Will litigators feel reassured or more concerned now that the agenda for Lord Woolf's far-reaching work is known? One of the themes is that the court should have greater control over the conduct and speed of cases.

Assigning individual judges or teams of judges to cases is one approach, greater use of technology another.

Both require increased resources - more money.

It is therefore disconcerting to learn that Lord Woolf has indicated that he has no reason to believe that there will be any extra resources available.Automatic striking out in the county court is one such control which, although well intentioned, has led to a stream of expensive litigation and delays as complications are slowly ironed out.

This relates not only to the drafting of the rule, but also to its operation.

It would have been preferable for the courts to despatch notices to the parties before the striking out but the technology to do this is not in place.

Reforms must result in policy that puts court technology at the top of the agenda.-- Automatic strike-outLitigation concerning automatic striking out (CCR ord 17, r.11(9)) continues.

Gardner v London Borough of Southwark [1994] CA, 19 April, concerned an appeal by the plaintiff against the dismissal of his application to reinstate his claim.

After Rastin there is still the world of difference between the court having the power to reinstate and getting it to exercise that discretion.

The onus is on the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the case indicates that the duty to progress the case diligently is on the plaintiff.

Diligence is judged by reference to the procedural rules.

As a plaintiff you must comply with these rules and ensure that the defendant also complies by taking out applications if delays occur.

The mere fact that limitation has not expired so that you can issue fresh proceedings is not to be taken into account (there is still some uncertainty as to whether you can proceed with a second action but most district judges allow it).The fact that the defendants would have supported an application to extend the time is not conclusive; the court now has control and it is not bound to grant consent orders.

The courts are not happy with the prospect of both sides effectively varying the timetable to slip back into what Lord Justice Henry referred to as 'the bad old days'.Plaintiffs may well take issue with some of the court's perceptions.

A tripping injury with two defendants - one of them a building contractor - a fight on liability, allegations of drink and a third party on the horizon may well have been a small claim in terms of quantum, but was it 'a simple and straightforward claim'? The 15-month time limit might well be about right but is the six-month time limit really 'generous'?I confess that I have yet to apply for a trial date within the six months, although the extensions I have sought have been short and of course eminently reasonable.

There is a growing school of thought that plaintiffs need to let the court have full reasons in consent applications, either by a short appointment or by covering letter giving the court the opportunity to fix an appointment if it is not satisfied.

The rule continues to provide an effective argument for technology in the office as well as in the court.Greater speed is also advocated by RSC ord 32, r.3, which requires that summonses be served, together with any evidence to be relied upo n, within 14 days of issue.

This may be to stop late service but rules are already in place counting back from the return date.

If these are perceived to be unfair then it should be these which are altered.

This rule measures speed by disclosure and not by reference to the length of time between the issue and return date.Having to wait three months for a relatively short appointment is one of the prime causes of delay in litigation and has led to the practice of issuing 'in advance' even if the application does not ultimately proceed.

This is particularly common in interim payment applications.

This change creates work at an early stage without addressing the real cause of the delay.-- AnimalsAt first sight, automatic striking out may appear to have little in common with animal cases.

However, in terms of enquiries the previous clear leader, automatic striking out, was beaten by the horse case I reported on in the last column (see [1994] Gazette, 13 July, 18).

It may therefore be tempting fate to refer to dog cases.In R v Bezzina [1994] 3 All ER 964 it was held that s.3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 imposed strict liability on the owners or handlers of dogs or any breed which are 'dangerously out of control' in public places.

It is an objective standard and the fact that the owner had no realisation that his dog might behave in this matter was irrelevant, since the onus was on the owner to take effective steps to ensure that the dog did not cause injury to others.The Act has not been free from controversy.

It has proved difficult to apply it to a pack situation and vets have claimed that thousands of dogs have been detained pending trial to determine breed at a cost to the taxpayer of £25,000 in kennel fees.

Other cases include Curtis v Betts [1989] Daily Telegraph, 18 December, which held that the owner of a normally amiable dog had to pay a small boy who was bitten by it, and Smith v Ainger [1990] The Times, 5 June, where the owner was liable where the dog was known to have a propensity to attack.

