As incidents of racial harassment and violence increase there are growing calls for stronger legal measures to combat them.Up to now, the government P in spite of its desire to strengthen policies to defeat crime in general P has resisted the introduction of new measures specifically targeted at racially motivated activities.

The Home Secretary, like his immediate predecessors, has said he regards the present law as adequate.But many of those with practical experience in race relations take the opposite view.

The Commission for Racial Equality supports new legislation and the Association of Chief Police Officers, in its evidence to the home affairs select committee of the House of Commons, advocated a new offence of racial harassment and enhanced penalties for racially motivated crimes of violence.Until the Race Relations Act 1965, the law provided no means of redress for unfairly discriminatory treatment of ethnic minorities P except in rare cases where it was possible to invoke a law introduced for a different purpose.

A classic example of the latter was that of the West Indian cricketer Learie Constantine (also a barrister and later Lord Constantine) who, in 1944, successfully sued a London hotel which operated a colour bar against him.

He ingeniously relied on the ancient obligation of innkeepers to accommodate all bona fide travellers and was awarded damages of five guineas.The 1965 Act created a limited civil remedy, which has been greatly extended by further statutes in 1968 and 1976.

The concentration of legislative effort during this period was on discrimination P as distinct from other forms of racially motivated conduct.

It was the pre-eminent problem, undermining the equal participation of ethnic minorities in the wider society.

It has continued to demand determined and effective action.The 1965 Act also created a new criminal offence of incitement to racial hatred, extended in the 1976 Act and subsequently re-enacted with more amendments in the Public Order Act 1986.

It was aimed at those who stir up others to engage in acts of racial hostility, rather than at the perpetrators themselves.

It was assumed that the perpetrators could be confronted effectively by the existing criminal law, if they were incited to commit crimes, or, if the hatred inspired in them by the inciters did not lead to acts already prohibited by the criminal law, that no legal measures were needed.In practice, the offence of incitement to racial hatred has played no significant role in curbing racism.

Prosecutions have been few and far between and convictions rare indeed.

Between 1965 and 1976, only 24 people were prosecuted of whom 15 were convicted.

Nor have the 1986 amendmen ts had any greater impact.

Most of the few cases since 1986 have been trivial.

In 1988, for example, there were only two prosecutions: one led to the conviction of a soapbox orator who was given a suspended sentence for a racist speech and for distributing racist literature.

The other led to a fine of £100 for posting Nazi stickers on lamp posts.

In 1990 there were four convictions.

The sentences were fines of £100 and £74, and two conditional discharges.

In 1991 again only four people were convicted.

One of them was Lady Birdwood, the 80-year-old widow of a field marshal.

She was conditionally discharged after having been found to have distributed racist publications.The small number of prosecutions contrasts with the large number of complaints reported by the Commission for Racial Equality, the Jewish Board of Deputies and other organisations.

The volume of complaints from reputable sources suggests that the law against incitement ought to be much more vigorously enforced by the Attorney- General, who alone has the power to bring or authorise prosecutions.

The cautious approach of Attorneys-General has been criticised by, among others, Sir Peter Imbert, former commissioner of Metropolitan Police, in his Sir George Bean memorial lecture in 1990.Yet, disturbing as it is that those who incite hatred have so little reason to fear the criminal law, the actions of those who carry out acts of harassment and violence are much more immediately harmful and are frequently devastating.

Complaints of racial harassment and racial violence far outstrip complaints of racial incitement.

Peter Lloyd, minister of state at the Home Office, acknowledged in July 1993 to the home affairs select committee of the House of Commons that the annual number of racial attacks, many of which were not reported by the victims, could be as high as 130,000.

These have included several murders, among which the cases of Rohit Duggal, Rolan Adams, and Stephen Lawrence have been widely publicised.

Yet, by contrast with discrimination and incitement, no specific legal measures at all have been introduced.

The government seems unwilling to recognise that the dimension and context added by racial motivation gives any action a qualitatively different and much more serious character.

