In criminal proceedings the proof required to convict is 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

In civil cases a party succeeds on a 'balance of probabilities'.

The differences have recently been highlighted yet again by the victory of a woman who obtained damages for rape when no successful prosecution had taken place.

But are there in reality different tests - and should there be?The need perceived (if it was) centuries ago to mark the seriousness with which the courts dealt with their responsibilities to protect the public interest in criminal cases may well have justified a higher standard of proof than in those cases where the claim had only a private individual interest or injury.

It seems to me that over the years since cases have been reported there have been many where the courts have shown indecisiveness and confusion as to the tests to be applied.

Often, that confusion has revealed an inability to distinguish standard from onus of proof, especially in cases where the onus shifts.Whether consciously or not, by the end of the last century courts were asserting that there was a distinction in the standard for criminal as opposed to civil cases, and the case of Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 is generally considered to have finally settled the 'beyond reasonable doubt' formula as being the test in crime.

I believe that the case dealt with the issue of the burden of proof, and there was no argument about the standard of proof at all.

For me, the most remarkable point about Woolmington is the time sequence.

The appellant killed his wife on 10 December 1934; was convicted on 14 February 1935 after the first trial jury disagreed; the House of Lords appeal was heard on 4 and 5 April 1935, and the reserved judgment given on 23 May 1935.

We cannot match that now!Despite Woolmington, cases have continued to exercise the minds of judges in the appeal courts over directions to juries which, it was said, confused rather than clarified the meaning of 'reasonable doubt'.

Eventually the formula 'satisfied so that they are sure' was accepted as an alternative (see R v Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059).

In R v Ching (1976) 63 CR App R 7, the Court of Appeal said: 'If judges stopped trying to define that which is almost impossible to define there would be fewer appeals.'Most of the cases concern appeals over directions to juries in criminal trials, but appeals in civil or family cases reflect an equal failure to settle the argument.

In Re Dellow's Will Trusts [1964] 1 WLR 451 this was said: 'It seems to me that in civil cases it is not so much that a different standard of proof is required in different circumstances varying according to the gravity of the issue, but...the gravity of the issue becomes part of the circumstances which the court has to take into consideration in deciding whether or not the burden of proof has been discharged.

The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it.' And in Re H; Re K [1989] 2 FLR 313, Stuart-Smith LJ said: 'Where serious allegations were made amounting to criminal or grossly immoral conduct, the degree of probability must be commensurate with the occasion and proportionate to the subject matter.'So, is there really a different standard now for crime and other cases? I would argue that in the very different conditions applying in the late 20th century, the time has come to say clearly that in all cases one standard of proof should be used.

Take one example: a man is charged with the theft of a tin of sardines; another man is sued for wrongful dismissal by his female employee who alleges sexual harassment.

For the public at large, which of these is more grave? If the latter, in a jurisdiction which still has two apparent standards of proof, then surely the higher standard should be the test in that case.If our former concerns related mainly to an environment when juries were not educated, cases were less complex, defendants could not even give evidence on their own behalf, and we had the death penalty, those days are gone.

So, let us settle on a formula for every case, criminal, civil or family, which is short and makes sense whether a jury is involved or not.

There is no longer the need to argue that public and private interest require different standards.

I do not believe that in fact in most cases this will lead to a different decision.