Official caution challenged in judicial review proceedings - proceedings 'criminal cause or matter' - no appeal lying to Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

R (Aru) v Chief Constable of Merseyside: CA (Lords Justice Waller, Longmore and Maurice Kay): 30 January 2004

The applicant had accepted an official caution relating to an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.

He sought judicial review of the lawfulness and procedural correctness of the caution.

Mr Justice Elias dismissed the claim.

He sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the judge's findings of fact, but the Civil Appeal Office ordered that there was no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

He appealed with permission of a single Lord Justice.

Leslie Thomas (instructed by Jackson & Canter, Liverpool) for the applicant; John de Bono (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard for the Solicitor, Merseyside Police, Liverpool) for the Chief Constable.

Held, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, that the words in section 18(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 were 'criminal cause or matter', not 'proceedings'; that the words 'or matter' denoted a wider ambit; that an official caution was another way of disposing of a criminal matter; that it was necessary to regard the inherent nature and consequences of an official caution and the question of the relevance of the caution in relation to good character; that a contrast could be drawn with proceedings relating to anti-social behaviour orders, which were civil not criminal because they had a preventative purpose; and that, in all those circumstances, an official caution was a 'criminal cause or matter' and so the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Judgment given to parties in draft - judge producing revised judgment after representations by parties - judge's obligation to alter judgment

Robinson v Bird and others: CA (Lord Justice Peter Gibson, Lord Justice May and Lord Justice Mance): 19 December 2003

The claimant had been granted a lifetime gift of 205,000, being sale proceeds of her mother's house.

On her mother's death, the residuary estate was 330,000.

Her mother's will provided for additional payment to the claimant as beneficiary of 75,000 and to the other beneficiary D, a minor and patient, payment of 255,000 on his attaining age 25.

The claimant applied for a greater proportion of the residuary estate.

After the hearing, the judge sent the parties' legal representatives a draft judgment.

Counsel for the third defendant, D, wrote to the judge asserting that the judge's reasoning had not expressly applied the two-stage test under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

The judge invited brief written submissions on that point.

The judge then provided a draft of a revised judgment which reached a different conclusion from that in the first draft.

The claimant objected, but the judge duly handed down the judgment rejecting the claim.

The claimant appealed.

Charles Holbech (instructed by Arbeid & Goldstein) for the claimant; Gerald Wilson (instructed by Hodge Jones & Allen) for the third defendant.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that whether to exercise the inherent jurisdiction to alter a judgment given to the parties' legal representatives in draft depended on the circumstances of the case; that those circumstances would include the possibility and appropriateness of an appeal and the court in which the problem arose; that where the judge himself had decided that his draft judgment was wrong, he was not only entitled, but positively obliged, to alter it; and that, accordingly, there had been no procedural error and the judgment which was handed down could not properly be regarded as wrong.