-- Aggravated vehicle-takingA person convicted of the offence of aggravated vehicle-taking who has pleaded 'guilty' to the charge is entitled to the usual discount on any custodial sentence in respect of that plea, unless one of the accepted exceptions to the practice of discounting is established (R v Sharkey and Daniels [1994] Crim LR 866).

The fact that the judge regards the maximum sentence as too low is not a valid reason for departing from the practice of discounting for a plea of 'guilty' (R v Carroll [1995] Crim LR 92).

If a death follows a case of aggravated vehicle-taking the maximum penalty for the offence is increased from two years' custody to five years' (Theft Act 1968, s 12A(4)).

In such a case, it is necessary for the count in the indictment to specify that a death has been caused, ie that the offence charged is under s.12A(2)(b) (rather than under s.12A(2)(a)) (R v Sherwood and Button [1995] Crim LR 176); a failure to specify that the charge relates to causing a death will preclude the court from imposing the heavier sentence.-- AppealIn a trial with a jury a judge should not act as a prosecutor.

In a fortiori where (as on an appeal against a conviction by justices for refusing to supply a specimen of breath for analysis where the advocate for the prosecution is absent) a judge is part of a fact-finding tribunal in proceedings, it is important that justice should be seen to be done and the judge should remain aloof from the proceedings and not descend into the arena (R v Wood Green Crown Court, ex p.

Taylor [1995] The Times, 25 May).-- Breath testsThe provisions of s.6 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 are merely permissive and do not themselves impose a duty on the police to administer breath tests in particular situations.

nevertheless, the failure to administer a breath test in particular circumstances may constitute either perverting the course of justice or misconduct in public office (R v Ward and Hollister [1995] Crim LR 398, where the police officers concerned had failed to administer a breath test to another police officer).

The refusal of a motorist to supply specimens of breath for analysis is not itself irreversible, and each case where the motorist claims to have expressed a change of mind after an initial refusal needs to be looked at as a matter of fact and degree (Smyth v D P P [1995] The Times, 21 June).-- Carriage of goodsThe rule applicable to carriage of goods by sea and also to international carriage of goods by land that there can be no set-off against a carrier's freight charges is also applicable to the carriage of goods by land within national boundaries (United Carriers Ltd v Heritage Food Group (UK) Ltd [1995] The Times, 8 March).

May J stated that he reached this decision (consistent with an unreported decision of Nolan J in 1984) with 'unconcealed reluctance' !-- Causing deathMatters of mitigation which are of a personal nature, eg acute feelings of guilt or a depressive illness requiring hospital treatment, which arose as a result of the incident but which were of a temporary nature, should not allow a court to be persuaded to impose a sentence on the offender which was less than appropriate for the gravity of the offence (R v Brown (Garry) (Attorney-General's Reference No.39 of 1994) [1995] The Times, 2 February.

In that case the driver, who had consumed twice the prescribed limit of alcohol had collided with an elderly pedestrian who was on a pedestrian crossing).

Mitigating factors (including a plea of 'guilty') should not deter a court in a bad case from imposing a substantial sentence on the offender (R v Nevison (Attorney-General's Reference No.22 of 1994) [1995] Crim LR 255, where the driver had pleaded 'guilty' to two charges of causing death by dangerous driving, had been shown to have driven at excessive speed and whose breath alcohol registered 112 micrograms).

Nor should the court be unduly influenced by a plea that a custodial sentence would serve no useful purpose where the driver is of good character and has suffered extreme distress as a result of having killed someone; suc h a plea ignores the deterrent effect of a custodial sentence (R v Taziker (Attorney-General's Reference No.36 of 1994) [1995] Crim LR 256).In R v Archer (Attorney-General's Reference No.38 of 1994) [1995] Crim LR 257, the court substituted a sentence of four years' detention in a young offender institution for one of 30 months, in a case where the driver had pleaded 'guilty' to causing death by dangerous driving.

