The past few months have seen some important developments in the law relating to road traffic.

Accident damages is a case in point.

Where an insurance company offers a scheme for providing temporary replacement vehicles to persons who have been involved in accidents and who are very likely to succeed in establishing the liability of another without any contributory negligence, the scheme is unlikely to be champertous or otherwise contrary to public policy (Giles v Thompson; Devlin v Baslington [1993] 2 WLR 908).In so holding, the House of Lords described the essence of such a scheme: the insurance company would make a vehicle available to the motorist while his or her own was under repair; it would pursue a claim against the defendant in the name of the motorist for loss of use of the vehicle; the company made a charge for the use of the replacement vehicle (at a profit), but this was re-imbursed from the loss of use element in the motorist's damages and was not payable until such damages were received; and the motorist was required to co-operate with the insurance company in pursuing the claim and in the litigation.Although the broad principles were found by the House to be acceptable, each case will have to be considered individually as the actual terms on which the replacement vehicles are provided may vary from case to case.-- AutomatismThe Court of Appeal has ruled in Attorney-General's Reference No.

2 of 1992 [1993] The Times, 31 May, that a state of driving without awareness (driver of heavy goods vehicle having driven 343 miles in six hours driving out of the previous 12 hours) did not constitute the defence of automatism to a charge of causing death by reckless driving.-- Careless drivingThe raising for the first time in a trial of the possibility of a jury bringing in a verdict of careless driving as an alternative to a charge of causing death when the trial judge is summing-up is a material irregularity and a conviction for careless driving in such circumstances will be quashed (R v Hammett [1993] RTR 275).-- Causing deathThe Court of Appeal has stated that the Boswell guidelines on sentencing drivers convicted of causing death by reckless driving apply also to the offences of causing death by driving without due care and attention after consuming excessive alcohol (s.3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988) (Attorney-General's Reference 14 of 1993, R v Shepherd; Attorney-General's Reference 24 of 1993, R v Wernet [1993] The Times, 27 December).

Only in exceptional cases could a driver convicted under s.3A expect to avoid a custodial sentence; the driver would have to show an alcohol level only just above the limit, that his or her carelessness had been momentary only, and that there was strong mitigation.Now that the maximum sentence for offences under s.1 and s.3A is ten years, drivers who race on the highway and/or who drive with reckless disregard for the safety of others after taking alcohol should expect a custodial sentence of upwards of five years (previously two or more years), and even higher in the very worst cases (ibid).The Court of Appeal, in dismissing an appeal against three years' imprisonment for causing death by reck less driving (and five years' disqualification), referred to the public concern at the grossly anti-social behaviour of persons who, having drunk excessively, had then recklessly driven a vehicle and in so doing caused the death of another; the courts had a duty to be sensitive to such concern (R v Craig (Geoffrey) [1993] The Times, 25 May).Although drinking does not itself prove the first limb of the Lawrence direction (cf R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510) (that the defendant was in fact driving the vehicle in such a manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road or of doing substantial damage to property), it may be relevant and therefore admissible to help to determine what was the manner of driving where the facts are in issue (R v Peters [1993] RTR 133).-- DisqualificationAn order for disqualification for life should not be made unless there is psychiatric evidence that the driver would indefinitely be a danger to the public if allowed to drive, or the evidence of many previous convictions so indicates (R v King [1993] RTR 245).

In the same case, the Court of Appeal (applying R v Russell [1993] RTR 249) drew attention to the need when making an order for disqualification in respect of a driver who was to serve a custodial sentence to consider (inter alia) the adverse effect that a lengthy period of disqualification would have on his or her eventual rehabilitation.-- Drivers' hoursThe European Court of Justice has held that art 7(1) and (2) of Reg (EEC) 3820/85 prohibit drivers to whom the regulation applies from driving continuously for more than four-and-a-half hours.

Once a driver has taken the 45-minute break (required by art 7(1)) or has taken several breaks of 15 minutes each over the four-and-a- half hour driving period or immediately after it (as permitted by art 7(2)), the calculation of the next four-and-a-half hour driving period begins afresh, without taking into account the driving time and breaks previously completed by the driver.The court held further that the period of four-and-a-half hours commenced when the driver set the recording equipment in motion and began driving (Re Charlton, Case C 116/92 [1993] The Times, 27 December).-- DrivingThe momentary seizing of the steering wheel of a car by a passenger (even with the intention of causing it to veer towards a pedestrian) is merely an interference with driving and (if the actual driver has not relinquished control of the vehicle) the passenger cannot properly be said to be 'driving' (DPP v Hastings [1993] RTR 205, following Jones v Pratt [1983] RTR 54).A person sitting astride a moped and propelling it along a road using his feet and directing it by the use of his hands on the handlebars may properly be said to be 'driving' it, even though he or she is attempting to kick start it and the engine will not fire because of a faulty spark plug (Gunnel v DPP [1993] Crim LR 619).

