Judicial review

Delay judge finding applicant acted promptly relief refused at substantive hearing on grounds of delay circumstances in which respondent permitted to raise delay at substantive hearingR (Lichfield Securities Ltd) v Lichfield DC and Another; CA (Lords Justices Potter, Sedley, Jonathan Parker); 8 March 2001The applicant sought permission to apply for an order to quash a decision of the planning authority.

At the hearing, with all parties present, the judge found that the applicant had acted promptly and granted permission.

At the substantive hearing, the judge refused the relief sought, which he would otherwise have granted, on grounds of delay.

The applicant appealed.

John Taylor QC and Gregory Jones (instructed by Wilbraham & Co, Leeds) for the applicant; David Mole QC and Ian Dove (instructed by Moseley Chapman & Skemp, Lichfield) for the first respondent; Mark Lowe QC (instructed by Wragge & Co, Birmingham) for the second respondent.Held, allowing the appeal, that regardless of whether it involved repetition of arguments on promptness already considered at the permission stage, section 31(6)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 placed undue delay on the agenda at the substantive hearing; that, in circumstances such as had arisen, a respondent should be permitted to recanvass, by way of undue delay, an issue of promptness decided at the leave stage in the applicants favour only (i) if the judge hearing the initial application had expressly so indicated, (ii) if new and relevant material was introduced on the substantive hearing, (iii) if, exceptionally, the issues as they had developed at the full hearing put a different aspect on the question of promptness, or (iv) if the first judge had overlooked some relevant matter or otherwise reached a decision per incuriam.