Decisions and interventions

The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ordered that the respondent should be reprimanded.  

While in practice as a solicitor and the sole practitioner at CLP Care Funding Solicitor, the respondent had failed to cooperate with the Legal Ombudsman and had failed to comply with their directions, thereby: breaching principles 2, 6 and 7 of the SRA Principles 2011 and, for conduct after 25 November 2019, principles 2 and 5 of the SRA Principles 2019; failing to achieve outcome 10.6 of the Code of Conduct 2011; and breaching paragraph 7.3 of the Code of Conduct for Solicitors 2019.

She had failed to cooperate with the SRA investigation into that matter and had thereby breached principles 2 and 5 of the 2019 Principles, and paragraph 7.3 of the 2019 code.

In the absence of any information from the respondent, who had not engaged with the proceedings, her motivation for the misconduct could not be determined and neither could it be said whether it had been planned or spontaneous. She had not breached a position of trust. However, as an experienced solicitor, she should not have conducted herself in the way that she had.

There appeared to have been no dishonesty, no concealment, no criminal activity, no bullying or preying upon the vulnerable. The respondent had been of hitherto good character with an unblemished disciplinary record. The harm caused was relatively low and limited in nature. 

A reprimand would be imposed where the SDT had determined that the seriousness of a respondent’s misconduct justified a sanction at the lowest level, and that the protection of the public and the reputation of the legal profession did not require a greater sanction.

A sanction of greater severity would have been disproportionate in all the circumstances of the present case, and the respondent was, accordingly, reprimanded.

The respondent was ordered to pay costs of £2,500.

The SDT ordered that the respondent should be struck off the roll. 

While in practice as a director at Michael W Halsall Solicitors Ltd, the respondent had, between 2015 and 2020, on three client matters made statements which were apt to lead the clients to believe that their personal injury claims had succeeded when he knew or ought to have known that they had failed. He had thereby breached principles 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the SRA Principles 2011; failed to achieve outcome 1.2 of the SRA Code of Conduct; and breached: principles 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the SRA 2019 Principles and paragraph 1.4 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs and RFLs. His conduct was dishonest.

Between 3 October 2018 and 14 August 2020, on three client matters without proper valuation, he had paid money to clients after their claims had failed, thereby: breaching principles 2, 4 and 6 of the SRA Principles 2011; failing to achieve outcome 1.2 of the SRA Code of Conduct; and breaching principles 2, 5 and 7 of the SRA Principles 2019 and paragraph 3.2 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs and RFLs. 

The respondent had admitted the first allegation in full, including dishonesty. He also acknowledged that there were no exceptional circumstances and the only sanction which could be imposed was strike-off from the roll.

The SDT could not dislodge the inherent seriousness of the admitted misconduct and, absent exceptional circumstances, it was constrained as to the sanction it should impose. 

The respondent was ordered to pay costs of £5,715.

The SDT ordered that the respondent should be suspended from practice for 12 months from 22 January 2025. It further ordered that, upon the expiry of that fixed term of suspension, the respondent should be subject to the following conditions imposed indefinitely by the SDT: that the respondent might not (i) practise as a sole practitioner or sole manager or sole owner of an authorised or recognised body; or as a freelance solicitor; or as a solicitor in an unregulated organisation; (ii) be a partner or member of a limited liability partnership, legal disciplinary practice or alternative business structure or other authorised or recognised body; (iii) be a head of legal practice/compliance officer for legal practice or a head of finance and administration/compliance officer for finance and administration; (iv) hold client money; (v) be a signatory on any client account; or (vi) work as a solicitor other than in employment approved by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, with liberty to either party to apply to the SDT to vary those conditions. 

While in practice as a freelance solicitor, from around 28 February 2022 to at least around 25 July 2022, the respondent had undertaken immigration work as a solicitor when he was neither a recognised sole practitioner nor a manager, employee or member of an authorised body. He had therefore breached principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2019 and regulations 9.5 and 10.1 of the SRA Authorisation of Individuals Regulations 2019. 

There had been a significant failure by the respondent to ensure requisite understanding of and compliance with the regulatory obligations incumbent upon him as a solicitor practising immigration law. The allegations arose from a continuing course of conduct, notwithstanding the repeated warnings from his regulator. The respondent’s culpability was high. 

The respondent had blamed others for his misconduct and had persisted in that submission during the substantive hearing. He had made submissions during his mitigation that indicated an ongoing failure on his part to understand the regulatory obligations for compliant immigration practice. 

The respondent lacked insight and a proper understanding of the seriousness of his actions. He remained unaware of the basis of his wrongdoing. 

As part of his rehabilitation the SDT would expect that, before he sought to return to practice, the respondent would have taken steps through further training and education to properly understand his regulatory obligations and the purpose of those regulations.

The respondent was ordered to pay costs of £9,500.

The SDT ordered that the respondent should be struck off the roll.   

While in practice as a solicitor, the respondent had raped person A, resulting in his conviction before the Crown court of the offence of rape of a woman of 16 years or over, contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, thereby breaching principles 2 and 5 of the SRA Principles 2019.

The respondent did not attend the hearing. The SDT found proved to the requisite standard that by reason of his conviction the respondent’s conduct had lacked integrity and amounted to a breach of the requirement to behave in a way which maintained the trust placed by the public in him, the profession and in the provision of legal services (respectively principles 5 and 2 of the 2019 Principles).

