Practice; delay in judicial review -- R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales ex p Caswell and another
HL (Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Lowry): 17 May 1990
The applicants, whose claim under the exceptional hardship provisions of the Dairy Produce Quotas Regulations 1984 was unsuccessful, applied for and obtained leave to move for judicial review two years after the date of the decision. At the substantive hearing they conceded that there had been undue delay for the purposes of s. 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and RSC, ord 53, r.4. The judge held that the tribunal had erred in its construction of the regulations, but dismissed the application on the ground that to do otherwise would have been detrimental to good administration. The Court of Appeal [1989] 1 WLR 1089 dismissed the applicants' appeal. With leave of the court the applicants appealed.
Richard Gordon and Helen Rogers (instructed by Dawson & Co) for the applicants. George Pulman QC (Instructed by the solicitor, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) for the tribunal.
Lord Goff of Chieveley said that when s.31(6) and (7) referred to "an application for judicial review", those words had to be read as referring, where appropriate, to an application for leave to apply for judicial review. The effect of r. 4(1) was to limit the time within which an application for leave to apply for judicial review might be made in accordance with its terms, ie promptly and in any event within three months. The court had, however, power to grant leave to apply despite the fact that an application was late, if it considered that there was good reason to exercise that power. That it did by extending the period. The combined effect of s.31(7) and r. 4(1) was that there was undue delay within s.31(6) whenever the application for leave to apply was not made promptly and in any event within three months from the relevant date: see R v Stratford-on-Avon District Council, ex p. Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 1319. Even if the court considered that there was a good reason for delay, it might still refuse leave or, where leave had been granted, substantive relief, if in its opinion the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause hardship or prejudice, as specified in s.31(6), or would be detrimental to good administration. The judge's conclusion, on the evidence before him, that there was likely to be a very real problem in relation to a number of milk producers seeking similar relief and causing administrative problems, was a finding of fact with which there could be no reason to interfere. Once that conclusion was reached, it seemed inevitable that to grant the relief sought would cause detriment to good administration.
Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner and Lord Lowry agreed.
Appeal dismissed. (WLR)
