appeal judgment in Padden v Bevan Ashford. In that case solicitors were warned they were under a positive duty to advise that a short consultation would be inappropriate in cases where further investigation was indicated, which I should have thought would cover the vast majority of contentious matters.

Phil Ambrose, solicitor, Kingston upon Thames



Thursday, 26 January 2012

I have noticed in the past six months a markedly increased level of rejections being received from the Legal Services Commission in respect of claims for payment, for what can only be described as the most petty of reasons. These include, among many:

  • a character in the LSC certificate number being misprinted on the claim 1 form, despite there being ample evidence with the supporting papers of the correct character, including the LSC certificate itself;
  • counsel had not been paid their graduated fees, despite the fact that confirmation of payment of their fees was received the same day that the claim was rejected; and
  • detailing all the work undertaken on page 7 of the claim 1, then limiting our costs on page 7 to reflect the cost limitation. The LSC required that we limit the actual work done on page 4, as merely limiting our costs was not sufficient.

However, the straw that broke the camel’s back was a rejection of a claim in excess of £5,000 on the basis that there was a 1p differential in what was paid to counsel and what was claimed on our claim 1.

This was quickly rectified following a rather strongly worded letter of complaint. The LSC has stated that it is not engaging in a campaign to reject as many claims as possible, but I wonder how many other legal aid providers are suffering the same unjustified delays?

Darren Isaacs, London Law Cost Consultants, Halstead, Essex



Thursday, 26 January 2012

In the sympathetic sense of the word, I pity Jewels. The Legal Services Commission clearly does not. An LSC spokesman said: ‘We are sorry to learn that Jewels Solicitors have decided to go into administration and we are now working with the administrators to ensure the firm’s clients continue to get the help they need. With other providers in the area, we anticipate there will be no major impact on access to legal advice.’

And stuff the poor lawyer who risked his livelihood to serve those clients well for 30 years; and stuff the lawyers and support staff who toiled, probably for much less than an LSC wage, and have been thrown into unemployment by apparent incompetence. I guess the firm was also contributing hundreds of thousands of pounds to the government coffers in VAT and income tax each year. False economy?

And ‘sorry’! For what? On the face of this reported story, the LSC has delivered the coup de grace to Jewels without shame or concern, when it could have avoided this merely by honouring its own commitment. For that, surely the least the LSC could do would be apologise.

Gordon Brown, Gordon Brown Law Firm, Newcastle upon Tyne



Thursday, 26 January 2012

In discussing two recent bail decisions, Robin Tilbrook asks, rhetorically, whether racism is now worse than murder. The answer, of course, is that murder is worse, because the victim has no chance of recovery from the damage inflicted.
But why the need for comparison between two evils? The subliminal message, whether intended or not, is that society should not take racism too seriously. Mr Tilbrook even offers mitigation for the racist defendant - she was ‘perhaps intoxicated’ (would he regard that as mitigation for murder?).

Racism causes great distress to its victims and diminishes the perpetrator. History shows that it can easily lead to murder and, if allowed to take root in a society, to genocide and all manner of other abuse.

Any lawyer knows it is dangerous to comment on cases without knowing the full facts. I have no idea whether the bail decisions in question were justified. I don’t know all the facts. But nor, by his own admission, does Mr Tilbrook - he relies on press reports. He then compounds his error by using the cases for electioneering (he says that he intends to stand for election as the Essex law and order commissioner on a platform of replacing ‘politically correct social engineering’ with ‘good old-fashioned English common sense’ in the criminal justice system).

It is to be hoped that lawyers, at least, will reject such naked populism and aspire to a system of justice which condemns any form of seriously abusive behaviour, based on a rigorous examination of the facts.

David Thomas, solicitor, Chobham, Surrey



Thursday, 26 January 2012

Robin Tilbrook’s comments have left everybody in my office thoroughly perplexed. Is he unaware that those accused of a crime are considered innocent until proven guilty? Will he, on behalf of the English Democrats, stand up and call for the repeal of this longstanding approach to criminal law? If he accepts that an accused is innocent until proven guilty then I, at least, cannot see immediately why bail should be decided wholly upon ‘good old-fashioned English common sense’.

Clearly, the seriousness of an offence has a bearing upon the grant of bail, but it is not the be all and end all; there are far too many factors to even begin discussing here.

Personally, I’m also confused by the line about the racist comments ‘… it would not even have been a criminal offence before the Public Order Act’. Rape by a husband upon his wife was not considered an offence before R v R. Presumably there was also a point in history when murder was not considered an offence. So what?

Perhaps Mr Tilbrook should spend more time focusing on the spelling of England on his party’s website (where it currently appears as Egland) and not on inventing problems in the criminal justice system for him and his party to ‘solve’.

Nicholas Diable, Erica Peat & Diable, London E3



Thursday, 26 January 2012

If Mr Pearlman wishes to be called ‘doctor’, I suggest he studies for a PhD or LLD - quite different animals from the solicitor’s vocational qualification.

Dr Julian Critchlow, Fenwick Elliott, London WC2



Thursday, 19 January 2012

Franklin Sinclair in the letter ‘Zero Support’ has only himself to blame. There is no purpose in having unprintable feelings or shouting about ‘outrage’ when the solution is in his own hands. The moral is: don’t do work if there is no possibility of payment.