At the time of the incident, the respondent was the manager and a partner at the firm. 

Following his conviction, the respondent was sentenced to 54 months’ imprisonment. That was increased to eight years’ imprisonment by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on review, following referral by the attorney-general on the basis that the original sentence imposed at the Crown court had been unduly lenient.

The SDT had reviewed all the material before it and was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the facts had been proved by the applicant.

The respondent had been convicted of an inherently and self-evidently serious offence.

There was no doubt that the respondent had committed an egregious abuse of trust upon a vulnerable victim and the impact of his conduct had wrought the most terrible damage upon the victim.

There was no mitigation. For conduct of the nature of that in the present case there were no words within the lexicon of regulatory and disciplinary conduct adequate to express the damage the respondent had caused to the victim and to the reputation of the profession. The misconduct was of such a degree that the public and the profession could expect no lesser sanction than for the respondent’s name to be struck from the roll. 

The respondent was ordered to pay costs of £6,250.

On 16 June 2025, the Adjudication Panel resolved to intervene into the above-named firm, formerly at Central House, 62-64 Bounces Road, Edmonton N9 8JS, and into the former sole practice of Lambert Ukpabi at the firm.

The firm closed on 16 May 2024 and entered voluntary liquidation on 17 July 2024.

The ground of intervention into Ukpabi’s practice was: Ukpabi had failed to comply with the rules made under sections 31 and 32 of the Solicitors Act 1974 (as amended) – paragraph 1(1)(c) of Schedule 1 to the act.

The grounds of intervention into Clifton Day Solicitors Ltd were:

• A relevant insolvency event has occurred in relation to the firm – paragraph 32 (1)(c) of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1985 (as amended).
• Ukpabi, as manager of the firm, and the firm itself had failed to comply with the rules applicable to them as a manager of the firm and the firm itself by virtue of section 9 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985 (as amended) – paragraph 32(1)(a) of Schedule 2 to that act.

John Owen of Gordons LLP, 1 New Augustus Street, Bradford BD1 5LL (tel: 0113 227 0377; email: intervention@gordonsllp.com) has been appointed to act as intervention agent. The intervention notices were served on 18 June 2025.

Ukpabi’s practising certificate has been suspended as a result of the intervention.

On 20 June 2025, the Adjudication Panel resolved to intervene into the above-named recognised body, formerly at 21 Grand Parade, Green Lanes, Harringay, London N4 1LA. The director at the firm is Chris Christodoulou. The firm closed on 31 January 2025. The ground for intervention was:

• It was necessary to intervene to protect the interests of the former clients of the firm – paragraph 32(1)(e) of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1985 (as amended).

Chris Evans of Lester Aldridge, Russell House, Oxford Road, Bournemouth BH8 8EX (tel: 01202 786341; email: interventions@la-law.com) has been appointed as intervention agent. 

The first date of attendance was 26 June 2025.

On 23 June 2025, the SRA intervened into the recognised body, Bolton-Jones & Co, the practice of Stephen Barton and the practice of Andrew Tyl-Lasota. The firm had one office at 3 Menlove Avenue, Liverpool L18 1LS. 

The grounds of intervention into the practice of Stephen Barton were:

• Barton had failed to comply with the SRA Accounts Rules (2019) which are rules made under section 32 of the Solicitors Act 1974 (as amended) – paragraph 1(1)(c) Schedule 1, Solicitors Act 1974.
• It was necessary to intervene to protect the interests of clients (or former or potential clients) of Barton, and/or the interests of the beneficiaries of any trust of which Barton is or was a trustee – paragraph 1(1)(m) Schedule 1, Solicitors Act 1974.

The grounds of intervention into the practice of Andrew Tyl-Lasota were:

• Tyl-Lasota had failed to comply with the SRA Accounts Rules (2019) which are rules made under section 32 of the Solicitors Act 1974 (as amended) – paragraph 1(1)(c) Schedule 1, Solicitors Act 1974.
• It was necessary to intervene to protect the interests of clients (or former or potential clients) of Tyl-Lasota, and/or the interests of the beneficiaries of any trust of which Tyl-Lasota is or was a trustee – paragraph 1(1)(m) Schedule 1, Solicitors Act 1974.

The grounds of intervention into Bolton-Jones & Co were:

• Barton and Tyl-Lasota as managers of the firm and the firm itself had failed to comply with the SRA Accounts Rules (2019) which are rules applicable to them as managers of the firm and the firm itself by virtue of section 9 of the Administration of Justice Act 1085 (as amended) – paragraph 32(1)(e) Schedule 2, Administration of Justice Act 1985.
• It was necessary to protect the interests of clients (or former or potential clients) of the firm and/or the interests of the beneficiaries of any trust of which the firm is or was a trustee – paragraph 32(1)(e) Schedule 2, Administration of Justice Act 1985.

The practising certificates of Stephen Barton and Andrew Tyl-Lasota were immediately suspended as a result of the intervention.

John Owen of Gordons LLP, 1 New Augustus Street, Bradford BD1 5LL (tel: 0113 227 0374; email: intervention@gordonsllp.com) has been appointed as intervention agent.