Q: We have read the points made in this column about the automatic stay of proceedings under CPR PD 51 para 19.

The panel advised that a defendant could apply to withdraw money in court without applying for the para 19 stay to be lifted.

But the glossary to the CPR defines a stay as 'imposing a halt on proceedings'.

If the court makes an order for payment out this surely amounts to a step in the proceedings, which is prohibited by the stay?A: An application for an order in consequence of a stay does not imply a need to lift the stay which made the application appropriate: that would be nonsense.

If, however, it were the claimant applying for permission to take out the money paid in, then that application would not be made in consequence of the stay and he would probably have to apply for the stay to be lifted to the extent necessary to enable the application to be made.

The district judge might well not object to the two applications being combined in one notice.We do fear that there is some risk of litigation over the circumstances in which the para 19 stay can be lifted.

Decisions such as Biguzzi will provide some clues.

We hope there is no risk of a repeat of the CCR Order 17, rule 11, litigation which was concerned with whether the automatic strike out had occurred.

The question whether the para 19 stay has occurred will usually be of little consequence.If nothing has brought the case to the judge's attention since 26 April 1999 then there has been delay which might or might not merit a stay or a strike out independently of para 19.If the delay is not bad enough to warrant a stay or strike out, a para 19 stay will presumably be lifted on appropriate terms.

The sanction of a strike out just because a date has been passed as under CCR Order 17, rule 11 has not been repeated in the CPR and deliberately not.Q: What impact will PD51 para 19 have on mortgage possession cases where prior to 26 April 1999 either a suspended possession order has been made and the money claim adjourned generally with liberty to restore or the claim has been issued but adjourned generally with liberty to restore as proposals have been agreed? Neither of these appears to be caught by the exceptions set out in para 19.A: The suspended order, coupled with adjournment of the money claim, is a final order and so we consider it is probably not caught by para 19 which, effectively, is geared towards case management.

As to a claim which stands adjourned after agreement to proposals, different considerations apply.

The case is akin to an application for a new business tenancy or lease which before 26 April 1999 was often adjourned generally on issue.

It will be caught and stayed at midnight 25 April 2000.Q: I recently acted for a defendant in a case which had been allocated to the fast track.

Some weeks before trial, the claimant amended the claim, with permission, to well over £15,000.

The claim was dismissed at the trial but the judge would only allow fixed fast track trial costs.

Surely the claim should have been treated as multi-track following the increase above the fast track limit?A: The court may re-allocate a claim (rule 26.10) on application or of its own initiative (PD26, para 11.2) when circumstances change but re-allocation is not automatic.

In this case, the court did not re-allocate when the claim was increased: presumably, neither party applied.

As the claim remained on the fast track, the judge was correct to apply fast track trial costs.

The only discretion to allow more than the set figures in part 46 arises where the paying party behaved improperly at the trial.Q: Claimant makes a pre-action part 36 offer received by defendant on 1 June 1999.

Defendant rejects and proceedings are commenced on 3 April 2000.

By rule 36.10(4) the defendant cannot now accept that offer without the court's permission.

Assume at trial the claimant betters his own pre-action offer.

Rule 36.21(2) and (3) provide that the court may order additional interest on damages awarded and indemnity costs with interest 'starting with' and 'from' the 'latest date when the defendant could have accepted the offer without needing the permission of the court'.

It seems the part 36 penalty interest and costs can only run from the commencement of proceedings.

Surely the purpose of part 36 is to penalise the defendant for not accepting the pre-action offer by making him pay for the post offer period before commencement, especially as the front loading of a case may see the claimant incur significant costs after making the offer.

Is the only solution for the claimant to rely on (a) rule 44.3(6) whereby the court may award costs incurred before proceedings have commenced and interest and costs before judgment and (b) para 2.3(4) of the Protocols PD as to additional interest?A: We all agree the claimant should normally have his pre-proceedings costs and interest.

We are split as to whether or not rule 36.21 directly applies.

One view is that since rule 36.10 merely provides that the court will take a pre-action offer into account, rule 36.12 and the semi-automatic provisions of rule 36.21 are probably intended to apply only to post-action offers but rule 36.21 would no doubt present a powerful analogy for the court to have regard to.

The other view is that rule 36.21 is relevant and, bearing in mind the objective and the purposive approach to the CPR, should be more widely interpreted.A literal interpretation of rule 36.21 could be that the latest date the defendant could have accepted the offer without permission (or at all) would be the date up to which -- not less than 21 days after it was made -- the claimant left it open but such an exercise in interpretation should be unnecessary.

It is important for the claimant making a pre-action part 36 offer to impose a time limit for acceptance -- we suggest no longer, or not much longer, than the minimum 21 days after it has been communicated -- to prevent the defendant accepting late, after the claimant has incurred costs additional to those sought in the offer.-- The answers given are not authoritative to the extent that they should not be considered binding on any court.

The panel regrets it is unable to enter into correspondence with readers.

E-mail questions for publication to: steve.jones@lawsociety.org.uk.