In 1963, Lord Reid said: 'We do not have a developed system of administrative law - perhaps because until fairly recently we did not need it.

So it is not surprising that in dealing with new types of cases the courts have had to grope for solutions, and have found that old powers, rules and procedures are largely inapplicable to cases which they were never designed or intended to deal with,' (Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40).Much has happened since then.

Indeed, such was the 'upsurge of judicial activism' (Lord Roskill, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374) that by the mid-1980s the courts were proudly acknowledging that 'the English law relating to judicial control of administrative action has been developed upon a case-to-case basis which has virtually transformed it over the last three decades', (Lord Diplock, Council of Civil Service Unions).The initiative seized by the domestic courts is well documented.

Our law has embraced new areas amenable to review; novel grounds for judicial intervention; new procedural rules; and a redefinition of the role of remedies.

Not that English administrative law is at, or even nearing, the end of its journey towards maturity.

Room has yet to be found for a general obligation on public decision-makers to give reasons for their decisions, or a general power in the courts to award compensation for 'maladministration'.At the judicial summit the signs are, however, that the flame lit by Lord Reid and carried by Lord Diplock has been taken up by Lord Woolf and his colleagues.

But just as important is the presence at a lower altitude of those who are prepared to blaze the trail.In two recent Greenpeace cases, 'first instance' judges took significant steps in the further upbringing of our administrative law, quietly exercising their discretion to override two of the principal obstacles traditionally placed in the path of the responsible public interest group: the standing objection and the costs burden.

The steps taken are complementary developments, each of which marks the rejection of a heresy based on the false analogy of judicial review with 'ordinary civil litigation'.The first case was Greenpeace's challenge to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Polution's grant of a licence 'variation' to allow BNFL to conduct testing in preparation for THORP (R v HMIP, ex p.

Greenpeace [1993] The Independent, 30 September).

Though the application failed, BNFL's argument that Greenpeace lacked standing to bring such a challenge was emphatically rejected by Otton J, in the exercise of his disc retion.Otton J's conclusion that Greenpeace had locus standi fits well with the line of cases which recognise 'the desirability of the courts recognising, in appropriate cases, the right of responsible citizens to enter the lists for the benefit of the public, or a section of the public, of which they themselves are members,' (Nolan LJ, R v Legal Aid Board, ex p.

Bateman [1992] 1 WLR 711) and thus the respectability of affording to 'individuals...liberal access under a generous conception of locus standi (Lord Wilberforce, Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435).It is surely time for the editors of Supreme Court Practice to re-think their comment that: 'Clearly, the formula "sufficient interest" is not intended to create a class of person, popularly referred to as a "private attorney-general", who seeks to champion public interests in which he is not himself directly or personally concerned, under the guise of applying for judicial review,' (Vol I at 53/1-14/11).Other jurisdictions recognise the concept of citizen actions.

What is more, the Law Commission has expressed concern at English law's previous failure to grasp the nettle, provisionally recommending clarification that our law of standing 'recognises the appropriateness, in certain circumstances, of public interest challenges to regulations and decisions including decisions affecting the public in general,' (consultation paper No.126 p.64).But Otton J's insight goes beyond the mere notion of the 'citizen action' to the fact that a mature public law system should afford to a public interest group a position more favourable even than that of the 'public-spirited citizen'.

Otton J expressed a preference for action by the responsible public interest group over that of an individual citizen.This was the heart of his Lordship's reasoning: 'I have not the slightest reservation that Greenpeace is an entirely responsible and respected body with a genuine concern for the environment...It seems to me that if I were to deny standing to Greenpeace those they represent might not have an effective way to bring the issues before the court.

There would have to be an application either by an individual employee of BNFL or a near neighbour.

In this case it is unlikely that either would be able to command the expertise which is at the disposal of Greenpeace.

Consequently a less well-informed challenge might be mounted, which would stretch unnecessarily the court's resources and which would not afford the court the assistance it requires to do justice between the parties...[This would not] have the advantage of an application by Greenpeace, who, with its particular experience in environmental matters, its access to experts in the relevant realms of science and technology - not to mention the law - is able to mount a carefully selected, focused, relevant and well-argued challenge.'The heresy which the Otton judgment can be seen to have exploded is the notion that a public interest group seeking judicial review is to be treated as being akin to a group action in 'ordinary' civil proceedings.

