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I do indeed contend that Parliamentary rules and procedures are not 'law' (whether common or otherwise) in the sense of being matters that are susceptible to judicial scrutiny in a court of law. If it is law at all it is 'a law unto itself' in that, as the Parliament website makes clear, the practices and procedures are matters of gradual development within the Houses themselves over centuries. For example, the website says: "Much of parliamentary procedure has developed through continued use over the centuries and is not written in the Standing Orders. This is sometimes known as 'custom and practice.' The practice of bills being 'read' three times in both Houses is not in the Standing Orders for example. Other procedures have developed through precedents such as rulings made by the Speaker and resolutions of the House." No mention is made anywhere of any role for the courts in interpreting or applying these practices and procedures (not surprising, really, given Art 9 of the Bill of Rights).

Of course, I agree that the courts "have quite a lot to do with what is said and done within the walls of Parliament". Again, hardly surprising given that Parliament makes the statute law that the courts must apply. But it is a one-way street in that Parliament says what the law is and the courts then interpret that law for those who come before them (including nowadays with the assistance of reference where appropriate to the Parliamentary debates as recorded in Hansard). The courts do not tell Parliament how to go about its business in accordance with the practice and procedure that Parliament lays down for itself to follow.

The courts' review of secondary legislation does not interfere with Parliamentary supremacy but upholds it, by requiring Ministers purporting to exercise their powers to create secondary legislation to do so only in accordance with, and not beyond, the powers conferred on them by Parliament.

As regards the Article 50 case, the Supreme Court, again, did not interfere with Parliamentary supremacy but upheld it, by holding that the Crown had no power to trigger Article 50 by using the Royal prerogative. The effect of this was that the triggering of Article 50 required the necessary power to act to be conferred by Parliament enacting suitable legislation, but the decision did not impose any obligation on Parliament to do so - Parliament remained free to legislate or not legislate in the matter, as it saw fit. Of course, in political terms, the Government found little difficulty in persuading Parliament to pass the primary legislation needed to allow the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU to give notice under Article 50. However, that is a matter of the Government using its political influence on Parliament, not a matter of the courts attempting to bind Parliament in its actions.

The effect of the Factortame litigation is discussed in the Article 50 case. Effectively, Parliament, by enacting the European Communities Act 1972, provided for EU law to have precedence over all domestic sources of UK law, including statute law. However, the supremacy of Parliament was not thereby negated since, as the Article 50 judgment confirmed (para 60) - "Of course, consistently with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, this unprecedented state of affairs [i.e. the current overriding nature of EU law] will only last so long as Parliament wishes: the 1972 Act can be repealed like any other statute." The so-called Great Repeal Bill will do this if and when enacted.