The Legal Aid Board's recent report on multi-party actions provides an urgently needed first step in solving the unique problems associated with managing that kind of litigation.

Some of the report's recommendations are eminently sensible; others are very controversial and raise issues deserving of public debate.

Of all the proposals, the need for the early identification and trial of lead issues is the most critical.

It is also long overdue.

In some multi-party actions, defendants have insisted that each individual claim be investigated and fully pleaded before the action is allowed to proceed, arguing that only then can they see the nature and extent of the claims they have to meet and whether to defend or make a realistic attempt at settlement.This is, however, completely impractical.

It unnecessarily drives up costs before any liability issues can be explored, often sending the costs benefit ratio through the roof even before discovery is given.

A compromise of defendants' strict rights of due process is necessary in this type of litigation but, equally, plaintiffs are deprived of their right to autonomy and participation in pursuing their individual claims.

Nevertheless, it has long been recognised that some degree of compromise is required if group actions are to be brought.The apparent fetter of the parties' rights is not great, since the lead issue approach does not preclude the investigation of individual claims, it merely puts it back.

This saves costs to both sides as well as court time, although some still see tactical advantages in driving up costs in anticipation of the Legal Aid Board withdrawing support on the basis of costs benefit.Another controversial issue is the question of publicity.

Although advertising is permitted by the Law Society, and potentially plays a crucial role in group litigation where limitation or cut-off dates must be met, it has been criticised by the courts and the LAB.

The report states that publicity may generate large numbers of claims with little or no prospect of success.Some forms of advertising may be inappropriate and guidelines may be required (though there will inevitably be difficulties in determining exactly what amounts to an acceptable advertisement), but does advertising necessarily produce meritless claims? The board has recognised the importance of advertising.

In the recent fluorosis litigation, legal aid was refused, inter alia, on the basis that the absence of advertising prevented the board from assessing the likely number of claimants.There are also problems where opponents become involved in the process of the granting or continuation of legal aid.

Pre-emptive strikes in the form of representations to the board by defendants run the risk of the board sitting in judgment over the merits of the claims rather than determining whether the statutory tests are satisfied.

This debate has probably now gone beyond the stage where the practice will be prohibited, though there is some irony in the fact that plaintiffs' solicitors are not permitted to attack defendants' sources of funding, for example by writing to insurance companies, since professional rules prevent them from directly contacting other solicitors' clients.

The present need is for opponents' representations to be regulated.

The confidentiality essential to legal aid must be maintained, and representations should only be permitted at certain key times of the litigation.

An unlimited facility to submit representations drives up costs because of the need for responses from the plaintiffs.Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the report is its suggestion that certain types of multi-party actions, such as pharmaceutical cases, be referred to an alternative forum such as a drugs compensation tribunal.

We oppose this both because many of the problems with the courts would be reduced if some of the report's other recommendations were adopted, and because of other potential difficulties transcending anything yet experienced in the courts.It is doubtful whether a tribunal could further either the parties' or the public's interests arising out of multi-party actions.

With regard to the former, courts, however imperfect, are public institutions deriving their legitimacy from the constitutional restraints of judicial office.

Can we similarly guarantee the ability of tribunal members to remain independent and to solve complex legal and factual problems? It is essential that those selected to sit on tribunals are above any influence from interested parties.

Medics and academics may, for example, be conscious of possible threats to research grants from industry, irrespective of whether such pressure was intended.

If formal procedural protections are introduced into the tribunal procedures, as they must, then it becomes no more than a surrogate court, and as expensive as the present system.The public interest arising out of multi-party actions requires the creation of legal and factual precedents.

Litigation such as asbestos and thalidomide demonstrates the extent to which private disputes can provide crucial information relating to public health, consumer safety and environmental protection.

Administrative tribunals have never produced the same level of public awareness, arguably because they can either be 'captured' by the industry they are regulating, or because by abandoning the adversarial approach, they lack the incentives for uncovering the truth.

In terms of determining the standards set by the rule of law, is it constitutional to vest these kinds of tribunals with the power to dictate society's standards?These are just some of the issues arising out of the LAB's report.

They must be resolved by a co-ordinated amendment to the court and legal aid rules, together with the provision of judicial management guidelines, if we are to avoid the spectre of a civil justice system which serves no one's interests.