A long delayed government white paper on privacy is now said to be imminent; it may well propose introducing a right of privacy into the law of the UK.

It is odd that it is not there already.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prescribes it, as do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Most European countries and the USA have some form of constitutional safeguard for privacy.On the other hand, the piecemeal development of our law has produced a range of separate remedies for most undesirable intrusions into private life.

So is a new remedy for infringement of privacy needed?Entering another person's house or land without permission, or remaining after permission has been withdrawn, is civi l trespass.

Under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, trespass can also be a crime when allied to intimidation or obstruction (s.68).

Other intrusions on occupation of premises may be nuisance, a tort which the Court of Appeal last year widened beyond the invasion of property interests to protect a non-householder pestered by telephone calls (Khorasandjian v Bush (1993) NLJ, 5 March).

Harassment resulting from the use of threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behaviour can now be a criminal offence under the same 1994 Act (s.154).There are sanctions against the disclosure of confidential information.

Breach of confidence actions are more common when the object is to protect commercial interests, but they can be used in cases of personal privacy, for example to protect the disclosure of hospital records to the detriment of the patient (X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648).

The publication of false information may also, of course, justify an action for defamation or malicious falsehood.The problem is not the lack of legal protection for privacy, but the absence of coherent guiding principles within our domestic law.

For those principles we need look no further than the European Convention.

Article 8 says: 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.' Exceptions are valid only if prescribed by law and are 'necessary in a democratic society'.

The exception must be justified by reasons which are both 'relevant and sufficient' (Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, para 59(a)).The dilemma is to reconcile art 8 with the equally authoritative art 10: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.

This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.' The exceptions are no wider than those in art 8.Government reports into privacy have consistently failed to face the problem as a whole.

The Calcutt committee in June 1990 thought that a new tort remedy for infringement of privacy was viable, and proposed a range of new criminal offences to prohibit some blatant forms of physical intrusion.

These included placing surveillance devices on private property with a view to obtaining personal information, and photographing or recording a person on private property.

However, it thought implementation should be delayed in the hope that strengthened self-regulation by a new Press Complaints Commission would make legislation unnecessary.In January 1993 Sir David Calcutt, asked to review the effectiveness of the commission, declared himself unsatisfied.

He thought the time had come for legislation, including the new tort remedy.Two months later the national heritage select committee of the House of Commons published its recommendations.

Unlike Calcutt it tried to link its proposals to freedom of expression.

Enhanced protection of privacy should be accompanied by freedom of information legislation.

But restrictions should not be directed exclusively against the media.In July 1993, the Lord Chancellor's Department reviewed the current law in a consultation paper 'Infringement of privacy'.

Like Calcutt it argued for a new tort remedy against infringement.

Defences would be 'consent, lawful authority, absolute or qualified privilege'.

Remedies would be damages and an injunction to restrain violation or its repetition.Remarkably, this review denied the need for legal aid, citing its absence in defamation cases as a parallel.

Yet all the other e xisting civil remedies qualify for legal aid and the anomalous exclusion of defamation has been repeatedly criticised, not least by the Lord Chancellor's own advisory committee.To introduce a civil action for infringement of privacy without access to legal aid would effectively deny the remedy to the only people likely to deserve or need it: those who are not public figures.In the USA - and increasingly in other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and India - the privacy and reputation of public figures, as distinct from those in whose activities no legitimate public interest can be claimed, are legally protected only against reckless or malicious attacks.

Placing new burdens on the media to demonstrate a public interest in the publication of every story would itself be a huge restraint on freedom of expression.

It would encourage the media to avoid contentious issues - as part of it is already much inclined to do.There is a strong case for a new comprehensive code, embracing freedom of expression and freedom of information, coupled with appropriate safeguards for privacy and reputation, to replace the current random collection of laws and implement the principles set out in art 8 and art 10 of the convention.What we do not need from the white paper are new, one-sided restraints on expression which, in the name of protecting privacy, will merely facilitate concealment from the public of what is done in its name, and with the resources which it provides.