Action brought after expiry of period for joining group litigation - permission to join group litigation refused - individual action not to be struck out as abuse of process

Taylor v Nugent Care Society: CA (Lord Woolf Lord Chief Justice, Lords Justice Tuckey and Wall): 19 January 2004

In 1997, a group litigation order was made in respect of damages claims by a number of individuals who alleged that they had been sexually abused in the 1970s while at children's homes run by the defendant.

Subsequently, directions specified that those who wished to join the group action had to do so by 31 May 1999.

The claimant commenced his proceedings in December 2001 and sought permission to join the group action, which was refused.

The defendant applied to have the claim struck out as an abuse of the court's process pursuant to CPR rule 3.4(2)(b) and/or under the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The judge, holding that he could not preserve the integrity of the group action and allow the claimant's action to proceed, struck out the claim.

The claimant appealed.

Richard Maxwell QC and Paula Sparks (instructed by Jackson & Canter, Liverpool) for the claimant; Edward Faulks QC (instructed by Hill Dickinson, Liverpool) for the defendant.

Held, allowing the appeal, that it was essential for the court to have wide powers to manage litigation involving a substantial number of claimants, in order to deal with that litigation more efficiently and economically than would otherwise be possible; that, although it was very important that the courts should support a group litigation order appropriately, Civil Procedure Rules part 19 gave the court no power to require a claimant to join a group action covering the issues involved in his litigation; that the court could manage proceedings brought by such a claimant so as to take account of the position of those claimants or defendants who were part of the group action and entitled to have their interests given a higher priority, since they were likely to be a numerically large group and were co-operating with the proper management of the proceedings; that it would not have been possible to bring the claimant's proceedings to an end on the grounds of delay alone, and to strike proceedings out was a Draconian order requiring clear grounds; that it had been disproportionate to strike out the claim when the court could have taken other steps fairly to protect the defendant's position, in particular, by staying the claim until after completion of the group action or part of it, requiring that the claimant be bound by the generic decisions in the group action, and ordering that the defendant should not pay additional costs to those which it would have had to pay had the claimant been part of the group action; and that, accordingly, the claim would be restored but stayed until the judge in charge of the group action had considered an application for directions as to its future management.

(WLR)

Official caution challenged in judicial review proceedings - proceedings 'criminal cause or matter' - no appeal lying to Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

R (Aru) v Chief Constable of Merseyside: CA (Lords Justice Waller, Longmore and Maurice Kay): 30 January 2004

The applicant had accepted an official caution relating to an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.

He sought judicial review of the lawfulness and procedural correctness of the caution.

Mr Justice Elias dismissed the claim.

He sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the judge's findings of fact, but the Civil Appeal Office ordered that there was no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

He appealed with permission of a single Lord Justice.

Leslie Thomas (instructed by Jackson & Canter, Liverpool) for the applicant; John De Bono (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard for the Solicitor, Merseyside Police, Liverpool) for the chief constable.

Held, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, that the words in section 18(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 were 'criminal cause or matter', not 'proceedings'; that the words 'or matter' denoted a wider ambit; that an official caution was another way of disposing of a criminal matter; that it was necessary to regard the inherent nature and consequences of an official caution and the question of the relevance of the caution in relation to good character; that a contrast could be drawn with proceedings relating to anti-social behaviour orders which were civil not criminal because they had a preventative purpose; and that, in all those circumstances, an official caution was a 'criminal cause or matter' and so the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.