This misapprehension was fuelled by earlier cases like (R v IRC, ex p.

National Federation of Self-Employed [1982] AC 617 and R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p.

Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990] 1 QB 504 in each of which it appeared to have been conceded that the group applicant was simply an amalgam of individuals and could be in no stronger position than would any one of them.The second case was Greenpeace's challenge to the government's decision to commission TH ORP without holding a public inquiry and without proper application of the EU principle of 'justification' (R v Environment Secretary, ex p.

Greenpeace [1994] The Independent, 8 March).

This application also failed, though it was regarded by the court as having been responsibly brought and properly pursued.

The government and BNFL argued that their legal costs should be paid by the unsuccessful applicant.

One irony which emerges is that a factor mentioned by Otton J in expressing a preference for Greenpeace as applicant, rather than an individual citizen, was its ability to meet an order for costs should it fail.Potts J reached the conclusion, in the exercise of his discretion, that there should be no order as to costs, saving Greenpeace an estimated £200,000 to £250,000.

His Lordship relied on three matters: that this was a case of substantial public interest; that leave had been granted; and that Greenpeace had succeeded on one important point - justification under EU law - thus clarifying the law for the future.The question is to what extent the first two points explode the heresy that, in relation to costs, judicial review proceedings are 'ordinary civil proceedings' to which the 'ordinary' rule should apply.

This is, after all, the premise which underlies the Crown Office's 'Official notes for guidance', which refers to the 'general rule that the party which loses is ordered to pay the costs of the other side'.

Again, other 'mature' jurisdictions, notably those which recognise special standing rules, have endorsed special costs rules in administrative law cases, so as to encourage - or at least not discourage - litigation which is in the public interest.The simple point is that judicial review is a special jurisdiction.

It is certainly not always characterised as 'civil proceedings' (see eg Re Waldron [1986] QB 824).

Furthermore, there is a long line of reported cases which show that it is perfectly respectable for a court to refuse to impose a costs burden on an unsuccessful applicant who has brought to light a matter of public interest.

Pre-Greenpeace, the most recent was the Privy Council decision in New Zealand Maori Council, making no order as to costs on the appeal since: 'The applicants were not bringing the proceedings out of any motive of personal gain [but]...in the interest of taonga which is an important part of the heritage of New Zealand...[This was] an important area of the law which it was important that their Lordships examine,' (Lord Woolf, New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General of New Zealand [1994] 2 WLR 254).The Law Commission has seen the point.

Its 1993 consultation paper considers the argument that 'where an application brought in good faith in the public interest is unsuccessful, the applicant should not be obliged to pay the other side's costs', since 'it could be said that the usual principle of costs being awarded to the successful party is really designed for civil litigation concerning the vindication of private rights'.The commission's (provisional) recommendation is that: 'Where leave has been granted on the footing that the application discloses arguable grounds that the court ought to exercise its prerogative jurisdiction, we consider that it may be appropriate to disapply the usual costs rules, on the footing that they are inappropriate to the nature of the jurisdiction,' (Law Commission consultation paper No.126).The Greenpeace cases contain clear signs that English courts may no longer be willing to allow procedural rules to discourage responsible and well-resourc ed public interest groups, which can show that there is a legitimate case to answer, from bringing their concerns to the judicial forum.

Further questions remain, such as whether the recent endorsement (R v Darlington Borough Council, ex p.

Association of Darlington Taxi Owners [1994] The Independent, 13 January) of the need for a group applicant to satisfy orthodox requirements of legal capacity is yet another hurdle based on a misplaced analogy with 'ordinary private proceedings'.The initiatives seized in the Greenpeace cases are surely further signs of English administrative law's progress towards maturity.

One drawback for would-be applicants is that each is capable of being marginalised as an exercise of judicial discretion, rather than a statement of any general principle.

However, given their significance, it may be that the appellate courts - or, better still, Parliament - will find the opportunity to endorse what Otton and Potts JJ have achieved.