Family lawBy David Burrows, David Burrows, BristolThe corporate veil in ancillary relief proceedingsMubarak v Mubarak and ors (2000) The Times, 30 November Mr Justice Bodey looked afresh at the question of when the court can pierce the corporate veil in ancillary relief proceedings, following such earlier and conflicting decisions as Crittenden v Crittenden [1990] 2 FLR 361 and Green v Green [1993] 1 FLR 326.

Mr Mubarak had placed his assets in a discretionary trust in Jersey.

He remained a director of one of two companies; but both were bona fide trading companies with commercial creditors and directors with fiduciary duties.

In such circumstances his wife was not entitled to an order directly against the companies' assets and thereby pierce the corporate veil to enforce a financial order against Mr Mubarak.This is a decision which needs closer reading than in the short report in The Times.

Its importance is to remind practitioners - though the attempt failed here - that the court is entitled to look at the reality of the couples' financial position, not necessarily only the family assets on paper (see Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668, CA especially the first two paragraphs of Lord Justice Waite's judgment).Sale of real property abroadHamlin v H [1986] 1 FLR 61On a restraint of disposal application it was mentioned, in passing, that the English court's ancillary relief jurisdiction included the power to transfer property held abroad by one spouse to the other.

A question may then arise as to whether that property can be ordered to be sold (following transfer under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.24A).

In Pollard v Ashurst (2000) The Times, 29 November, the power of the court to order sale of freehold property abroad arose in the context of a trustee in bankruptcy seeking to sell the property in Portugal of an English bankrupt.The question turns on whether the order sought falls within the terms of art.1 of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (see Sched to Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982) and to exceptions which give the local courts exclusive jurisdiction.

The question depends also on whether it is sought to enforce a property right in rem, which binds the whole world (such as title to property), as distinct from a property right enforceable against a particular individual.

In the case of Mr Pollard his title to the property was a right in rem.

As against him, as a bankrupt, the court held that an order for sale, made originally by a district judge, should stand.Reversal of factDesigner Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (2000), The Times,28 NovemberThe House of Lords considered the question of the extent to which an appellate court can reverse findings of fact made by the court of first instance.

To interfere with a judge's findings of fact the appellate court must find that the court below misdirected itself.

It may be appropriate to bear this analysis in mind, for example, in care proceedings.

The making of a care order is a two-stage process: a finding of 'significant harm' and, subject to that, the making of a care or supervision order.

The first is a question of fact, to be questioned on appeal on the Designer Guild basis of whether the court below misdirected itself.

The second stage is one of discretion; and as such an appeal should only succeed if it can be shown that the exercise of discretion by the court below was plainly wrong (G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] FLR 894, HL).The corporate veil in ancillary relief proceedings

Mubarak v Mubarak and ors (2000) The Times, 30 November Mr Justice Bodey looked afresh at the question of when the court can pierce the corporate veil in ancillary relief proceedings, following such earlier and conflicting decisions as Crittenden v Crittenden [1990] 2 FLR 361 and Green v Green [1993] 1 FLR 326.

Mr Mubarak had placed his assets in a discretionary trust in Jersey.

He remained a director of one of two companies; but both were bona fide trading companies with commercial creditors and directors with fiduciary duties.

In such circumstances his wife was not entitled to an order directly against the companies' assets and thereby pierce the corporate veil to enforce a financial order against Mr Mubarak.This is a decision which needs closer reading than in the short report in The Times.

Its importance is to remind practitioners - though the attempt failed here - that the court is entitled to look at the reality of the couples' financial position, not necessarily only the family assets on paper (see Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668, CA especially the first two paragraphs of Lord Justice Waite's judgment).Sale of real property abroadHamlin v H [1986] 1 FLR 61On a restraint of disposal application it was mentioned, in passing, that the English court's ancillary relief jurisdiction included the power to transfer property held abroad by one spouse to the other.

A question may then arise as to whether that property can be ordered to be sold (following transfer under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.24A).

