There is a book, alas little known, entitled Legal Levities & Brevities written in 1913 by Cholmondeley Harrison of Jesus College, Cambridge.

The author did his best to re-write various parts of the law in rhyming form.One verse referred to Wren v Holt [1903] 1 KB 610 in which the plaintiff recovered damages for breach of the term (implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1893) as to merchantable quality when beer was contaminated by arsenic.Since Mr Harrison wrote his verse, there have been changes which would require him to re-write his lyrics.

It is no longer a pre-condition to the term 'merchantable quality' that the goods be sold by description.

And, thanks to the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, since 3 January 1995, there is no more 'merchantable quality'.The current requirements of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 - that goods supplied in the course of business be of merchantable quality - is replaced by a more modern phrase.Goods will now be required to be of 'satisfactory quality'.

This differs from the recommendation and draft Bill produced by the law commissioners in their report 'Sale and supply of goods' (1987) (Law Com 160, Scot law Com 104), which had recommended 'acceptable quality'.Goods are defined as of satisfactory quality if they 'meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances'.

These were precisely the points which had to be taken into account under the old law when determining if goods were of merchantable quality.What, however, the old law did not do was spell out the matters which fell for consideration in deciding on issues of merchantability.This omission is made good in the 1994 Act, which lists the following, 'among oth ers', as matters which are to be taken into account in appropriate cases: the fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied; appearance and finish; freedom from minor defects; safety and durability.This particular feature of the new law seems important more for its practical value than for any main legislative change produced.

It had already been established in Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd [1987] QB 933 that appearance and pride in ownership of the particular goods was an ingredient in the definition of merchantable quality.

It was also established in Bernstein v Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 220 that safety defects put goods in breach of the condition as to merchantable quality.

On the other hand, it was far from clear, and was indeed almost certainly not the case, that the old law did cover freedom from minor defects, and here probably is an extension of a buyer's rights.What is not apparent is what change is wrought by the express reference to durability.

It was the view of the Law Commission that the old law enshrined a requirement as to durability, though the cases appeared contradictory, as is evidenced by Mash & Murrell Ltd v Emmanuel Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 485, and Crowther v Shannon Motor Co [1975] 1 WLR 30.

Whatever the position might have been, however, it is now clear that durability can be a feature of goods which are to count as satisfactory.

As the Law Commission makes clear, goods will now have to be supplied possessing 'those qualities which will enable them to last in reasonable condition for a reasonable time'.The condition as to satisfactory quality is disapplied where defects have been pointed out, or examination made, but these do not differ in effect from the old law.The present law provides a buyer of a quantity of goods, who finds them to be affected by a breach of contract, with a limited choice: either all the goods must be accepted, or all the goods must be rejected.

The 1994 law changes this by introducing a right of partial rejection.

Now, provided that the buyer accepts all such goods as are unaffected by any breach, he or she may accept only a portion of the goods delivered and reject the rest.

In practice, no doubt, acceptance will be only of those goods which are of the contract quality.

The buyer's rights, in those cases where none of the goods are of such quality, is also to retain such as he or she wishes and reject the rest.

This is, however, a right which is subject to any contrary intention expressed or implied by the contract.If the seller does attempt to exclude the right of partial rejection, his or her success will depend very much on the status of the buyer.

If the latter is a business buyer, then, since the relevant clause is not such as is covered by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, he or she could not call on the seller to prove the clause to be reasonable.

But if the buyer is a consumer, then the latter might be able to show that the clause is unfair under the Unfair Contract Terms Regulations (adoption of which is imminent).The rules of partial rejection are subject to new provisions regarding 'commercial units'.

Such a unit is one, division of which would materially impair the value of the goods or the character of the unit.

Acceptance of any goods within the unit is acceptance of all.

This would mean, for example, that a buyer would not be allowed to accept part and reject part of an item of machinery or equipment.A new provision affects the remedies available to those taking goods in the cour se of a business.

Where such a buyer would otherwise have the right to reject for breach of the implied terms as to description, satisfactory quality or fitness for purpose, he or she will now be deprived of that right if the breach is 'so slight that it would be unreasonable for him' to reject the goods.

The burden of proof lies on the seller.

Here, too, the parties may choose to disapply this particular provision.

Any such provision, obviously inserted by the buyer, would not be subject to the 1977 Act.The effect of the change would seem to be that cases such as Jackson v Rotax Motor & Cycle Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 937 can no longer be treated as good authority.

The goods were purchased for £450 and the cost of putting them right was £35.

The buyer was held entitled to reject the goods, even though the defects, though they could not be said to be trivial, were minor.

Similarly, Winsley Bros v Woodfield Engineering Co Ltd [1929] NZLR 480 - where the defect on an item costing £90 could be repaired for £1 and it was held that the goods were still not merchantable - has now lost its persuasive value.The Sale of Goods Act 1979 deals specifically with the seller who delivers more than the quantity ordered, or less than the quantity ordered.

In the former case, the buyer may accept so much as was actually ordered and reject the balance, or may reject the entire delivery.

The buyer is further entitled to accept all that is tendered and, if this is the case, then he or she must pay for the goods at the contract rate.

In the latter, the buyer may reject the consignment, or accept it, paying at the contract rate.The law is now modified so that, if the shortfall or excess is so slight that it would be unreasonable to allow rejection, then this is a right which is denied, but only to the business buyer.

The burden of proof lies on the seller.It should be appreciated, however, that the law is only modified as to rejection.

There is no change to those provisions relating to a buyer's option to accept a differing quantity from that which was ordered.

