CriminalAppeal - proceedings brought by public authority - whether convention rights retrospectiveR v Kansal (No 2): (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hutton): 29 November 2001In 1992 the defendant was convicted of offences under section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 and section 354 of the Insolvency Act 1986 after a trial at which the prosecution had adduced evidence of answers given by the defendant under compulsion in his bankruptcy proceedings.

Following the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, which by section 22(4) provided that persons who were victims of an unlawful act within section 6(1) of the Act were entitled, in 'proceedings' brought against them by a public authority, to rely on their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights even if the act took place before the Act came into force, the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the convictions back to the Court of Appeal.

Applying section 22(4), the Court of Appeal held that the use of the compulsorily obtained evidence in 1992, though otherwise lawful, had been in breach of article 6 of the European convention.

It quashed the convictions.

The Crown appealed.John McGuinness QC and James Eadie (instructed by Department of Trade and Industry Legal Services (Prosecutions)) for the Crown.

Ivan Krolick and Lindsay Weinstein (instructed by Campbell Chambers) for the defendant.

Ben Emmerson QC, Murray Hunt and Piers Gardner (instructed by Stephenson Harwood, by Mishcon de Reya and by Peters & Peters) for Isidore Jack Lyons, Gerald Maurice Ronson and Anthony Keith Parnes, intervening.

Held, allowing the appeal, that following the Court of Appeal decision, it had been held by a majority of the House of Lords in R v Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 that the Human Rights Act 1998 was retrospective in respect of proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority but not in respect of appeals in those proceedings.

That decision was to be followed (Lord Hope of Craighead dissenting) even though (per Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn) the reasoning of the majority in that case was mistaken; and that, accordingly, applying Lambert, the defendant had not been entitled to rely on the section 22(4) retrospectivity provision.

(WLR)