We all have expectations. Some, like Dickens’ Pip, may have Great Expectations. But, great or otherwise, expectations aren’t always ‘legitimate’. For that is a question of law. So if a councillor apparently gives a binding commitment to a meeting that a proposal will not happen if residents oppose it, would that create a legally recognised legitimate expectation? This was the issue before Mrs Justice Lieven when on 14 April she gave judgment in R (Grantchester Parish Council) v Greater Cambridge Partnership [2025] EWHC 923 (Admin).
The case concerned a challenge to the decision of the Greater Cambridge Partnership (GCP), a joint committee set up under section 102(1)(b) of the Local Government Act 1972, to develop infrastructure (with substantial central government funding) to progress a greenway (the Haslingfield Greenway (HG)), through Grantchester village. At issue was whether councillor Bridget Smith, a member of the GCP executive board, gave a binding commitment at a meeting on 17 October 2022 that the route of the HG would not go through Grantchester if the residents were opposed to it. Two members of the parish council present at the meeting contend that the commitment was given but Peter Blake, head of transport at GCP and Smith both said that it was not given. The case is unusual since on 20 September 2024 Lang J ordered cross-examination of five witnesses, and their evidence was before Lieven J.
The two grounds of the parish council challenge were: 1. (i) whether there was a binding legitimate expectation that the ‘through Grantchester’ route for the HG would not be progressed if Grantchester residents did not support it; (ii) even if the promise allegedly made by Smith did not give rise to a binding legitimate expectation, did it amount to a material consideration which the GCP was required to take into consideration when making the decision; and 2. whether any rational decision-maker would have undertaken further investigation of the dispute as to whether a promise had been made, pursuant to the principle in Secretary of State for Education v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014.
Whether or not any statement can give rise to a legitimate expectation depends upon the precise factual and legal context in which such statements were made. Lieven J considered that there are three key stages: ‘was there a clear and unambiguous commitment; was it reasonable for the promisee (here the parish council) to rely upon it; would it be inappropriate to allow the promisee to enforce the commitment’. In United Policyholders v AG of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1 WLR 3383 at [37] Lord Neuberger said that: ‘In the broadest of terms, the principle of legitimate expectation is based on the proposition that, where a public body states that it will do (or not do) something, a person who has reasonably relied on the statement should, in the absence of good reasons, be entitled to rely on the statement and enforce it through the courts. Some points are plain. First, in order to found a claim based on the principle, it is clear that the statement in question must be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”, according to Bingham LJ in R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545’. Moreover, ‘the principle cannot be invoked if, or to the extent that, it would interfere with the public body’s statutory duty – see e.g. Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629’. ‘The burden of establishing a commitment which is clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification rests on the person asserting it, see Re Finucane [2019] HRLR 187.’ ‘The next stage of the analysis is whether if such a clear and unequivocal statement was made, whether it was reasonable to place reliance upon it, and whether any such reliance was “legitimate”.’
In the circumstances, Lieven J accepted on the facts that it is ‘inherently unlikely that Smith would have given a binding commitment’. For she is a highly experienced local councillor and fully aware of the limitation on her power to bind other councillors or the council. So: ‘To give such a binding commitment at an informal meeting, when she knew she had no power to do so, would have been a fairly extraordinary thing to do’. Furthermore, Smith did not strike Lieven J as being at all likely to have made an error of such magnitude. And it ‘would have been even more surprising given that the other executive members of the GCP came from different councils, so Smith would have had even less justification to feel she could bind their decision-making’. But even if a clear unequivocal statement was made, it was not reasonable for the parish council to believe that it would bind the GCP.
Ground 1 therefore failed since, on the evidence, no binding commitment had been given and so GCP plainly did not have to take it into account. Regarding ground 2 and the Tameside duty, the scope of this duty is context-specific and (subject to a rationality challenge) it is for the decision-maker (and not the court) to decide upon the manner and intensity of inquiry to be undertaken into any relevant factor. This ground was therefore rejected and in all the circumstances, the claim was dismissed.
The case demonstrates that while public bodies and their representatives do need to be careful about making promises that can be misconstrued, potential claimants have a considerable burden of proof to establish the core ingredients of legitimate expectation.
Nicholas Dobson writes on local government, public law and governance
No comments yet