Although the court accepted that there might be a distinction between 'riding' and 'driving' a motor cycle, it was difficult to imagine circumstances when a person could properly be said to be riding such without driving it.-- EvidenceFollowing the chase of a stolen car by the police, the car crashed and the occupants dispersed.

The police searched the area and found the appellant who was hiding; a conversation then ensued between the appellant and the police.

The appellant was later charged with reckless driving and with taking a conveyance without authority.At his trial, the recorder ruled that the conversation with the police had not constituted an 'interview', and that breaches of the 1985 code of practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did not render the conversation inadmissible in evidence.

The appellant was convicted.

On appeal (R v Ward [1993] The Times, 29 July), the appellant submitted that the recorder ought to have borne in mind the provisions of the later code of practice (1991) which required comments made outside an interview to be recorded in writing.

The court stated that the provisions of the later code (representing current views on what was fair practice) could have been borne in mind by the recorder as being relevant to the issue of the fairness or otherwise of admitting the evidence of the conversation under s.78 of the 1984 Act.It seems that the conversation with the police (in part at least) in fact amounted to an 'interview' for the purposes of the code of practice (so far as a question put to the appellant after his comment on his arrest was concerned); the nature of the questions rather than their length being the criterion for deciding whether or not a conversation amounted to an 'interview'.The court was, however, satisfied that had the recorder considered the application of s.78, he would then have exercised his discretion in favour of admitting the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Further consideration was given by the court to what amounts to an 'interview' in R v Park [1993] The Times, 30 July.

Although the latter case involved a burglary, inquiries by the police were instituted at the roadside; the court stated that when the answers to exploratory questions gave way to a well-founded suspicion that an offence had been committed the inquiries (in effect) turned into an interview and the provisions of the code of practice had to be applied, not only from that point onwards but also (so far as practical) in relation to the earlier questions which should be recorded in writing as soon as practicable.-- GoodsThe term 'goods' is defined in s.92 of the Transport Act 1968 as including goods or burden of any description.

Justices had ruled (for the purposes of operator licensing and excise licensing of goods vehicles) that a tractor unit used to collect and return trailers for testing and repair by the owner of the tractor unit as part of his business were 'goods' even when empty and, accordingly, the towing of an empty trailer by the tractor unit required an operator's licence and an excise licence under s.8 of the Vehicles (Excise) Act 1971.

On appeal (Booth v DPP [1993] RTR 379), the Divisional Court declined to interfere with this finding of fact.-- Laboratory specimenA motorist who is required to provide a specimen of blood for analysis does not have the right to choose the medical practitioner who will take the sample (DPP v Smith (Alan) [1993] The Times, 1 June, distinguishing Bayliss v Thames Valley Chief Constable [1978] RTR 328).Where a police officer requires a motorist to provide a specimen of blood for laboratory analysis, although he or she is not required to have offered the motorist an opportunity to express a preference for providing a specimen of blood or of urine (DPP v Warren [1993] Gazette, 12 May, 27), the officer must ask the motorist whether there are any reasons why a specimen cannot or should not be taken by a medical practitioner (Edge v DPP [1993] RTR 146).

This view was confirmed in Meade v DPP [1993] RTR 151 where the court added that the requirement to allow the motorist the opportunity to explain why a specimen should not be a specimen of blood was not satisfied by a question by the police officer whether the motorist would provide blood, nor by a question from the medical practitioner whether he or she was agreeable to supplying blood.-- Motor insuranceThe Bahamian law on motor insurance is broadly the same as English law.

At the time of an accident, there were two relevant policies issued by different companies.

As against the driver, the first company had cancelled the cover but, under statute, remained liable to indemnify the victim of the accident.

The second company could repudiate liability as against the driver for want of notice of the accident.The Privy Council held in Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Provincial Insurance plc [1993] 3 WLR 257 that the contribution of the insurance companies to the victim's loss should be determined in accordance with their respective liabilities to the insured driver under contract.

