Media law

Beckham's signature - a sign of the times?

McManus & Others v Beckham

Victoria Beckham will have fond memories of the US given that her son Brooklyn is named after the New York City borough in which she discovered that she was pregnant.

However, American Independence Day, 4 July 2002, was not a great day for the posh one.

The Court of Appeal in London upheld the claimant's interlocutory appeal in a slander and malicious falsehood action, contested by Ms Beckham, in which parts of the case had previously been struck out.

The effect is that if the claimant is successful, the defendant may be liable for considerably more in damages than one might imagine for an allegedly defamatory publication to an initial audience of five.

In March 2001, so the story goes, Victoria Beckham was shopping at the Bluewater centre in Kent when she noticed an autograph and memorabilia shop with some of her husband's autographs on display.

Apparently, Ms Beckham did not recognise the signatures she saw as resembling the little billets-doux that no doubt David leaves around 'Beckingham Palace' for her.

It is alleged in the particulars of claim that she said to customers in the shop, 'Excuse me but do not buy any autographs from this shop, they are all fakes.

That is not my husband's signature out there...

I just don't want to see you people being ripped off.'

An embarrassing moment for the shop manager, Tim McManus, whose shop assistant insisted to Ms Beckham that the autographs were purchased from a reputable dealer.

Although showing remarkable restraint - 'I want to apologise for upsetting her, but I also want to resolve this in a respectful and friendly atmosphere ...

this is a small family business and we like all our customers to be happy' - Mr McManus's patience may have been sorely tested when this incident was later widely reported in the national press, including the Daily Mirror, the News of the World and the Sunday Mirror.

And even more so when his profits, it is alleged, started to decline dramatically.

Issuing slander and malicious falsehood proceedings against Ms Beckham for the allegation that they were 'in the habit of dishonestly and fraudulently ripping off their customers by knowingly selling fake autographs', the claimants relied, in support of the damage that they alleged, on both the extensive coverage of the matter in the national press and on Ms Beckham's own celebrity status.

It was argued: 'The defendant routinely and assiduously courts publicity in all forms of media in relation to all aspects of her personal and professional career and many aspects of her private life.

As [she] well knew and would and did foresee her publication of the words complained of was likely to come to the attention of the national and local media, including in particular the tabloid press...

and was likely to be reported widely in such media in eye-catching and sensational terms and/or repeated in the specialist celebrity autograph market.

Further, or in the alternative, it was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's publication of the said words that reports of them would appear in the media and/or be repeated within the specialist celebrity autograph market.'

The interlocutory judge had considered whether the media articles had repeated the words alleged to have been spoken in the shop and finding that they had not, he struck out the paragraphs pleading the press publication and the losses said to be flowing from them.

The claimants asked the court of appeal to reconsider this and to adjudicate on whether the judge was right to remove from the jury at interlocutory stage, the question as to whether Victoria Beckham could be held liable in damages to them, not only as a result of the original publication to the five in the shop, but also as a result of the further surrounding publicity in the national press.

The general principle in defamation is that a publisher of defamatory words will be liable to a successful claimant in damages.

It has been held that the defendant may be liable for any further resultant damage where: he has authorised further publication of the defamatory words; further publication resulted from a duty on the part of the first publishee to repeat the defamation to a third party; the further publication was the 'natural and probably consequence' of the first publication, or was 'foreseeable'.

The question for consideration here was whether the defendant would be liable for the alleged extensive damage where it was said to have been caused or exacerbated by unauthorised repetitions of the slander which were foreseeable and/or the natural and probably consequence of the original alleged outburst.

The claimants maintained that the contention was at least arguable and correctly a matter to be put to the jury later at trial.

Numerous cases have involved consideration of the general premise over the years.

But this decision has significant importance given that the question of celebrities' rights and responsibilities is one of great debate and interest in today's media ruled world.

The Court of Appeal judges concluded that this was indeed a matter to be put before the jury.

In reaching their conclusion, the judges examined thoroughly the many cases on the subject of foreseeability over the years and their rulings serve as a good reference guide to the law on the subject.

But the significance of this decision is perhaps in its consideration of the consequences of the actions of celebrities.

In the leading judgment, Lord Justice Waller saw a danger in limiting the equation simply to the question of foreseeability in analysing responsibility for further publications and resultant damage.

And he helpfully set out for the trial judge the direction that he suggested would be appropriate to give to the trial jury: 'If a defendant is actually aware that what she says or does is likely to be reported, and that if she slanders someone that slander is likely to be repeated in whole or in part, there is no injustice in her being held responsible for the damage that the slander causes via that publication.

I would suggest further that if a jury were to conclude that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have appreciated there was a significant risk that what she said would be repeated in whole or in part in the press and that would increase the damage caused by the slander, it is not unjust that the defendant should be liable for it.'

This libel action is in its infancy and is contested by the defendant.

It remains to be seen what the jury will decide if the matter goes that far on the evidence both sides put before it.

But this decision indicates that parties, be they a celebrity in a posh car or the man on the Clapham Omnibus, must consider the effect of their actions.

A party may be held liable for consequences and damage which they did not intend but which they should have appreciated would flow from their actions.

Although not perhaps what you would expect in an action about a Spice Girl, Lord Justice Laws referred to the pertinent quotation from Virgil's Aeneid in setting out his reasons for agreeing with the decision: 'Defamatory statements are objectionable not least because of their propensity to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs'.

Whether we can expect to hear that sampled in Victoria's next single, remains to be seen.

By Amber Melville-Brown, Schillings, London