The possible extradition of one of the London bomb suspects from Italy is putting the European arrest warrant under scrutiny, and raising broader questions about common European Union justice and immigration policies, writes Julia Bateman

Barely a month after the German Constitutional Court declared the European arrest warrant null and void in Germany, this fast-track extradition instrument was being hailed as a key anti-terror tool in the investigations into the attempted bombings in London on 21 July.


On 17 August, an Italian judge approved the extradition to the UK of suspect Hamdi Issac, also known as Osman Hussain. Although at the time of writing an appeal against extradition is pending, if all goes to Scotland Yard's plan, Mr Isaac could be returned to the UK by the end of September. Fast-track indeed.


It appears, then, that the Home Office description of the Euro-warrant as 'a radical innovation in the EU's ability to fight crime from within its own borders' may soon ring true. Certainly, as Home Secretary Charles Clarke chairs the EU justice and home affairs ministerial meetings in the coming months, he will want this seemingly model example of EU judicial co-operation as a feather in his UK presidency cap.


In the spirit of co-operation, little has been said regarding the fact that the suspect in question made it all the way to Rome - a deliberate ploy to hide the weaknesses in the fledgling EU justice system? Moreover, it appears that the doubts cast not only by the German court, but also the Polish court just months earlier, are being played down.


In a judgment on 27 April, the Polish Constitutional Court stated that the domestic legislation implementing the European arrest warrant did not conform to the Polish constitution. A similar stance was used by the German judges on 18 July as they pronounced the implementing legislation null and void.


The German court decreed that the domestic act encroached upon the freedom of extradition in a disproportionate manner. Moreover, the legislature had not exhausted all possibilities under the European framework decision as regards the 'highest possible consideration in respect of fundamental rights concerned'. The German court refused to extradite the suspect to Spain. On the other hand, the Polish court agreed that the implementing legislation could remain in force for a further 18 months.


Given that we are supposed to be living in one European area of freedom, security and justice, not to mention in an era of 'mutual trust and reciprocity', how can such widely divergent views of the so-called centrepiece of European judicial co-operation be reconciled? Surely if there is fault with one, then there is a fault with all.


The European Commission would certainly not agree with this indictment, being at pains to point out that fault was found with the German implementing legislation rather than the EU's project itself. Given that the European arrest warrant replaced and repealed existing extradition treaties, this may have been the only position to take.


Indeed, any notion that the delicate political constructs supporting the EU's justice and security policy may be under threat is soon dismissed by the displays of political unity and strong rhetoric on need to fight 'the affront on the universal values on which the EU is based'.


Moreover, a look at the volume of legislation the UK presidency is looking to adopt before Christmas leaves the observer in no doubt as to this commitment. The attacks in London are talked about as the 'UK's 9/11'. Certainly as far as patterns go, London's '7/7' may act as a catalyst for progress on the latest raft of EU justice and security measures in the way the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US injected a sense of urgency into the adoption of the European arrest warrant.


Deadlines for the adoption of the European evidence warrant have been brought forward. Political quarrels and legal concerns over the data-retention proposals appear to be have been settled at unprecedented speed. Priority is given to proposals that relate to cutting off funding to terrorist organisations and disrupting support networks. The recently adopted Third Money Laundering Directive - expected to enter into force at the end of the year - is awaited in the coming weeks. Work on improving intelligence-gathering and information-sharing between law enforcement authorities also tops the agenda.


Essential work, doubtless, but cause for concern when the long-awaited proposal on procedural safeguards for suspects and defendants appears to have disappeared off the radar.


Of further concern is the raft of new proposals dealing with the treatment of third-country nationals and new proposals relating to illegal immigration. The fact that the EU must have an effective common immigration and asylum policy is not put in doubt here, but interior and justice ministers meeting under the same roof is seen by some as no small coincidence.


As the link between illegal immigration and anti-terrorism policy is drawn ever more clearly, and constitutional doubts as to the validity of the European arrest warrant are played down, the EU seems to have gone from a union in crisis to one that is now mobilising itself to the clarion call of the 'war against terror'.


Julia Bateman is the justice and home affairs policy executive in the Law Society's Brussels Office.

E-mail: brussels@lawsociety.org.uk