Practice

Government compensation scheme for people surrendering handguns - claimant issuing summons following delay in meeting claim - duty to process claim within reasonable time arguable and private law remedy appropriateSteed v Secretary of State for the Home Department: HL (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Woolf MR, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Clyde and Lord Millett): 18 May 2000

The claimant sought compensation under the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 Compensation Scheme for the value of handguns which he had surrendered pursuant to the provisions of that Act.Having received no compensation within two months of submitting the claim, he issued a summons against the home secretary claiming payment of the compensation with interest.

The home secretary applied to have the summons struck out on the grounds that there was no obligation on his Department to process claims within a reasonable time and that the claimant should have brought his complaint by way of judicial review.

The district judge refused the application.

The judge and Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

The home secretary appealed.Ross Cranston QC, S-G and David Elvin (instructed by treasury solicitor) for the home secretary.

Michael Heywood (instructed by Howell-Jones & Partners, Kingston upon Thames) for the claimant.Held, dismissing the appeal, that it was plainly arguable that when a person was obliged to surrender his property and was to be compensated for it his claim would be considered, approved or rejected within a reasonable time; that it was also plain that a citizen who had given in his gun could challenge in court, by one means or another, what he considered unreasonable delay in the consideration of his claim or the failure to pay in due time; that if the claimant had been making a general challenging to the legality of the operation of the scheme it would have been right for him to have applied for judicial review; but that, since his claim was essentially for money due to him which had not been paid when it was due and interest thereon, there was no issue which might arise which could not be dealt with by a judge hearing the summons; that dealing with such issues would not usurp the province of the administration; and that, accordingly the summons was not an abuse of the process of the court and the judge had been right to refuse to strike it out.

(WLR)