The decision last week that Reverend Moon must have the chance to respond to allegations against him when applying for entry clearance confirms the importance the courts now attach to the duty to act fairly.Over the last few years there has been a sea-change in judicial attitudes.

As Lord Mustill pointed out in R v Home Secretary, ex p Doody [1994] AC 531, the recent cases show a perceptible trend towards insisting on greater openness or 'transparency' in making administrative decisions.In Ex p Doody, in which the rights of mandatory life prisoners to make written representations about time to be served in prison was confirmed, Lord Mustill set out basic principles which have led to a significant extension of the pr inciples of natural justice.

These are:-- where an act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all circumstances; -- the standards of fairness are not immutable and change over time, both in general and in their application to particular cases; -- principles of fairness cannot be applied by rota, but depend on the context of the decision in questions; -- an essential feature of the context is the statute creating the discretion, in terms of the language and shape of the administrative system within which the decision is taken; -- fairness will often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations, either before the decision to produce a favourable result or after the decision to ensure its modification, or both; and-- since the person affected cannot usually make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors weigh against his interest, fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case he has to meet.The sharpest disputes have arisen in prison cases.

R v Parole Board, ex p Wilson [1992] QB 740 held that a prisoner was entitled to all the reports before the parole board in advance of its decision as to whether he should be released on licence? (see R v Home Secretary, ex p Georghiades [1992] 5 Admin LR 457).

R v Home Secretary, ex p Duggan [1994] 3 All ER 277 ruled that a category A prisoner was entitled to be informed of the gist of any facts or opinions relevant to his security categorisation.

These principles were extended to victims of miscarriages of justice in R v Home Secretary, ex p Hickey No 2 [1995] 1 WLR 734.

Where a convicted prisoner asks the home secretary to refer his conviction to the Court of Appeal, the interests of fairness and informed decision-making now require that the petitioner be given sufficient disclosure to present his case effectively.The failure to disclose relevant material in advance will mean that an adversarial hearing, such as a police disciplinary hearing (see R v Ministry of Defence Police, ex p Bryne [1994] COD 429), and even statutory inquiry into homelessness will be unlawful because the duty to act fairly has been breached (see R v Poole CC, ex p Cooper [1994] The Independent, 13 October).The one exception to the general rule concerns those seeking political asylum.

Under the 1993 legislation a fast track procedure has been introduced for asylum seekers where the home secretary certifies that an asylum claim is without foundation.Even though asylum decisions have such an impact on life and liberty that only the highest standards of fairness will suffice (see R v Home Secretary, ex p Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514 and R v Home Secretary, ex p Thirukumar [1989] Imm AR 402), the Court of Appeal decided in Home Secretary v Abdi [1994] Imm AR 402 that the Home Office was not obliged to disclose its evidence for saying that it was safe to return the applicant to the third country from which he had arrived.

The court could not impose additional obligations to secure fairness because that would frustrate the purpose of legislation in achieving a quick determination.Ex p Doody also confirmed that there is no general duty for a public body to give reasons for its decisions.

However, the duty to act fairly can imply an obligation to provide reasons, and in R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 421 it was held that such an implied duty ari ses for a decision where: first the subject matter is of an interest so highly regarded by the law, eg, personal liberty, that fairness requires reasons as of right; or secondly where the decision appears aberrant, fairness requires reasons so that the recipient can see if the abberation is real and challengeable.

Consequently, there was no implied duty to give reasons where the decision in question involved pure matters of academic judgment.

Whether the reasons given by a decision maker are adequate and lawful depends on the context in which they are given.Rigorous standards apply in homelessness cases.

In R v Southwark LB, ex p Davies [1993] 26 HLR 677, it was held that the local authority must spell out its conclusion on the main issue it had to decide (see R v Sefton MBC, ex p Healis [1994] The Times, 2 May; R v Wandsworth LBC, ex p Hawthorne, [1991] The Times, 14 July and R v Islington LB, ex p Hinds [1994] 27 HLR 65).A similar approach was taken about the reasons given by an immigration adjudicator (see R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Shahim Begum [1995] The Times, 15 February).

On the other hand, a more broad brush method is appropriate in education cases (see W v Education Appeal Committee [1994] ELR 530; R v Lancashire CC, ex p M [1994] ELR 478 and R v Lancashire CC, ex p M [1995] ELR 136).The doctrine of legitimate expectations has its roots in the idea of a duty to act fairly.

Uncertainties about the proper scope for the doctrine were resolved by Simon Brown LJ in R v Devon CC, ex p Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73 where he identified four different senses in which the phrase 'legitimate expectation' is used as a substantive right or entitlement that the claimant asserts cannot be denied him; as the claimant's interest in some ultimate benefit he hopes to retain; as a right to a fair procedure; and as a procedure to be applied because of a public body's promise or past practice.