In Pollard v Ashurst (2000) The Times, 29 November, the power of the court to order sale of freehold property abroad arose in the context of a trustee in bankruptcy seeking to sell the property in Portugal of an English bankrupt.The question turns on whether the order sought falls within the terms of art.1 of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (see Sched to Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982) and to exceptions which give the local courts exclusive jurisdiction.

The question depends also on whether it is sought to enforce a property right in rem, which binds the whole world (such as title to property), as distinct from a property right enforceable against a particular individual.

In the case of Mr Pollard his title to the property was a right in rem.

As against him, as a bankrupt, the court held that an order for sale, made originally by a district judge, should stand.Reversal of factDesigner Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (2000), The Times,28 NovemberThe House of Lords considered the question of the extent to which an appellate court can reverse findings of fact made by the court of first instance.

To interfere with a judge's findings of fact the appellate court must find that the court below misdirected itself.

It may be appropriate to bear this analysis in mind, for example, in care proceedings.

The making of a care order is a two-stage process: a finding of 'significant harm' and, subject to that, the making of a care or supervision order.

The first is a question of fact, to be questioned on appeal on the Designer Guild basis of whether the court below misdirected itself.

The second stage is one of discretion; and as such an appeal should only succeed if it can be shown that the exercise of discretion by the court below was plainly wrong (G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] FLR 894, HL).The corporate veil in ancillary relief proceedingsMubarak v Mubarak and ors (2000) The Times, 30 November Mr Justice Bodey looked afresh at the question of when the court can pierce the corporate veil in ancillary relief proceedings, following such earlier and conflicting decisions as Crittenden v Crittenden [1990] 2 FLR 361 and Green v Green [1993] 1 FLR 326.

Mr Mubarak had placed his assets in a discretionary trust in Jersey.

He remained a director of one of two companies; but both were bona fide trading companies with commercial creditors and directors with fiduciary duties.

In such circumstances his wife was not entitled to an order directly against the companies' assets and thereby pierce the corporate veil to enforce a financial order against Mr Mubarak.This is a decision which needs closer reading than in the short report in The Times.

Its importance is to remind practitioners - though the attempt failed here - that the court is entitled to look at the reality of the couples' financial position, not necessarily only the family assets on paper (see Thomas v Thomas [1995] 2 FLR 668, CA especially the first two paragraphs of Lord Justice Waite's judgment).Sale of real property abroadHamlin v H [1986] 1 FLR 61On a restraint of disposal application it was mentioned, in passing, that the English court's ancillary relief jurisdiction included the power to transfer property held abroad by one spouse to the other.

A question may then arise as to whether that property can be ordered to be sold (following transfer under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.24A).

In Pollard v Ashurst (2000) The Times, 29 November, the power of the court to order sale of freehold property abroad arose in the context of a trustee in bankruptcy seeking to sell the property in Portugal of an English bankrupt.The question turns on whether the order sought falls within the terms of art.1 of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (see Sched to Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982) and to exceptions which give the local courts exclusive jurisdiction.

The question depends also on whether it is sought to enforce a property right in rem, which binds the whole world (such as title to property), as distinct from a property right enforceable against a particular individual.

In the case of Mr Pollard his title to the property was a right in rem.

As against him, as a bankrupt, the court held that an order for sale, made originally by a district judge, should stand.Reversal of factDesigner Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (2000), The Times,28 NovemberThe House of Lords considered the question of the extent to which an appellate court can reverse findings of fact made by the court of first instance.

To interfere with a judge's findings of fact the appellate court must find that the court below misdirected itself.

It may be appropriate to bear this analysis in mind, for example, in care proceedings.

The making of a care order is a two-stage process: a finding of 'significant harm' and, subject to that, the making of a care or supervision order.

The first is a question of fact, to be questioned on appeal on the Designer Guild basis of whether the court below misdirected itself.

The second stage is one of discretion; and as such an appeal should only succeed if it can be shown that the exercise of discretion by the court below was plainly wrong (G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] FLR 894, HL).