Practice The claimant bank was informed by the police that a money laundering investigation was being conducted into activities closely associated with its customer, A Ltd...The claimant bank was informed by the police that a money laundering investigation was being conducted into activities closely associated with its customer, A Ltd. The bank feared that if it paid out money from A Ltds accounts it could be liable to third parties as a constructive trustee and that if it did not an action could be brought and it would not be able to defend itself because the police objected to it revealing what it had been told and invoked section 93D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as inserted by section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. On the banks application without notice for directions, Lightman J granted an injunction against the bank restraining it from making any payment from the accounts. A Ltd was not to be informed of the orders existence. Mr B and C Ltd were joined as defendants because they had remitted the money into the accounts. The bank subsequently paid the money out to A Ltd. Laddie J then discharged the interim order, holding that it should never have been granted, and ordered the bank to pay the costs of all the defendants: A Bank v A Ltd The Times, 18 July 2000. The bank appealed.Geraldine Andrews (instructed by Underwood & Co) for the bank. Paul Downes (instructed by The Bower Cotton Partnership) for the defendants. Jonathan Crow (Solicitor, Serious Fraud Office) for the SFO.Held, dismissing the appeal, that the court could not envisage any circumstances when it would be appropriate to grant an injunction against the only party seeking relief; that with the development of the courts powers to grant declaratory relief it was not necessary for the bank to establish the status of a trustee in order to obtain relief; that if there was a dispute as to whether a payment could be made or disclosure made, the SFO and the bank should try to resolve it between themselves; that, if they could not do so, an application for interim declaratory relief could be made by the bank with the SFO as the defendant; that if proceedings were brought by the customer against the bank, the bank would have to take a commercial decision as to whether to contest them and, if they were to be contested, they should be conducted as openly as possible; that consideration should be given as to whether it was desirable for the judge who heard any proceedings against the bank to be different from the judge from whom guidance was sought; that the ability of the court to grant an interim advisory declaration must not be regarded as a substitute for financial institutions taking decisions which were their commercial responsibility; that, although the use of the courts power to grant such a declaration would not automatically provide protection against actions by customers or third parties, it was almost inconceivable that a bank which sought the courts guidance would subsequently be held to have acted dishonestly so as to incur accessory liability (WLR).