Since the last update (see [1994] Gazette, 23 November, 20) there have been one or two interesting developments.Law of Property(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994S.14 of the Act (which like the rest of the statute is expected to be operative from 1 July 1995, subject to a commencement order being passed) vests an intestate's estate in the public trustee - a corporation sole - for the period prior to obtaining a grant of representation to the intestate's estate.In future the public trustee will take over the powers at present vested in the president of the Family Division in respect of intestates' estates, prior to the grant and, by the new provision, the former's authority is extended to where there is a will but no executor with power to obtain a grant either at the date of death or later.

As soon as the enactment is operative, property already vested in the president of Family Division vests in the public trustee instead, as does the estate of any testator who died earlier and to whose estate the statute will now apply.S.15 validates the registration of a land charge a land under the Land Charges Act 1972 against a person who creates a land charge even though he or she has since died.

At present a land charge can only be registered against an estate owner and nobody can be an estate owner after he or she has died.S.16 enacts that all personal representatives, other than executors, who do not prove, must join in a contract for the sale of land.

Previously, it was not essential for all personal representatives to be a party to the contract so long as they joined in and executed the conveyance.S.17 of the enactment is concerned with provisions about notices.

There are two situations which are covered.

First, where the person serving the notice has no reason to believe the recipient is dead, the notice will in future be deemed to be properly served if served in a way which would have been effective if the recipient were still alive.

For example, if the person who serves the notice has no reason to believe the recipient is dead, he or she can proceed in the usual way.

This provision does not change what has to be done, but confirms the efficacy of the action.If the person serving the notice has reason to believe the recipient has died then, until a grant is filed in the principal probate registry, the notice must be addressed to 'The personal representatives of --' and must be left at the last known address or residence or place of work.

A copy of the notice, addressed in the same fashion, must also be sent to the public trustee.The procedure applies both in respect of intestate persons and to testate persons before the issue of a grant of probate until such time as a grant is filed in the principal registry.

There may, in practice, be some time after a grant is issued out of a district probate registry but there is one advantage: only one search is required to find out whether it still applies.It is intended that the public trustee will keep a register of copy notices which are served on him presumably by the name of deceased and will make copies available.

It is expected regulations on this topic will soon be forthcoming.Income taxThree cases have recently been reported which may be of interest to the practitioner.

In the first case, Deeney v Gooda Walker Ltd [1995] The Times, 26 January it was held that damages payable to Lloyd's Names by their former managing agents were liable to income tax and the damages could not be reduced by any tax saving under the rule in BTC v Gourley [1956] AC 165.

Parker J held that the damages were paid to the Lloyd's Names in respect of their business as underwriters and would be subject to tax under schedule D in their hands.In the second case, Nichols v Gibson (inspector of taxes) [1994] The Times, 12 December, Sir John Vinelott held in the Chancery Division in a reserved judgment that a severance payment by an employer to a former employee after he had ceased to reside in the UK was chargeable to income tax under schedule E.

He held that although none of the cases set out in schedule E applied to the payment, s.187 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 did.In effect s.187(2) created a charge in respect of payments within description referred in that subsection which was independent of the cases under which schedule E was charged.

Under s.187 payments to the holder or past holder of an employment were liable to tax.Finally, on income tax, reference must be made to the case of Allan v IRC, Cullen V IRC [1994] BTC 417.

Mr Allen and Mrs Cullen were in the employ of a clothing company operating in Edinburgh and Glasgow.

It became clear that the company could no longer trade profitably and, therefore, it was decided to wind up the company.

The company paid its employees supplementary redundancy payments over and above the amount to which they were legally entitled.However, as it turned out, the company continued to trade on a reduced scale.

Therefore a number of the employees, who had received redundancy settlements, continued to be employed by the company.

The Inland Revenue, not surprisingly, assessed the employees to tax on the basis that the supplementary redundancy payments were emoluments from their employment.

The tax payers contended that although they were emoluments they were not emoluments from their employment.

The commissioners held the payments were taxable.On appeal to the Court of Session, it was held that the tax payers were liable to tax on the payments.

The payments, it was held, were different in character to redundancy settlements as they were made to all employees regardless of whether they were made redundant or not.

Once it is conceded that a payment is an emolument, then it does not make sense to argue that emolument does not arise out of the tax payers' employment.Other mattersAs from 6 April next the annual exemption for capital gains is increased to £6000 and the inheritance tax threshold to £154,000.

At last the House of Lords has delivered its judgment in White v Jones [1995] The Times, 17 February.The Lords by a majority of three to two confirmed the Court of Appeal's previous decision.

It now seems, therefore that if, due to unacceptable delay by a solicitor, a will is not drawn up, a solicitor is liable in negligence to potential third party beneficiaries.

However, most interestingly at the end of this judgment, Lord Goff added: 'Finally, there was the objection that if liability was recognised it would be impossible to place any sensible limits to cases in which recovery was allowed.

There have to be boundaries to the availability of the remedy but they would have to be worked out in the future; as practical problems come to light before the courts'.

Clearly problems will arise, in particular in 'what is a reasonable time in which a solicitor might be expected to prepare a will' or also clearly as to extent of the liability itself.