Civil litigation practitioners are now five months into the Woolf regime, and are coming to terms with the changes demanded of them.

Family lawyers have the feeling that, by and large, they have escaped the cleansing fire of Woolf.

But are they right? Can they safely continue in their established ways and ignore the bulky volumes of new rules and commentaries which fill legal booksellers' windows?Well, up to a point, they can.

Family lawyers have had their own versions of root and branch reform in the shape of the Children Act 1989 and, for some, the ancillary relief pilot scheme.

Some, nervously or hopefully, as the case may be, are looking ahead to the promised land of the Family Law Act 1996 - whenever that may come.

And it is a fact that, with certain exception, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) do not apply to family proceedings (r.2.1(2)).

However, there are two basic points; first, the exceptions are important and, second, Woolf may prove to be as much an attitude as a set of rules.The only parts of the CPR which are specifically applied to family proceedings are some of those relating to costs - these are parts 43, 44 (except rr 44.9 to 44.12), 47 and 48.

Costs in family cases are now governed by these rules, with certain modifications.

For example, there is no general rule that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party's costs.

However, it should be noted that 'costs reserved' now means the same in family proceedings as in all other types of litigation.

And since no-one ever seemed to be aware of the previous distinction this may as be just as well.What, then, are the changes in costs which family lawyers must learn? Obviously, the detailed provisions as to assessment - as taxation is now called - must be mastered; they are significantly different from the old procedure.

When seeking an order for costs against another party, whether in respect of one hearing or an entire application, the practitioner will have to opt for detailed assessment or summary assessment.

The latter is to be preferred since solicitors will get their money more quickly and the court will not be troubled with a detailed assessment.

However, this could not apply to complex cases where there was likely to be prolonged argument about the reasonableness or otherwise of some aspect of the work.

In any event, an application for summary assessment must have to hand a schedule of costs in form 1 (schedule of costs forms) annexed to the practice direction to part 44.

This is not the same form as the statement of costs required by the practice direction of the Family Division's senior registrar of 28 March 1988 [1988] 2 All ER 63 which is still required for different reasons.

However, needless to say, the figures should not contradict each other.

One aspect of the CPR which may impinge on family proceedings while not being directly applied by the rules is part 36 which related to offers to settle.

Offers to settle are referred to in the costs provisions (r44.3(4)) as being one of the matters to be taken into account by the court in any issue as to costs, and so are brought in, as it were, by a sidewind.

The offer to settle may be in any form and does not have to be made under part 36, so that Calderbank offers are still valid.

However, while it cannot be said that part 36 is completely irrelevant, there are still problems about what part 36 offers in the family context.

For example, they can only be made after the proceedings have been issued and they must offer to pay the other party's costs up to 21 days after the offer is made.

An offer to settle made before the issue of proceedings may be taken into account under r.36.10 provided that, if made by a respondent, it makes a similar offer as to costs.

This does not apply to a claimant's offer.

It may be thought that these rules fit uneasily with family matters and that Calderbank principles will continue to be the most appropriate way of making offers to settle.What has been said so far relates to the matters which the CPR expressly import into family matters.

There is one other specific matter, not in the CPR but in a new s.74A County Courts Act 1984 introduced by s.5(2) Civil Procedure Act 1997, which is of some relevance.

No court may make any practice direction without the consent of the Lord Chancellor; so goodbye to local practice directions, whether as to ancillary relief, children cases, or whatever, which do not comply with the rules.

If a local court introduced some innovation which does not seem to accord with the Family Proceedings Rules 1991, solicitors should ask politely whether the Lord Chancellor has given his blessing.There has been some speculation as to whether the CPR provisions as to, for example, disclosure of documents or expert evidence apply to family cases.

The short answer is that they do not.

Save as provided for in the CPR, family cases continue to be governed by the FPR, and if the two codes are contradictory the FPR will prevail.

However, is that necessarily the end of the story? One example illustrates what may be the correct approach.There are many areas of the FPR wher e provision is made for some procedural steps in outline only.

Take expert evidence.

Rule 2.75 (under the pilot scheme) provides that the court 'shall give directions' as to obtaining and exchanging experts' evidence.

It goes no farther; it is for the court to decide how it should exercise its discretion in this field.

When deciding whether or not to limit expert evidence, or to require a joint report, can the court ignore Woolf? The district judge's objective on the first appointment is to define issues and save costs (r.2.74(1)).

If he also has in mind the overriding objective in CPR r1.1, can it be said that he is exceeding his powers? Under the CPR.

the judge may limit expert evidence on some issues to that of a singly jointly-instructed expert.

Does the reference to obtaining and exchanging expert evidence in r.2.74 mean that a party is entitled as of right to call his own expert - and incidentally to force the other party to do the same - in a case which simply does not merit it?Proportionality is one of the cornerstones of the CPR and of the Woolf regime generally.

Family lawyers are no strangers to this concept, whether under the pilot scheme in ancillary relief or in the limiting of issues and evidence in Children Act proceedings.

It may be said to be the unspoken assumption which lies behind the modern practice of the law.

Woolf principles are certainly entirely consistent with the best practice in family cases, and it can do no harm to use them as a yardstick.