The only custodial sentence available in the youth court is a detention and training order.

In that court no detention and training order may be imposed on an offender under 12, or an offender who is 12 but younger than 15 and who is not a persistent young offender.

However, such defendants may in appropriate cases be committed for trial at the crown court so that they may be detained under the provisions of section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (previously section 53 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (R v Jenkins-Rowe and Glover (2000) Crim LR 1022).The Court of Ap peal has given considerable attention to the meaning of the phrase 'persistent offender'.

In the event the court has not followed Home Office guidance but has held that whether a defendant is a persistent offender is a matter of fact in each case.

There is no need for a previous conviction.

If an offender is convicted on one occasion of offences committed on more than one day -- or is convicted for the first time but has a record of cautions, reprimands, or warnings -- then, depending on circumstances, he or she may be regarded as a persistent offender.Relevant considerations include whether there is a substantial gap before the first conviction and the nature of the earlier crimes.

(R v Smith (2000) Crim LR 612; R v D (2000) Crim LR 864; R v C [2000] The Times 11 October.Detention and training orders may only be for fixed periods of time, the shortest being four months.

If the court purports to impose a sentence shorter than that, the correct remedy is to return the case to the magistrates under section 142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 rather than to appeal, as a crown court might otherwise use its powers to increase the sentence.While each individual detention and training order must be for one of the lawful terms consecutive sentences do not need to add up to such a term.

R v Norris (2001) Crim LR 48.The fixed length of the terms available however, causes considerable difficulties for courts under the general sentencing principle of proportionality.

Where a young person is sentenced in relation to the same offence as an adult (who may only be a few weeks older) courts must, for instance, have regard to the fact that the adult court can only impose a maximum of six months for any number of summary offences, while the youth court has in law 24 months available.

While credit will be given to the adult for time spent on remand, no such credit is given to a youth.Therefore, courts must adjust sentences on young people to allow for this.

(R v Ganley [2000] The Times, 7 June; R v Cassidy [2000] The Times, 13 October).

However, although the legislation requires the court to take account of any time spent on remand in these circumstances, the matter is not one of mathematical calculation and short amounts of time -- particularly those spent in police stations -- are unlikely to result in a shortening of the sentence.

However, where significant periods of time have been spent on remand an appropriate adjustment should be made ( R v Inner London Crown Court, ex parte I [2000] The Times, 12 May; R v B (2000) Crim LR 867; R v Inner London Crown Court ex parte N & S (2000) Crim LR 869; R v Fieldhouse and Watts (2000) Crim LR 1020; R v Davis [2000] The Times, 20 December).