Family law

Property not recovered or preserved on compromise of proceedingsIn Morgan and others v Legal Aid Board [2000] NLJ 583, Neuberger J considered the extent to which property received as a result of the compromise of court proceedings could be subject to the statutory charge as property which is the subject of a compromise of proceedings (Legal Aid Act 1988 s.16(7)).

In Morgan, farmers owed money to a bank, which was charged on their land.

Subsequently there was litigation between the bank and the farmers which was compromised by the land, which had not been in issue in the litigation, being released from the charges.

If in issue, property is subject to the charge.

If not in issue can it be said to be recovered or preserved by being substituted in some way for rights, claims or property which were in issue.

Here release of the charge was a by-product of the settlement; and in those circumstances the charge could not arise.

By contrast in Van Hoorn v Law Society [1985] QB 106, [1984] FLR 203, Balcombe J, Mrs Van Hoorn received on property in substitution for another which was in issue.

The charge was held to apply.

Access to Justice Act 1999 s.10(7) makes similar provision for attaching the statutory charge as does s.16(7).

Civil litigation miscellanyA pot-pourri of civil litigation cases, with family law undertones, appeared in The Times, 4 April.

A without prejudice offer in correspondence which is accepted is a contract: the correspondence ceases to be privileged.

If the offeree accepted the offer but asked for 'indulgence', such as for time to pay, then, provided that the acceptance was otherwise unconditional, there was an agreement.

So held the Court of Appeal in Society of Lloyds v Twinn and another.

This case may be of relevance on the construction of an agreement following Calderbank correspondence.All-in-One Design and Build Ltd v Motcomb Estates Ltd held that the rules had power to provide for interest on a Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r.36.21 offer.

Rule 36.21 is in similar terms to the dreaded new - from 6 June - Family Proceedings Rules 1991 r.2.69C.

Interest on an offer is all right; but what about interest on a lump sum under r.2.69C? All-in-One holds that interest under Supreme Court Act 1981 s.35A gives the court power to compensate a claimant for being kept out of his money.

Rule 36.21 is additional to that.

Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.23(6) (interest on a lump sum) is more restrictive.

Will the All-in-One approach apply to interest under r.2.29C; or can that be said to be ultra vires?And in Fryer v Pearson and another the Court of Appeal admonished a barrister for speaking of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) - a term not readily comprehensible to those for whose benefit it existed.

Fee hike: ancillary relief affected Most commercially minded people, faced with a drop in customers, reduce their prices.

Not so the Lord Chancellor.

Faced with a drop in issue of process and to meet his budget the head of our judiciary raises fees, thereby, perhaps, reducing further access to justice; and perhaps to guarantee a further hike next year.

Perhaps he could take on an economist - or a shopkeeper - to train him in the ways of attracting business.

Or he could go back to the days (before his predecessor) when justice was a service rather than a government-sponsored trade.For the family lawyer, the change to watch is that an application for ancillary relief increased to 80 from 25 April 2000; and there are eased fees on detailed assessment.

by David Burrows, David Burrows, Bristol