In an ideal world it woul d never happen.

Hearing dates for interlocutory applications would not be overlooked.

Defendants would not have the opportunity to strike out under CCR O 9 r 10.

You would remember to comply with automatic directions.

Your cases would proceed speedily in accordance with the time limits fixed by the rules.

However, all may not be lost if you are faced with striking out in one form or another since the court's approach will vary according to the category of the case.Failing to attend on an interlocutory applicationThe prospects of being able to return to the status quo ante and to have a re-hearing are not too remote.

The court has a discretion to reinstate and to set aside any orders made (RSC O 35 r 2: CCR 037 r 2).

Reinstatement will normally be allowed if not to do so would result in injustice and if costs are conceded (Hayman v Rowlands [1957] 1 All ER 321 CA).

The harsher regime set out by the Court of Appeal in Shocked v Goldschmidt [1998] 1 All ER 372 only applies if you fail to turn up for a trial.

Your starting point should be an open letter to the other side agreeing to pay its costs thrown away if they consent to reinstatement.

The court will expect an apology and an explanation since court time will also have been wasted.Failure to comply with an 'unless' orderThis is much more serious.

The reports are full of instances in which it has been said that orders are to be complied with.

An unless order should be seen as a last chance for a party to put a case in order.

However, if the failure to comply with the order is unintentional and unavoidable, the court may in the exercise of its discretion excuse the failure if this is in the overall interests of justice.

The principles are set out in Hytec Information Services Ltd v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 1066 CA.

In this context, the quality of the explanations and the excuses will need to be of a high standard.

An application to extend the time for compliance is even less likely to succeed following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lownes v Babcock Power Ltd The Times 19 February 1998.Order 17 rule 11Everyone should now be familiar with Bannister and Greig Middleton.

There are no signs of any new relaxations.

Little has happened on this topic since, except that you can now forget about automatic directions if the court has ordered that a defence is to be struck out and a fully pleaded defence is to be filed.

The timetable will not begin again when the new defence is filed (Figgett v Davies The Times 11 February 1998 CA).CCR order 9 rule 10This is the rule where time limits cannot be extended.

If there is no defence, admission or judgment within 12 months of service of a default summons, the action must be struck out, regardless of the circumstances.

However, the rule has been held not to apply where the time for service of the defence has been extended by agreement (Heer v Tutton [1995] 4 All ER 547 CA) and where the time for acceptance of a payment into court by a defendant who has not filed a defence extends beyond the strike-out date, the operation of the rule is suspended (Harding v Cartwright The Times 9 June 1997 CA).

Nor does the rule apply to cases in which the defence admits only liability, since this is not an 'admission' for the purposes of the rule (Parrott v Jackson [1996] PIQR 394 and Limb v Union Jack Removals Ltd & Anor The Times 17 February 1998).Want of prosecutionThere is not usually very much which can be done about delay, unless the other side is responsible for it.

Delay can be inordinate if i t exceeds the time prescribed by the rules and inordinate delay is prima facie inexcusable (Trill & Anor v Sacher & Ors [1993] 1 All ER 961 CA.

However, the onus is on the party applying to strike out and it is necessary to show a causal link between the delay and serious prejudice.

Study the judgment of Peter Gibson LJ in Shtun v Zalejska [1996] 3 All ER 411.

While specific evidence of prejudice is not required, all the circumstances have to be considered, including the affidavit evidence.

Successful resistance to an application to strike out will be more likely if the affidavits in support are vague on the issue of prejudice or if the affidavits in opposition can show that there will in reality be no significant prejudice.Delay as an abuse of processDelay resulting from a wholesale disregard of the time limits prescribed by the rules can now result in a striking-out even if there is no prejudice to the other party (Choraria v Sethia The Times 29 January 1998 CA).

Earlier indications that this principle would be applied only to extreme cases in which a party had no intention at all of pursuing a claim (Grovit v Doctor [1997] 2 All ER 417 HL) or to cases in the future (Arbuthnot Latham Bank Ltd v Trafalgar Holdings Ltd & Ors The Times 29 December 1997 CA) no longer apply.

However, the Court of Appeal has subsequently identified an escape route by holding in Miles v McGregor 23 January 1998 unreported that the principle should only be applied in exceptional cases where the conduct of the party in question amounts to a serious affront to the court.It is thus clear that, even at present, there are limited opportunities to avoid the consequences of strike-out.

It is also clear that the regime will become even more severe in the future.

The courts will be increasingly critical of excuses and even applications for extensions of time will be scrutinised more closely.

How then should problems which lead to delay be dealt with? First, you should operate a system which relates the progress of the case to the timetables applied by the rules and which enables the progress of the case to be regularly monitored.

Secondly, if you find that, for example, difficulties with legal aid are causing slippage, you should apply to the court quickly for directions and for an appropriate extension of the timetable.In relation to striking out, prevention is far better than the uncertain prospect of a cure.