You can certainly get a good reputation by doing such work and no doubt put smiles on a lot of faces. But nobody of any influence in government or elsewhere is going to pay us to do work if, as a body, we have shown a willingness to do it free of charge.

Months ago there was a suggestion that payment for representation at police stations would come to an end. What happens? At least one major ‘player’ in criminal representation went on public record saying such a step would make no difference to them and that representation would continue as before.

Is there ever going to come a time when we put aside the pernicious doctrine of politically correct attitudes and spend just a small part of our time protecting and enhancing our own interests? Every passing day makes me more doubtful.

Reg Le Pla, Bradford



Thursday, 19 January 2012

I cannot be the only practising solicitor who finds the various and vastly different money laundering requirements within the financial industry to be utter nonsense. In one particular estate, I am one of three executors. The other two are my senior partner and a long-standing client.

We have a grant of probate issued and sealed by the High Court. The deceased had a modest investment with Legal & General worth less than £2,000, which we are seeking to cash. To do so the three executors must sign a form and add their dates of birth, home address and time at that address. In addition, Legal & General requires identification from them in the form of a passport, bank statement, driving licence or utility bill; there is a two-page list. This is unacceptable.

Perhaps the Law Society might do me and my fellow practitioners a service and get together with the financial services industry with a view to stopping this waste of time, resource and money.

David Endicott, Spratt Endicott, Banbury



Thursday, 19 January 2012

Institutional memory in the Crown Prosecution Service is notoriously short.

Many years ago, when I ran a CPS branch, some genius at CPS HQ had the same idea of a paperless office. Two bright young things visited me uttering the dreadful words ‘pilot scheme’.

I asked: ‘What happens when one court finishes early and offers to help out the court next door? How is the transfer effected?’ They looked baffled and asked ‘does this happen?’.

I responded that it probably happened in every courthouse in the country every day of the week, and that the system would not work without it. Nobody actually appreciated CPS cooperating in this way, but that was irrelevant!

They looked horrified and said, sadly, ‘well, nobody has told us!’. They left, crestfallen, and nothing more was heard of the idea.
With all the problems of government computer procurement, combined with defence intransigence and CPS management involvement, this idea is doomed to fail. I would put a small wager on no one having thought about cases being swapped between courts.

John Edwards,solicitor, Neston, Cheshire



Thursday, 19 January 2012

Geyve Walker claims to inhabit ‘the hard world of commerce’. When I became a solicitor, like Franklin Sinclair, it was into a profession and not a business that I stumbled. A professional person has a number of motivations, two of which are service and compassion.

John Alcock, Davis Blank Furniss, Manchester



Thursday, 19 January 2012

I read with interest the letters from Edward Foster and CJA Cope regarding ‘the point’ of mediation.

Cope ‘fails to understand how mediation can resolve a dispute which involves interpretation of [an] agreement’.

Mediation is great for resolving disputes and I do not think anyone doubts that, but its real power is in allowing both parties fully to appreciate the other’s point of view. I get both parties, using simple techniques, to consider the matter from the other party’s position. The key is for your client to understand firstly what their position, interests and needs (PIN) are, and then, secondly, their opponent’s PIN.

Moreover, using principled negotiation rather than positional negotiation is critical (see Getting to Yes by Fisher & Ury). The classic example in that book is the anecdote of two brothers fighting over an orange. Positionally, they both want the orange.

They can see no way to split the orange because they both want it all. Through principled negotiation (and, by analogy, mediation), each party’s PIN can be adduced. It turns out that one brother wants to make orange juice and one wants to grate the rind for a cake. The dispute can easily be resolved by splitting the orange differently. Each brother gets what they want and walks away happy.

Back to Cope’s letter. Mediation can definitely assist in the interpretation of an agreement; perhaps not legalistically arriving at an agreed interpretation of the clause. However, it can and will help the parties to understand where each other is coming from and to work out the underlying PIN of each party.

Steven Mather, accredited mediator, litigation solicitor, Josiah Hincks Solicitors, Leicester



Thursday, 12 January 2012

Is racism now worse than murder? A few weeks ago I heard about a couple of cases which, if accurately reported, gave me great concern about the politicised nature of our criminal justice system.

It was reported that there had recently been an instance where family members who had allegedly sexually assaulted and murdered an infant had been granted bail. Wouldn’t any ordinary ‘right-thinking’ member of the public expect automatic remand in custody?

Compare that case with the remand of the accused in a hyped incident where a perhaps intoxicated young woman mouthed off offensive obscenities and racist comments on public transport, but no one was hurt (indeed, it would not even have been a criminal offence before the Public Order Act).

I ask rhetorically which one of these two offences would ordinary right-thinking members of the public imagine that the criminal justice system would take most seriously? You have only to ask the question to know the answer, but instead it would appear that the system prioritises targeting an offensive public rant even over the rape and murder of a small child.

Obviously the law of England should be properly enforced, but it should be done so in a way which accords with the democratic will of the people of our nation. Next November the public will have the opportunity to rebalance the way that law and order issues are dealt with by voting for law and order commissioners.

I intend to stand for election to be the Essex law and order commissioner, and I can assure your readers (and the public) that, if elected, it will be my mission to inject a healthy dose of good old-fashioned English common sense into a system where it currently appears to be absolutely lacking. I shall also try to focus the system on justice rather than politically correct social engineering.

Robin Tilbrook, solicitor, chairman of the English Democrats