On 15 August 1993 the Daily Telegraph reported the case of a 12-year-old girl who had been awarded £7500 by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board on the basis that an owner who takes a dog into a public place knowing it is dangerous is 'criminally reckless'.-- Structured settlementsIn September the Law Commission published its final paper on structured settlement and interim and provisional damages (CM 2646).

It recommends the creation of a statutory scheme to rationalise the procedures for making a structured settlement and supports payments being made directly by the life office to the plaintiff whilst preserving the tax advantages.The commission has decided against giving the court the power to impose a structure on the parties.

The total responses to the consultation were slightly in favour but here, as elsewhere, the commission is proceeding cautiously; it holds back from making recommendations on several controversial issues including discounts, intermediaries, commission and disclosing purchase price.

The commission supports the use of actuarial tables and money market information as a more scientific approach to the multiplier in lump sum damages but does not support a change in the law to introduce provisional damages in cases of 'gradual deterioration'.Consultation papers on general damages, bereavement damages and nervous shock will be issued before the end of the year and empirical research into the way victims of personal injury use their awards will be published in October.

Early signs ind icate that the representative sample of over 700 victims will show that prudent investment triumphs over the pools-win syndrome.-- Video nastiesThe problem with 'cards on the table' is that this seems to apply more to plaintiffs than defendants.

Some form of plaintiff's offer to settle is well overdue.

Khan v Armaguard [1994] The Times, 4 March, has done something to redress the balance.

The Court of Appeal held that it would now be extremely rare for an order for non-disclosure of a video to be made.

Videos which the defendants contest show malingering will therefore be seen pre-trial.

There are some interesting ethical questions surrounding the tactics that the makers of these videos employ to obtain the evidence and guidance on this from the courts would be welcome.-- Nervous shockSion v Hampstead Health Authority [1994] The Times, 10 June, held that a statement of claim can be amended with the leave of the court under RSC ord 20, r.5(5) after the limitation period has expired in order to add or substitute a new course of action arising out of the same facts as those already pleaded but which discloses no sustainable cause of action.

The amendment will not always be allowed.

A plaintiff whose original claim was 'manifest nonsense' will not be allowed to change it after the limitation period has expired.Another case concerning psychiatric injuries is R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p.

Johnson [1994] CA, 20 July.

The case concerned a woman who suffered psychiatric injuries after discovering the murdered body of a friend.

The direct attributibility test under the scheme does not function according to the same criteria as the reasonable foreseeability test for nervous shock in personal injury cases.

It must first be established that there was an injurious after-effect brought on by the shock amounting to something more than emotional upset.

You have then to establish that the injury was caused by finding the body.

Foreseeability can be relevant to whether the evidence establishes causation.-- Multi-party claimsThis summer the Legal Aid Board published its paper entitled 'Issues arising for the Legal Aid Board and the Lord Chancellor's Department from multi-party claims'.

The successful litigation for some of the Lloyd's Names and the successful judicial review in the smoking cases has kept multi-party claims in the news.

There have also been recent hard-fought taxations arising out of the Marchioness disaster and British Midland Airways crash at Kegworth.

These have dealt with the status of steering committees, recoverability of liaison costs and, indeed, in one case whether it was actually a multi-party action.

It cannot be satisfactory for these matters to be left until the end of the case; neither the plaintiffs' or defendants' advisors can properly advise their client about costs.These and other associated issues are being addressed by the Law Society's working party on group actions.

There are at present no rules which are designed to deal with this relatively new concept.

This gives rise to enormous practical problems.

Group actions are different; it must be recognised that they are more than a bunch of individual claims.

It is a complex process but if the mechanics do not change the creature may become extinct.I recently lectured in Cambridge to women returning to the law after career breaks of up to 14 years.

The task made me appreciate the phenomenal changes which have taken place in litigation even within the last five years.

The good news for my audience was that it is still changing a nd therefore newcomers and old hands need to adapt and be flexible.

Gone are the 'bad old days' - it is now a brave new world.