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Martin @ 21.09 - A significant point in the reasoning of the judgment is that access to the courts is so fundamental, that it takes express authority of parliament to restrict it.

The judgment doesn't say that parliament can't do this. It says the way that the *executive* did it was not sufficient. If the government want to place exactly the same fee structure in place, they can - but they need parliament to agree, rather than putting it in place via secondary regulations.

So rather than restricting or usurping the role of parliament, I would say the judgment recognises and indeed strengthens the role of parliament. Rather than saying the rule of law trumps absolutely everything, in my view the Supreme Court have acknowledged that Parliament does indeed have the power to restrict access to justice. But such a restriction has to be done properly.

You can however argue that it does indeed weaken the power of the executive (though personally I don't see that as a bad thing). A counter argument is that it simply reasserts what the position has always been: Parliament is supreme, not the executive.

That the executive are subject to the rule of law is not a new concept, and quite frankly it is a rather important one.