Furthermore, where more than the desired quantity is tendered it is only the right to reject the entire quantity which is qualified.

It is still the case that, where only a modest amount in excess is delivered, the buyer need accept only that part which corresponds exactly with the contract quantity.

Unlike the restriction on the right to reject for slight breaches of the implied terms, there is no proviso that this particular restriction is subject to any contrary intention of the parties.S.30(4) of the 1979 Act covers incidents where the contract goods are delivered 'mixed with' goods of a different description.

It provides that the buyer may accept the contract goods and reject the rest, or may reject the entire consignment.

The Law Commission had questioned the utility of this provision, and the 1994 Act repeals it in its entirety without providing any replacement.

It is not now entirely clear what happens in those cases - no doubt extremely rare - where the correct quantity of goods is delivered but mixed with some additional matter.

It may be that the common law will apply not dissimilar remedies so that the buyer can always accept the contract goods and reject the rest, or accept the extraneous items if he or she agrees to pay a reasonable price.

Possibly those provisions of the 1979 Act dealing with deliveries of excess quantities can be interpreted to embrace not just excess quantities of the right goods, but also of the wrong goods.The issue of acceptance is central to a contra ct for the sale of goods.

The moment of acceptance determines just when a buyer is compelled to retain the goods and to seek only damages as compensation for any breach.

The Act of 1979 provides for acceptance when: the buyer intimates acceptance; after the lapse of a reasonable time without any intimation to the seller of rejection; and when the buyer has done an act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, though this last is subject to a prior right to examine the goods.

The 1994 Act amends this position by extending the right of prior examination to cases involving the intimation of acceptance where it is currently stated as applying only to acceptance by an act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller.It was formerly the case that a sub-sale was classically an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership, as evidenced by decisions such as J&J Cunningham Ltd v Raymond A Munro & Co Ltd (1922) 28 Com Cas 42; Hardy & Co (London) Ltd v Hillerns & Fowler [1923] 2 KB 490; and E & S Ruben Ltd v Faire Bros & Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 490.

However, the 1994 Act now expressly provides that acceptance will not arise merely because the goods are delivered to another under a sub-sale or other disposition.This right of prior examination is further supported in a new provision, but one which is applicable only to those not buying in the course of business, which provides that such a buyer does not lose this right 'by agreement, waiver or otherwise'.

The old practice of seeking to deprive a consumer of his right of rejection by securing his acceptance of a delivery note which acknowledged receipt of the goods in the correct condition will now be deprived of its intended effect.

In fact, it was never entirely certain that signing such notes, or a contractual agreement to the effect that the goods have been examined and found to be in good condition, was of itself an act of acceptance.In Libau Wood Co v H Smith & Sons Ltd (1930) 37 Ll L Rep 296, mere receipt of goods without more did not amount to acceptance.

Again, in Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 All ER 611, the Court of Appeal ruled that a contractual term, under which a party agreed that he had not made known the purpose for which goods were wanted, could only estop the relevant party if the other had relied on it to his detriment.

The logic of this case would apply equally to those accepting as a term of the contract that the goods had been examined and found to conform to the contract.The 1994 Act also retains as the final method of acceptance of goods their retention after the lapse of a reasonable time.

This, however, is now linked to the right to examine, but not in the unqualified way as applies to the other methods of acceptance.

It is now spelled out that the issue of lapse of a reasonable time must take note of any reasonable opportunity the buyer might have had to examine the goods.

This may help to alleviate problems such as arose in Bernstein v Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 220.

Here, the buyer of a new car rejected it after giving it its first test run following purchase.

Even though he had had the car for scarcely three weeks, including the Christmas period and a short spell of personal illness, a reasonable time was said to have passed.Passage of time is, however, not made dependent on examination.

This should overcome any problems which would otherwise have arisen where, for legitimate reasons, the goods are left unexamined for some considerable time.A business buying in spare parts may fairly leave these on the shelf without testing for months, even years, but it could not be doubted that in many such cases a reasonable time will have elapsed.

So, also, the consumer who buys goods in the January sales for use as Christmas presents 11 months hence is likely to have accepted them if they are only examined when the recipient takes possession of them.It was never entirely clear that the buyer who sought repair of the goods was thereby implicitly accepting them.

For instance, it was held in JS Robertson (Aust) Pty Ltd v Martin (1955/56) 94 CLR 30 that a claim against insurers in respect of damage to the goods is not inconsistent with the seller's ownership, but no case has ever faced the problem head on.

The Court of Appeal in Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Ltd [1987] QB 933 declined to answer the point which had not been expressly pleaded.

In any event, the 1994 Act makes the position clearer, specifically providing that a buyer does not accept goods merely by asking for, or agreeing to, their repair by or under an arrangement with the seller.

Seeking repair, therefore, would not of itself be looked upon as inconsistent with the seller's ownership; nor would the period of repair be taken into account when looking at issues of lapse of time.Separate legislation, the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994, does away with a piece of history: the exception to the nemo dat rule, whereby good title was guaranteed where goods were bought in market overt (such as every shop within the City of London).

This anachronism was also repealed on 3 January.The first Sale of Goods Act, 1893, made no distinction between private and business buyers.

Since 1973, when exclusions clauses were made to differ in their effect depending on precisely this distinction, there has been a gathering trend for the law to separate out consumers and businesses.

This trend was emphasised in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and has been accentuated in these latest measures and by the forthcoming implementation of the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, which is applicable only to consumers.

It is thought that the next major overhaul of legislation affecting sale should be marked by the adoption of separate enactments for businesses and consumers.