There was no justification in departing from the contractual position by creating a 'cut-off' point (ie the date of the loss/accident) which would leave the second company more exposed than the first by reason of the inherent delay in its right to repudiate the contract.

Both companies had a statutory liability to recompense the victim and no distinction should be made between their respective positions; they were required to make equal contributions.-- Operator licensingThe requirement for private hire cars to be licensed under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 if they operate within a specified area is not contravened merely by placing an advertisement in directories circulating within such an area (and also outside it) if the headquarters of the operator (at which bookings are made) are based outside that area (Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v Mahboob Khan [1993] The Times, 7 May).

However, s.56(1) (contracts deemed to be made with the operator) related only to vehicles which had been appropriately licensed and concerned the operator rather than the user or driver of the vehicles and s.75(1)(a) (nothing in the relevant part of the Act applies to bringing passengers within a controlled district) could not avail a driver (or user) who came into a controlled area in order to collect passengers (Braintree District Council v Howard [1993] RTR 193).-- Private prosecutionOn an application for judicial review of the refusal by a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate to issue a summons alleging causing death by reckless driving on the application of a private prosecutor, the Divisional Court stated that a private prosecutor must surmount the hurdle of persuading a magistrate to issue a summons and, thereafter, if he wished to retain control of the case he might have to persuade the DPP not to take it over (R v Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p.

Chaudry [1993] The Times, 14 September).

In the same case the court commented that when the DPP was seised of a case, it did not necessarily follow that she must take over all proceedings arising from it; further, that when considering an application for a summons in such circumstances the magistrate should consider the whole of the evidence (including the knowledge that the DPP might take over the proceedings) and might properly consider information beyond that supplied by the informant, provided that he did not go so far as to conduct a preliminary hearing.-- Requirement to stop vehicleA constable in uniform may require any person driving a motor vehicle on a road to stop (s.163 of the Road Traffic Act 1 988).

A person sitting in the driver's seat of a car cannot, however, be said to be 'driving' it merely because he or she is sitting erect, has switched on the engine and has placed a hand on the steering wheel.

Nevertheless, if a request not to drive off is made to him or her and he or she nevertheless proceeds to drive off within seconds of that request, an offence is committed under s.163 (Leach v DPP [1993] RTR 161).Road or other public placeThe use of a club car park by a member of a bona fide club (whose membership was not so wide as to be indistinguishable from the public at large) was not use by a member of the public even if there was no notice stating that the car park was private nor any physical obstruction to keep the public out (Havell v DPP [1993] Crim LR 621).-- Seat beltsA driver used a clip on his seat belt which enabled the tension to be eased, either by a few inches or by allowing the belt to hang loose.

A demonstration failed to show whether or not the clip would enable the belt to operate properly if the vehicle decelerated.

A charge of failing to wear a seat belt was dismissed and the justices' decision upheld on appeal (DPP v Shaw [1993] RTR 200), where the court stated that if a clip were employed which did not prevent the seat belt from operating to prevent or lessen injury to its wearer there would seem to be no objection to it; the question was, however, essentially one of fact.-- Special reasonsA driver who had consumed 'laced' drinks pleaded 'guilty' to a drink/drive charge but submitted a plea of special reasons.

The justices found that special reasons had been established, but that the driver had acted foolishly and must have realised that he was unfit to drive.

In the exercise of their discretion they ordered a period of disqualification.

On the driver's appeal (Donahue v DPP [1993] RTR 156), the Divisional Court stated that, where justices were invested with a discretion in sentencing, it was peculiarly a matter for them, seeing and hearing the witnesses and making their own assessment of the answers which were given to them, to determine whether in the exercise of that discretion they should impose a penalty other than disqualification.

In the absence of any misdirection, a failure to take relevant evidence into account, or a wrong approach to the exercise of their discretion, the court would not interfere with their decision.-- Speeding: radar gunWhere a driver who is charged with a speeding offence in reliance on the evidence of such a device gives notice to the prosecution before the hearing that he or she calls into question the accuracy of the measurement of speed, and the prosecution fails at the hearing to show that the gun is an approved device under s.20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, the evidence provided is not admissible (Roberts (Colin) v DPP [1993] The Times, 1 June).As the court in that case pointed out, once the prosecution is alerted to the existence of an issue as to the admissibility of the evidence, it is a simple matter for the approval of the device to be brought to the attention of the court.