The Defamation Bill, which was laid before the House of Lords last week, provides for significant changes to the law.

In a related move, the Lord Chancellor's Department proposes to in troduce new measures for judges to control defamation actions.

This, to some extent, presages Lord Woolf's civil justice reform proposals.The most significant change brought by the Bill is the introduction of a summary procedure.

Currently, defamation actions cannot be resolved by summary judgment under RSC ord 14.

Under the Bill the court, without a jury, on its own motion, or on an application from any party, may dismiss the plaintiff's claim, or the defence, if either have 'no realistic prospect of success' and there is no other reason why the matter should proceed to trial.

If judgment is entered for the plaintiff, summary relief may be awarded.

This may be simply a declaration that the words complained of were defamatory, an order that the defendant publish a suitable correction or apology, damages not exceeding £10,000 or an order restraining the defendant from further publishing the matter complained of.Allied to this new procedure is the LCD's proposal that all defamation actions should come before a judge at an early stage.

This, if enacted, is the first implementation of the proposal in Lord Woolf's interim report that all civil matters come before a judge to determine the action's future conduct.Last December, in John v MGN Ltd [1995] The Times, 14 December, the Court of Appeal introduced radical rules on how juries in defamation actions are to be addressed on the question of damages (see [1995] Gazette, 24 January, 26).

These are likely significantly to reduce future jury awards.

This judgment, together with the proposals for the new summary procedure, could shape a new regime for defamation actions, with many matters being resolved modestly at the summary stage with significant costs savings.Another factor which should encourage early settlement is the change to the offer of amends defence where there has been an innocent or accidental defamation.

Publishers will no longer have to show that they took all reasonable care in relation to the publication; the onus will be on the plaintiff to show that the publisher did have the requisite knowledge.

Plaintiffs are assisted as the publisher must offer to pay damages.

These damages, if not agreed, can be assessed by the court.

A sensible updating of the law on defamation appears in the new defence of innocent dissemination.

This is of particular Interest to Internet service providers.

This defence applies where the defendant is merely a conduit.

It will not, therefore, ever apply to the author, editor or publisher.

Specifically, the Bill provides that a person will not be the author, editor or publisher if he is merely a processor, distributor or seller, the broadcaster of a live programme or the operator of a communications system over which defamatory statements are made by persons over whom the operator has 'no effective control'.

The defence will be available if such persons can show that they took reasonable care in relation to the words complained of and if they did not know, and had no reason to believe, that they were contributing to any defamation.This includes the Lord Chancellor's approach to certain Internet problems which have already arisen in the USA.

In the now notorious US case of Stratton Oakmont Ink v Prodigy Services Co 23 Media Law Report 1794, a service provider was held liable for words which appeared on its bulletin board when it had sought to exercise some control over them.

The control was in relation to obscene, not defamatory, material, but the court still held that the defence of innocent dissemination failed.

This has led to the odd conclusion that a service provider who exercises no control is more likely to have a defence than an arguably more responsible one who exercises some, but insufficient, control.Much will depend on the court's interpretation of 'no effective control'.

If construed restrictively, the defence will be of little use to service providers.

It might be argued that they could all have absolute control over statements transmitted on their systems if they wanted to.

It would also be a weakness in the defence if Prodigy were followed and an operator was held to have 'effective control', even where that control was not in relation to defamatory material.

The courts will also have to give guidance over what is meant by 'reasonable care' in this particular context.

In the case of Internet service providers it is hard to see what care might be expected, given the fast flow of information, although the court will probably expect some policing of the system.The Bill will also abolish the rule in Scott v Sampson [1882] 8 QBD 491.

A defendant will be able to rely on specific acts of misconduct by the plaintiff to reduce damages.

This may help prevent over-compensation, but could lead to an increase in 'muck-raking'.The Bill will reduce the limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood actions from three years to one year.

However, the court will have the discretion to extend this.

Finally, the Bill extends the defences of absolute and qualified privilege and provides that, in defamation proceedings, evidence of a person's conviction will no longer be conclusive proof that he committed the offence, unless that person is the plaintiff.

Procedural changes-- New summary procedure allowing cases to be dismissed or summary relief granted including damages of up to £10,000.

-- Limitation period reduced to one year.New defences-- Defence of innocent dissemination extended and updated.-- Offer of amends defence made easier.

-- Scope of qualified and absolute privilege extended.Evidential changes-- Convictions no longer conclusive proof of guilt except against plaintiffs.

-- Rule in Scott v Sampson abolished.