When Carol McEvoy went for a week's holiday at Isola, France, in March 1990, little did she know the dramatic impact the trip would have on her life - involving her in the trauma of medical problems and defended litigation for the next three- and-a-half years.Ms McEvoy had one week's previous skiing experience.

She was placed in a class of near beginners consisting of about 15 English people with a French ski instructress.The first day of her holiday passed without incident.

On the second day, Ms McEvoy and the others were told by the instructress to follow her down the mountain and stop at a certa in position on the left of the slope.The slope was steeper than that skied on the first day and relatively icy.

Some of the group were worried about it.

Ms McEvoy traversed down the slope and, when she was stationary, a skier went into her from behind.

They both fell and his ski went into the right side of her face causing serious facial injuries and damaging her right eye.

In great pain on the ground, Ms McEvoy asked another skier to point out who was responsible.

Luckily, someone also noted his name and passed it on to the ski instructress.He was called Christopher Briggs, was English and from the same tour group.

Ms McEvoy was taken to hospital in Nice and, after some emergency repair work, was flown home for major surgery in England.The client first instructed my firm to act for her in July 1990 and we wrote to Mr Briggs.

His insurers, the Norwich Union, responded.

In early correspondence we pointed out that the French Civil Code provided that a skier was strictly liable for the control or his or her skis (s.1384).

However, negotiations with the insurers came to nought and proceedings were issued in the High Court in June 1991.When solicitors were instructed for the defendant by the insurers they made it clear from the outset that liability was wholly disputed and this was the stance they adopted until the end of the trial.

No payment into court or offers of any description were made throughout that period to the injured plaintiff.

A formal defence was served denying liability.The client had barely seen the other skier involved in the collision although thought he was an adult.

A further shock lay in store when, in 1992 - over a year after the initial defence had been filed - the insurers' solicitors stated that the defendant, Christopher Briggs, was a child aged 13 at the time of the accident and that he had been on his first skiing holiday with his father.We had to amend the statement of claim to sue the defendant by his father, Roy Briggs, and as his guardian ad litem.

At the same time, in the amended pleading, in addition to the French Civil Code, we referred specifically to r.3 of the Federation International de Ski code (the FIS rules).

R.3 provides that: 'A skier coming from above whose dominant position allows him a choice of path must take a direction which ensures the safety of the skier below.'The FIS code has now been adopted throughout much of Europe although it does not have the binding force of law.

Indeed, in England it is questionable whether breach of the FIS code is evidence of negligence although the FIS rules are displayed in most of the ski centres in the UK including on the majority of dry ski slopes.The matter continued towards a trial with the case transferred from the High Court to the Mayor's and City of London Court for trial.

There remained concern on the question of jurisdiction and matters relating to French law, so we took advice from French law experts.One main difference between French and English law is that the time limit for the commencement of proceedings in France is ten years from the date of the accident as opposed to the three-year limit in England.Furthermore, where a child is involved in France one would be required to sue both of his or her parents rather than the child.

Both parents could be liable even if they were nowhere near the ski slope where the accident occurred.In addition, costs are not normally recoverable in France and the general damages could be lower there.

There is always the added financial and practical language problem of taking action in France where both parties are English with English insurers involved.Eventually, it was conceded that the trial would take place under English jurisdiction as if the accident had occurred in England.Another serious problem we found in preparation for the trial was that there appeared to be no reported English cases on skiing law and only a relatively small number of reported overseas cases.The trial took place before His Honour Judge Simpson in October 1993 and lasted for six days.

The evidence at the trial was that the defendant child did not see the plaintiff.

It was not disputed by the time of trial that she had been stationary on the slope.A skiing expert for the defendant gave evidence as to the stress and level of concentration a child would have on the ski slopes.

Christopher Briggs said that he had not seen the FIS rules.

Our ski expert relied on the fact that the plaintiff was stationary, it had been a slow collision and the general application of the FIS rulesCounsel for the defendant submitted that the appropriate standard was that of a reasonable learner placed in the position of the defendant taking into account his experience, abilities and age.It was argued that because he was a child he owed a lower duty of care and that children tended to ignore danger which explained why Christopher Briggs had not been worried about the steepness of the slope (as his father had been).

It was also suggested that one small error did not amount to negligence.

The defendant had spent a number of hours on dry ski slopes in England but, prior to his holiday, had not skied on snow before.Counsel for the plaintiff had referred the judge to the well-known learner driver case of Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 and argued that there was no valid distinction between that of a learner driver and a learner skier.

However, the judge held that Nettleship v Weston could be entirely distinguished from a skiing case and, moreover, it had been based on public policy considerations relating to learner drivers which were not relevant to skiing accidents.Judge Simpson gave a reserved judgment on 29 November 1993.

He referred to a number of overseas cases, including the Ontario case of Fink v Greeniaus [1973] 2 Ontario Reports (2d) 541 in which it was held that a skier owed a duty of care to his or her fellow skier not to act in reckless disregard of the other's safety.He also referred to the case of Condon v Basi [1985] WLR 866 in which it was held that a duty of care was owed by a football player to a member of an opposing team, the player having to exercise a degree of care which was appropriate in all the circumstances.

He held that the defendant did have a duty of care to Ms McEvoy.The judge accepted the submission that the defendant child owed a lower standard of care arising from his age, limited experience as a learner skier and abilities.

He also felt the defendant's expert evidence was flawed and even though the defendant was a child lacking experience and technical competence, none of that explained why he had failed to see Ms McEvoy who was stationary on the ski slope.He held that it would have been within the defendant's ability to have taken action to try to avoid the collision or shouted out to alert the plaintiff and that he failed to attain the standard of care relevant to the case.The judge also held that Christopher Briggs was in breach of r.3 of the FIS ski code and, although those rules amounted to no more than common sense, they were useful guides as to what a reasonable skier would or would not do.The cas e had been a traumatic one for the plaintiff and illustrates the perils and difficulties of personal injury litigation.

She did not have the backing of legal aid and had borne all the tremendous financial risks herself.

What had started as a relatively straightforward claim, the plaintiff being injured on a ski slope in France, produced considerable difficulties regarding jurisdiction and the standard of care owed by another skier - particularly where a child was involved.However, what the McEvoy v Briggs case in the Mayor's and City of London Court did establish was that a 13-year-old boy, who was having his first skiing holiday on snow, despite having a reduced standard of care, did owe one to another skier.

The plaintiff was compensated for the very considerable injuries that she received, although she will not be skiing again for a long while.