The so-called Chabra jurisdiction with respect to freezing injunctions is an essential tool for those pursuing fraud. It allows an applicant to freeze assets held by those other than the defendant, where it can establish that it is likely to be able to enforce an eventual judgment against those assets.
However, powerful tools such as Chabra freezing orders face challenges where defendants and/or assets move across borders. In Gilbert v Broadoak Private Finance Ltd & Others [2026] EWHC 153 (KB), David Quest KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, considered the jurisdiction to permit service out of a Chabra‑based worldwide freezing order against two respondents in Spain.
The decision is important in understanding the jurisdictional limits that will restrict the use of the Chabra jurisdiction. The result, whereby the judge was compelled to discharge the injunction for lack of jurisdiction to serve out, is another nudge that may lead the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to revisit the service out gateways.
Background
The claimants had already obtained judgment for £4.2m against Broadoak, an English property‑finance company controlled by a Mr Bleakley. They alleged that substantial sums had been diverted to his estranged wife, Mrs Bleakley, and to King Street Capital SL, a Spanish company. A without‑notice worldwide freezing order was granted against both respondents on
4 August 2025. At the return date, following disclosure of extensive assets having been transferred without consideration to Mrs Bleakley and King Street Capital, the key issue was whether any CPR practice direction 6B gateway permitted service out.
Analysis of the service out gateways
In an effort to maintain the Chabra freezing injunction, the judgment creditor sought to rely on a variety of the CPR PD 6B gateways to justify the service out of the jurisdiction of the proceedings.
Gateways 2, 3, 10 or 11 – ingenious attempts at reinvention?
Several of the gateways considered can be addressed rather briefly. They reflected well-trodden attempts by the victims of fraud to shoehorn their application into one of the gateways. In particular:
1. Gateway 2 was relied on, by which Mrs Bleakley (who held a UK bank account) might be required to ‘do something within the jurisdiction’, presumably being to pay money from her UK bank account. Unfortunately for victims of fraud, established authority rejects gateway 2 in freezing injunction cases.
2. Gateway 3 requires a ‘real issue to be tried’ between the claimants and an anchor defendant, in respect of which it is reasonable to join the out-of-jurisdiction defendant. Here, rather fundamentally, the proceedings were concluded against Mr Bleakley (against whom judgment had been obtained), so there was no issue to be tried. An ingenious attempt to make him party to the Chabra application (and treat that as an ‘issue to be tried’) was similarly doubted by the judge.
3. Gateway 10 applies only to claims to enforce a judgment. A Chabra freezing application is not a claim to enforce a judgment; it is only ancillary relief to assist with enforcement. The deputy judge followed Linsen International Ltd v Humpuss Sea Transport Pte Ltd and held that gateway 10 could not apply.
4. Gateway 11 would allow service out where the claim principally relates to property within the jurisdiction. The claimants argued that the judgment debt was a chose in action located in England, but the deputy judge more conventionally held that the ‘subject matter’ of the application was the respondents’ assets abroad, not the debt itself.
Gateway 20 – an ‘intriguing possibility’ ended?
What remained for the court to consider was gateway 20, which is the ‘catch-all’ fallback gateway for service out. The claimant highlighted some judicial debate and legal scholarship that suggested gateway 20 was an ‘intriguing possibility’ for service out of freezing injunctions. This included talks given by highly experienced Commercial Court judges Foxton J and Henshaw J. An attempt was made to make an application on that basis in Commercial Bank of Dubai v Al Sari, but it was not determined.
Despite the possibility being trailed by judges, the court in this case held that section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 does not ‘allow proceedings to be brought’ but simply gives the court remedial powers within proceedings that are already properly before it. This conclusion was reached on the basis of previous authority and also on policy grounds. There was a concern that permitting service out through gateway 20 would permit further claims against the same defendant under gateway 4A arising out of the same or closely connected facts, rendering the gateway system redundant.
The result was that there was no gateway through which the Chabra application could pass. Both the injunction and permission to serve out were set aside.
The judgment demonstrates that Chabra relief against foreign respondents requires strict compliance with the CPR PD 6B service out gateways. Other factors, such as strong evidence of unjustified dissipation, cannot cure the absence of jurisdiction. After final judgment, gateway 3 will generally be unavailable, and the remaining gateways (for example, enforcement, property and enactment) do not readily apply to Chabra relief in a cross‑border context, though permission to appeal has been granted and it remains to be seen whether the Court of Appeal will be willing to expand the scope for service out in such cases. Early and careful jurisdictional analysis is essential, particularly in cases involving overseas respondents holding foreign assets.
Jason Woodland, partner at Peters & Peters, is a committee member of the LSLA. Cara Haslam (legal researcher at Peters & Peters) and Philip Gardner (senior associate) also contributed to the article
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