My new year commenced with a spell as an advocate at an inquest which caused me to renew my acquaintance with the Coroners Rules 1984.JThe practice of adjourning inquests judicially to review the coroner on a point of law was considered in R v Greater London Coroner, ex p.
Diesa Koto [1993] Independent, 21 September, which indicated that this should only be used in exceptional circumstances.The court also indicated that the verdict of unlawful killing should be left to the jury where there is evidence which cannot be rejected as incredible or worthless.
However, the evidence as to how the death occurred did not give room for a verdict of lack of care which was defined as failure to provide care rather than carelessness.The coroner in R v HM Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, ex p.
Jamieson [1993] Independent, 12 July, was also entitled to disregard the issue of lack of care.
This inquest was into the death of a prisoner who had hanged himself while he was left unsupervised in a cell and it would only have been relevant if the deceased had been deranged and in need of constant attention.R v Coroner for Western District of East Sussex, ex p.
Homberg [1994] Independent, 27 January, indicated that the coroner's duty to inquire how the deceased came by his death did not mean an inquiry into the underlying responsibility for every circumstance which might have contributed to the death - in this case the lack of fire escape in a death caused by a fire.Case after case has stressed the limited nature of inquests and the fact that the verdict should not be framed so as to appear to determine any question of criminal or civil liability.
This causes frustration in an already emotionally charged atmosphere.
R v HM Coroner for Inner West London, ex p.
Perks [1993] The Times, 13 July, indicated that the coroner did not display apparent bias towards the relatives of the victims of the Marchioness disaster in deciding not to resume the inquests three years later, notwithstanding that he had described one of them as 'unhinged'.An inquest cannot take the place of a public inquiry but sometimes an inquest is all there is.
The deceased in my inquest lost their lives at Katmandu which made the focus narrower still and a detailed report by an international team of aircraft investigators was not used because the Nepal government has deemed it confidential.
It is no wonder that one of the coroners referred to above indicated that the system had 'let the relatives down'.Psychiatric injuriesBy way of contrast, the Piper Alpha disaster was the subject of a public inquiry culminating in the report of the Honorable Lord Cullen.
Having been involved in the case and the inquiry I was intrigued to read of the decision in M cFarlane v EE Caledonia [1993] The Times, 30 September, under the headline 'No duty of care to rescuer'.
I had always thought that rescuers were well-placed to recover compensation for psychiatric injury even after the Hillsborough cases.Closer reading indicated that the plaintiff, who was a painter on board a support vessel and did not get closer to the rig than 100 metres, was expressly found not to be a rescuer even though the vessel had assisted in the rescue operations.
The three situations where a plaintiff might be a participant when sustaining psychiatric injury through fear of physical injury to himself were defined as: when within the zone of danger; when outside that zone but because of the sudden and unexpected nature of the event reasonably believing himself to be in it; and when coming into that zone as a rescuer.
Witnessing the horrific scenes at close quarters and fearing for the lives of workmates to whom he was unrelated was not enough.Duty of careThere have been many recent cases on the duty of care.
Managing agents of Lloyd's syndicates using pre-1987 agreements do owe a duty of care to Lloyd's Names (see Arbuthnott v Feltrim [1993] The Times, 30 December).Vendor's estate agents owe a duty of care to purchasers of properties in respect of negligent mis-statements upon which these purchasers relied in entering into the purchase contract (McCullagh v Lane Fox and Partners Ltd [1994] The Times, 25 January).Local authorities, however, do not owe a duty of care towards children in their areas (X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1993] The Times, 24 November).The Law Society, when investigating a complaint made against a solicitor by a client, owes no duty to that client to safeguard him or her against loss caused by the solicitor's conduct (Wood v Law Society [1993] QBD, 28 July).Soap stars exposedIt would be impossible to write this column without some reference to recent libel cases and, although I start by reference to a case involving soap stars and pornographic poses, Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1994], The Times, 12 January, did not attract the same attention as Ms Taylforth's case.
Madge and Harold from Neighbours were understandably annoyed when a photograph accompanying a newspaper article had their heads superimposed onto the bodies of models in the said poses.They conceded that if you read the whole of the text you would realise that it was a mock-up but indicated that a substantial number of readers would not go beyond the photos and headlines.
The Court of Appeal resisted any temptation to comment on the habits of readers of the News of the World and indicated that the publisher was entitled to have the article looked at in its full and proper context.If you do wish to prosecute an action for libel to clear your name you should proceed quickly otherwise the court is entitled to infer that your motive for delay is not a proper one and constitutes an abuse of the process (Grovit v Doctor [1993], Independent, 13 December).Watts v Aldington [1993] The Times, 16 December, was a case against the backdrop of the Lord Aldington/Count Tolstoy libel affair but it is of wider applicability.