The focus on discrimination in the 1960s and 1970s was understandable.

A substantial number of immigrants from the West Indies and the Asian sub-continent had been established in the UK long enough to become impatient with the obstacles blocking their progress, especially in the job and housing markets.

Discrimination came to be recognised in the wider community as a major potential source of social tension P quite apart from its obvious injustice.

Criminalising racial incitement also seemed a suitably low key response to the small number of vociferous but slightly ludicrous adherents of neo-fascist fringe organisations like the National Front and the British Movement.

Harassment and violence are later developments (or more recently perceived as such) and are just beginning to be understood in the corridors of power, at a time when the commitment of the 1960s and 1970s to legislative action against racism has weakened.Yet the arguments for tougher laws against racial harassment and violence are at least as strong as for any other criminal activity.

Proving racial motivation may indeed be difficult, but it is a task which is regularly undertaken successfully by courts and tribunals in cases under the Race Relations Act.

The home secretary has also argued that criminalising racist s is counter-productive because it creates 'martyrs'.

But fear of arousing support for the attackers surely can never be allowed to detract from the right of the victims to the best protection the law can afford.The main argument against new legislation is that existing laws are adequate.

However, there is no specific offence of racial violence or racial harassment.

Any act of violence is already a criminal offence but racial motivation not only makes it more serious from the perspective of the perpetrator, it also becomes an attack on a whole community.

While it may reasonably be argued that no new separate offence is needed to deal with acts which are already criminal, new provisions are necessary to require the racial dimension to be effectively taken into account.In 1989, the Home Office issued guidelines for statutory agencies on responding to racial attacks.

It recorded the policy of the CPS to regard the existence of a clear racial motivation as an aggravating feature pointing towards prosecution.

There are also guidelines issued to magistrates in some areas (Nottingham, for example) encouraging them to give weight to racial motivation in sentencing.

Without legislation, however, courts cannot be required to impose heavier sentences, nor indeed can prosecutors be required to put evidence of racial motivation before the court.

In several of the US states, 'penalty enhancement' statutes have been enacted to provide heavier penalties for racially motivated crimes.Secondly, racial harassment takes a variety of forms.

It may fit easily within the scope of an existing offence or it may not.

Deliberately breaking the window of a car belonging to a West Indian neighbour would plainly be criminal damage, but what about repeatedly leaving banana skins on the car? This might P apart from the racist element P seem no more than a childish prank and at worst a civil trespass.

To a vulnerable family, in a hostile environment, it can convey a terrifying message.

In an actual case, it was the prelude to a physical attack.Racial motivation and context can turn behaviour which in itself seems innocent or trivial into a terrifying threat.

To treat racial harassment as if it were civil trespass or nuisance is to ignore the reality and fail to deal with the problem.There is also a strong case for effective civil remedies for the victims of racial harassment and violence.

Again, the current legal position is a mixture.

A civil action lies for damages for assault or trespass and an injunction may be sought to restrain such acts.

But special damages or damages for pain and suffering may be difficult to establish.The Race Relations Act provides expressly for victims of racial discrimination to receive compensation for injury to feelings.

Why not for victims of racial harassment as well? Moreover, it may be very frightening for victims to contemplate action against those who intimidate them.

Powers are therefore needed for local authorities (who already have a duty under s.71 of the Race Relations Act to promote good race relations) to seek injunctive relief on behalf of their residents, and the Commission for Racial Equality should be given a similar power.

There is profound anxiety among members of ethnic minorities that the government and the forces of law and order are not committed to protecting them and bringing the perpetrators of racial attacks to justice.

In several cases the perpetrators of very serious attacks have escaped justice.

Strengthening the law cannot guarantee that more criminals will be caught, but specific laws, dir ectly aimed at racial attacks and harassment, would go far to supplying the sense of security and equal treatment to ethnic minorities which is surely the right of every citizen.