I am told that a well-known firm of law stationers is selling a sign for use in counsels' chambers.

It reads 'If all else fails, argue the Human Rights Act!'.

Well, one can understand the sentiment.

Human Rights is the 'new thing', an esoteric exercise destined to confuse the informed and stun the ignorant.

Whole sets of chambers have been set up on the strength of it.

Some regard it as yet another European gravy train and it is clear that for at least the next couple of year s we shall be hearing a lot about it.But is it really that significant, especially with regard to civil matters? Certainly during the third reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor stated that 'in 99% of the cases that will arise, there will be no need for judicial declarations of incompatibility', a view echoed by the Home Secretary, Jack Straw during the second reading in the Commons.Be warnedPerhaps more significantly, Lord Woolf, the architect of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), recently warned counsel against taking civil courts down 'blind alleys' in raising unnecessary human rights points (Daniels v Walker (2000) The Times 17 May, CA).

He stated 'The provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 make it clear that it is the obligation of the court to deal with cases justly .

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it is highly undesirable for the consideration of issues to be made more complex by the injection of Art.

6 (right to a fair trial) arguments and it is hoped that judges will be robust in resisting such arguments.' In other words, the CPR are enough to satisfy the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and were drawn up with them in mind.Even soBut it may be that there are areas where the civil courts may be vulnerable to human rights arguments:-- 'A public hearing'.

The right to a fair trial in Art.

6 includes a right to a hearing in public or open court.

Strasbourg has no apparent difficulty with regard to interim hearings in private as the only ruling concerning them seems to reflect the view that as they are not a final determination the need for them to be in public is not so pressing.

However, the English legal system has already visited the concept of 'public hearing' and found it wanting.

In Roger Storer v British Gas Plc (2000) The Times 1 March, an industrial tribunal hearing took place in a courtroom that was only accessible through a door which had a combination lock, something which is common for district judges private hearing rooms up and down the country in which many final hearings take place.

The Court of Appeal held that this did not constitute a hearing 'in open court' and therefore the proceedings were flawed.

The implications of this for the court service are, frankly, alarming.-- Court fees.

The right to a fair trial implies reasonable access to the courts.

'Reasonable' implies proportionality which is itself a keyword both in the CPR and the ECHR.

The Lord Chancellor recently headed off a potential human rights challenge by removing the allocation fee of £80 for small claims up to £1,000, but at the same time he increased other fees and threatens further increases in order to move the courts to a position of financial independence.

How far will this deprive potential litigants of reasonable access to the courts remains to be seen.-- 'Equality of arms'.

A concept embodied both in the CPR and ECHR, but what does it really mean? How will it apply to a moderate income earning defendant being sued by a clearly impecunious claimant either with or without the benefit of public funds? They may feel that they are on a hiding to nothing -- if they defeat the claim they will not be able to recover their costs.

How can the court ensure 'equality'? See also 'sanctions' below.-- Sanctions.

A number of recent decisions by the Court of Appeal have made it clear that sanctions imposed under the CPR for default should be proportionate.

Fair enough but this can also work unfairly especially where financial alternatives, such as an order for costs or a payment-in by way of security for costs or to ab ide the event, cannot be enforced (or even ordered) where the defaulting party is impecunious or publicly funded.

The right to a fair trial implies the right to reach a final hearing.

Imposing a sanction for non-compliance with a court direction or order which strikes a party out before that stage may, depending on the circumstances, be seen as disproportionate.

This must be balanced against the argument that the right to a fair trial implies compliance with reasonable court orders and that default in effect prevents a fair trial taking place.-- Fast track.

Solicitors may argue that the limited time period for preparation for trial from allocation (maximum period -- 30 weeks) is unfair, especially where experts' reports are involved.

Again this has to be balanced against the right to a speedy trial.

Similarly, strict time-tabling of examination of witnesses and submissions at the trial coupled with the sanctions for failing to complete a fast track case within one day (case normally heard the next day; no recoverable party-and-party fees for advocates) may be regarded by some as unfair.-- Without notice hearings.

The right to a fair trial includes a right to be notified of the trial and being given an opportunity to attend unless there are cogent reasons why this should not happen, for example, notice would defeat the very purposes for which the application is being made or it was impossible or impractical to serve the other party.

Accelerated possession proceedings are a strange hybrid.

Although the defendant is given an opportunity to defend by filing a reply to the claim, if they fail to do so a possession order, depriving them of their home, may be made against them without a hearing.

Breach of Article 6 or 8 (right to private family life)?-- Appointment of judges.

The ECHR is concerned to ensure that judges are free from bias and this includes being independent of the Executive.

The Lord Chancellor (head of the judiciary but also a government minister) has already taken steps to head off arguments concerning the appointment of part-time judiciary by changing the basis on which they are appointed (now fixed term contracts, removal only for misconduct).

But has he got over the question of the duality of his position?Robust means expensiveFormer Law Commissioner Trevor Aldridge QC, writing in the Solicitors' Journal earlier this year said, when cautioning restraint against an over-use of the Act, 'The gravy train may be about to leave the station but if it does we'll all land up with egg on our faces.'It is clear that, bearing in mind the stationer's sign, human rights points will nevertheless be raised even if they are met with a 'robust' response from the bench.

Sensible advice would be, do not raise human rights unless you are convinced that you have a good point.

It could work out expensive!