District Judge Michael Walker takes the first of a two-part look at the 35th update of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR)

Someone in the Department for Constitutional Affairs likes to cut deadlines finely.

While the statutory instrument (SI 1306/ 2004) that contains the most recent rule changes was laid before Parliament on 11 May 2004, the 35th update itself was only released on 28 May, when the amendments to the practice directions were available for the first time.

Here we deal with the substantive amendments in force on 1 June 2004.

It might in future be slightly easier for the Attorney-General to apply to have someone declared a vexatious litigant, as a new rule 5.4A now permits the attorney to search and obtain copies of any court file when preparing an application.

In reality, however, Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 provides a much faster remedy in the majority of cases.

If any court considers that an application or a claim is totally devoid of merit it should say so, and this reason should appear on the face of the order.

A judge at any level of court can then be invited to make a civil restraint order if a litigant makes a number of vexatious applications in a single set of proceedings all of which have been dismissed as being totally devoid of merit.

Such an order will restrain the litigant from making any further applications in those proceedings without first obtaining the permission of the court.

And if that does not do the trick then the remedies are an extended civil restraint order or even a general civil restraint order.

A new rule 30.8 is inserted providing that claims under chapter I or II of part I of the Competition Act 1998, as well as claims arising an issue under articles 81 or 82 of the Treaty of Rome, must be transferred to the Chancery Division at the Royal Courts of Justice.

The really keen may also like to look up the amendment to practice direction 52, paragraph 21.10A or the amendments to both of the practice directions for competition law claims.

The success fee in road traffic accident cases to which section II of part 45 applies (namely, fixed recoverable costs in costs-only proceedings involving RTA cases valued at less than 10,000, outside of the small claims track, where the accident happened on, or after, 6 October 2003) is 12.5% of the fixed recoverable costs.

A new part 45 section III now builds on that scheme.

In those cases to which section III applies (RTA disputes arising on or after 6 October 2003, outside of the small claims track or its scope if not allocated, and not falling within the costs-only provisions of section II) the success fees will be:

- For solicitors - 100% where the case concludes at trial; 12.5% otherwise.

- For counsel - 100% where the case concludes at trial; if a fast track case, 50% if the claim concludes 14 days or less before the date fixed for the commencement of the trial or 12.5%; otherwise, if a multi-track case, 75% if the claim concludes 21 days or less before the date fixed for the commencement of the trial or 12.5%; otherwise, 12.5% if the case is issued, but settles before allocation to track; 12.5% in relation to costs-only proceedings.

And if that were not enough to remember, rule 45.17 goes on to deal with how to define 'the date fixed for the commencement of the trial'.

Rule 45.18 provides a mandatory escape route in the catastrophic cases where the damages, agreed or ordered, exceed 500,000 (or would have been so were it not for a finding of contributory negligence), and where either the solicitors' success fee or that of counsel would otherwise be 12.5%.

Under that escape route, the court must either assess the percentage increase or make an order for the percentage increase to be assessed.

However, there is a sting in the tail of rule 45.19 for any claimant if the percentage increase is actually assessed at no more than 20% and less than 7.5%.

What is curious is why the claimant should not pay the costs of the assessment if the success fee would otherwise have been 12.5% and the court assesses it at less than 7.5%.

No doubt someone holds the explanation.

Turning to exclusion orders under section 38(4) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, sadly, these are no more.

Rule 56.2(4) is gone.

Gone too is all revenue they raised for the Court Service.

But no tears will be shed either by the practitioners who had to produce all of that documentation in triplicate or by the district judges whose only joy was to find a mistake or two in them.

Moving on to claims under section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.

For the last five years since the CPR were introduced in April 1999, war has raged between judges who saw the CPR as there to be enforced and practitioners who strove to avoid their rigours at every turn.

The Regulatory Reform (Business Tenancies) (England and Wales) Order 2003 (SI 2003/3096) represents an effective truce.

The courts still have to be used, but a new rule 56.3 imposes a much-relaxed regime.

Opposed lease renewal applications will now be handled under part 7, as modified by the amended practice direction 56, paragraph 3; part 8 will be restricted to unopposed applications.

For those under part 8, the rules of evidence in CPR 8.5 and 8.6 are disapplied, the claim form must be served within two months of issue and the court will give directions after the acknowledgement of service has been filed.

The three-month stay has gone as part of the substitution of the new CPR 56.3.

There is much in the detail; property litigators need to read the new rule and the revised practice direction 56 for a full appreciation of all the changes.

And what if your client goes bust? There may be the threat of a bankruptcy restriction order (BRO).

A whole new set of 29 paragraphs is introduced as paragraphs 16A.I-16A.29 to the practice direction on insolvency proceedings.

If granted, a BRO can run for between two and 15 years.

The practice direction sets out how the secretary of state or the Official Receiver should make the application, the evidence needed, how to oppose the BRO being made, the hearing, making either full or interim order and how to deal with undertakings.

District Judge Walker sits at Wandsworth County Court