Lord Aldington had a judgment of £1,500,000 against Count Tolstoy and Nigel Watts but accepted £10,000 plus some other conditions from the latter.
This settlement agreement could not then be used by Count Tolstoy as a release as it was merely an agreement with one losing defendant not to sue on the remainder of the judgment and did not discharge the other losing defendant fro m liability.PaymentsWe now go from a case with two losing defendants to one where two plaintiffs receive one payment in.
In Walker v Turpin [1993] The Times, 2 November, it was accepted that RSC ord 22, r.1(1) allowed a defendant to make one unapportioned payment into court in satisfaction of all the plaintiffs' causes.
However r.1(5) requires the defendant to amend the notice of payment in so as to specify the sum paid in respect of each cause of action if the plaintiff is 'embarrassed' by the payment.The underlying concept of embarrassment involves placing the plaintiff in difficulty which he or she ought not fairly to have to face.
In this case one plaintiff wanted to accept and it was unfair to him because he was deprived of the opportunity so to do.
It was also unfair to the plaintiff who wanted to reject because he knew that he was compelling his co-plaintiff to go ahead against his wishes.
The court therefore ordered the amendment to be made.RSC ord 29, r.11 concerning interim payments was examined in Stringman v McArdle [1993] The Times, 19 November.
Provided that the conditions of the order were satisfied the judge was not concerned with the use to be made of the money; the judge had to see that the amount was just and did not exceed a reasonable proportion of the damages.
The money was to be used to convert a home for a paralysed plaintiff and the concern expressed was that there was insufficient money left for the plaintiff's future care.
This is a potential argument in structured settlement cases where significant interim payments can cause difficulties in any event but this is surely a matter for the plaintiff and his or her advisers.
The decision also seems to support the case that there is no requirement for need.Expert evidenceRather against the run of play, leave to adduce expert evidence at a late stage (three weeks before trial) was refused in Winchester Cigarette Machinery Ltd v Payne [1993] The Times, 19 October.
It was held that where prejudice to a party would result because of the need to seek an adjournment of the trial so as to deal with this evidence it was right to refuse an application under RSC ord 38, r.36.
In addition, a default judgment obtained due to a breach of an 'unless order' was upheld in Caribbean General Insurance v Frizzell Brokers [1993] The Times, 4 November.
A combination of repeated failure and absence of excuse by the plaintiff together with prejudice to the defendant influenced the court in this instance.CostsWith the issue of conditional fees still being hotly debated it was interesting to note the case of British Waterways Board v Norman [1993] The Times, 11 November.
The respondent was on income support but there was no legal aid available to her in the proceedings against the board.
The board maintained that in these circumstances there must have been an express or implied agreement between the respondent and her solicitors not to charge her in the event that she lost.
The court agreed that she had not incurred any liability for costs and therefore the applicant who was the losing party did not have to pay her costs.On the subject of costs also look out for Joyce v Kammac [1988] Ltd [1993] Liverpool CC, 20 October, which held that a solicitor who works for a client on green form is not entitled to any excess of costs over the statutory financial limit from the Legal Aid Board, the assisted person, the other party (who in this case was the paying party) or anyone else.Criminal injuriesThe changes to the criminal injuries compensation scheme were an nounced in a white paper published in December.
This long-awaited document has been widely criticised but it is not a consultation document and the changes will take effect on 1 April 1994.R v CICB, ex p.
Gambles [1994] The Times, 5 January, concerned an applicant who had willingly engaged in violence and had received serious injuries.
Para 6 of the scheme was considered and it was open to the board to award no compensation, full compensation or something between the two.
The board had to examine whether the applicant's behaviour made a full award inappropriate and if so to what extent that behaviour impacted on the appropriateness of the award.
They then had to consider what award he should receive.
All three steps had to be carried out in order.Civil justice reviewThe independent working party, set up jointly by the General Council of the Bar and the Law Society, published its report, 'Civil justice on trial - the case for change' last year but reforms will have to be prioritised on the grounds of ease and cost of implementation.
One of its recommendations is for uniformity of procedure between the High Court and the county court.A difference was illustrated in Rolph v Zolan [1993] Independent, 19 May.
The difference between CCR ord 7, r.1 and 10, and RSC ord 10, r.1 means that a county court summons posted to the defendant's last known address and forwarded to Spain by a friend was properly served; the rules could not be restricted to 'within the jurisdiction' in the same way as in the High Court.
The case may also be of passing interest because the defendant was a solicitor who had emigrated to Spain to start a new career as a guitarist and flamenco dancer.
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