The government believes that the magistrates' courts service should remain locally based.

However, the 1989 scrutiny of magistrates' courts identified that: 'It is impossible to locate clear management responsibility or accountability anywhere in the structure', and concluded that the service should become a national executive agency.

For the retention of a local service to be acceptable, the Lord Chancellor must be able to show Parliament, to which he is accountable, that it is being administered efficiently and effectively and that he can ensure that a high standard of service is provided to all court users.

Much has been said and written recently about the white paper, 'A new framework for local justice'.

Many of the concerns expressed are based on misunderstandings about the proposed reforms.

For example, the government proposes to introduce fixed term contracts and performance-related pay for justices' clerks.

In [1993] Gazette, 22 September, 3, Laurence Cramp was reported to have said that justices' clerks on fixed term contracts would 'realise that the Lord Chancellor could simply sack them and get other people in to do the job'.

This is not so.

Clerks will continue to be employed by magistrates' courts committees (MCCs).

Rather than holding office at the MCCs' pleasure, new appointees will have contracts of employment.

These contracts will be with the MCC.

Not with the government.

Not with the Lord Chancellor.

Not with the inspectorate.

Currently, justices' clerks can be dismissed at will by their MCCs and have no protection except to seek judicial review.

Contracts of employment will clarify justices' clerks' management responsibilities and the MCCs' employment responsibility towards them.

The intention of the fixed term is not to dangle the sword of Damocles above the head of a justices' clerk who lives in constant apprehension of the termination of his or her contract.

It is intended to provide the framework for a 'rolling review' of the clerk's management performance and responsibilities.

There will be a presumption of renewal for those who meet standards set by their MCCs -- not the government or the inspectorate.

Performance-related pay, based on appraisal, will allow the MCC to reward those who meet -- or exceed -- its standards and encourage those who may need to improve their performance.

It has been claimed that these arrangements will threaten judicial independence.

Justices' clerks will have, for the first time, the full protection of employment law which they can use if they are disciplined or dismissed for exercising their independence in advising their Bench.

Fixed term contracts will ensure that clerks are, feel, and appear to be independent in the advice they give.

In addition, the legislation will state unequivocally that management may not direct justices' clerks in the advice that they give in individual cases and their contracts will explicitly exclude this from performance appraisal.

The chief justices' clerk's role is also misunderstood.

He or she will not report to the inspectorate or to the Lord Chancellor.

Like justices' clerks, chief justices' clerks will be employed by and be responsible to their MCCs.

They will line manage justices' clerks, ensuring that the MCCs' decisions are both understood and implemented.

Volunteer magistrates working in their own time cannot be expected to be full time managers.

They need someone to support and implement their decisions.The chief justices' clerk will not be able to direct justices' clerks either when they advise magistrates in court or when they exercise the functions of a single justice.

The inspectorate's role has been misunderstood.

It is to improve the standards of administration in magistrates' courts.

The inspectorate will be funded by the Lord Chancellor's Department, not out of the grant paid to the service.

The chief inspector will report directly to the Lord Chancellor, but her reports will be published in full without amendment or interference from government.

Thus, the inspectorate will be independent -- both from central government and from the service it inspects.

I should explain how the proposed changes will be paid for.

Implementation will produce transitional costs of approximately £5 million.

There is absolutely no question of magistrates' courts having to reduce their level of service to the public to meet these costs.

The cost of setting up the inspectorate has already been provided from central government sources.

The remainder will be taken into account in allocating resources to the service -- as the white paper promised.

Moreover, we are confident that the reforms will pay for themselves over time, and result in a greater, not lesser, capability to deliver a h igh quality service.Over the last few months, I have concentrated particularly on white paper issues.

Many members of the service have written to me and I have studied their comments carefully.

I have also been able to visit a number of MCC areas and discuss the white paper reforms with those managing our system of summary justice.

I remain convinced that concerns about the white paper proposals are unfounded.Most of our reforms are based on ideas already implemented by individual MCCs.

Some areas have already benefited from centralised administrative functions.

Others have introduced fixed term contracts and designated a chief justices' clerk.

The arrangements seem to be working well with no sign of the disadvantages that some fear.

I am sure that implementation of the reforms throughout the service will provide an effective framework for local justice, locally managed, which is able to meet the challenges of the future.