The court commented that racing or competitive driving on the public highway was one of the established aggravating factors and, even in the absence of alcohol as a factor, the original sentence had been unduly lenient.

The Court of Appeal also increased a custodial sentence of three years imposed on a driver who had pleaded 'guilty' to causing death by dangerous driving in R v Vickers (Attorney-General's Reference No.42 of 1994) [1995] Crim LR 345; in that case the driver's breath sample contained 115 micrograms of alcohol and his car was driven erratically before it mounted the pavement and killed a pedestrian; the driver had driven away at high speed after stopping for a brief period.

the court stated that in a very serious case such as this the original sentence should have been double that imposed.

The fact that the driver had been affected by drink or that he had consumed such a quantity of alcohol as would be likely to affect a driver was relevant on the trial of a charge of causing death by careless driving having consumed alcohol in excess of the prescribed level (R v Millington [1995] The Times, 12 May, applying R v McBride [1962] 2 QB 167).-- Damages for personal injuriesThe House of Lords in Page v Smith [1995] The Times, 12 May (a running-down case), by a majority decision ruled that, where a plaintiff in a claim for damages for personal injuries was the primary victim and had suffered no physical injuries, damages could be awarded for nervous shock; the test was whether the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that his conduct would expose the plaintiff to the risk of personal injury, either physical or psychiatric.

the line of cases running from Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 where the plaintiff had been a spectator or bystander were not in point where the plaintiff was the primary victim.-- Dangerous drivingWhere dangerous driving is alleged by reason of the dangerous state of the vehicle (which must be such as to be obvious to a competent and careful driver: see s.2A(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988), the criterion of obviousness is not satisfied by a need to look underneath a newly-acquired vehicle to discover the defect (R v Strong [1995] Crim LR 428).-- Defence of duressThe Court of Appeal has confirmed that the defence of duress is not peculiar to road traffic offences, but is generally available.

It is not clear whether there is a general defence of necessity available in English law or, if there is, what are the circumstances in which it is available (R v Pommell [1995] The Times, 22 May).-- EvidenceOnce the breathalyser print-out has been adduced in evidence, it is formally before the court and the defence cannot claim that, because it has not been examined by the justices before the close of the prosecution case, they can have no knowledge of its contents (R v Pydar JJ, ex p.

Foster [1995] The Times, 23 May, where the police officer had handed the print-out to the prosecutor after giving evidence and the prosecutor then closed the prosecution case).

A breathalyser contains a computer and accordingly the provisions of s.69 of the Police and Criminal Evid ence Act 1984 apply to the admissibility of the print-out from the breathalyser.

If the print-out is shown to disclose the time inaccurately, the contents are inaccurate and the print-out inadmissible (McKeown v R; Jones v R [1995] Crim LR 69).

A failure to sign the certificate of compliance with the 1984 Act renders the print-out inadmissible in the absence of oral evidence of the breathalyser's reliability; but if a conviction is entered on wrongfully admitted evidence, the matter can be rectified on appeal to the Crown Court by adducing appropriate oral evidence (R v Medway Magistrates' Court, ex p.

Goddard [1995] RTR 206).The fact that a person is found at 1.20am one Sunday morning sitting at the wheel of his stationary car on a road, smelling of alcohol and with the keys in the vehicle's ignition is sufficient to raise an inference that he has driven himself to that spot (Whelehan v DPP [1995] RTR 177).-- Forgery of documentsA person who makes or has in his possession any document so closely resembling a document to which s.173 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 applies (eg vehicle licences, test certificates, certificates of motor insurance), as to be calculated to deceive, commits an offence under s.173(1)(c).

A pad of blank but bogus forms of motor insurance certificate bearing the name of the purported insurer and duly numbered was held by the Court of Appeal to constitute documents for the purposes of s.173(1)(c), the possession of which was an offence under s.173(1) even though the forms had not been completed (R v Aworinde [1995] The Times, 25 April).-- HighwaysThe use of vehicles in contravention of s.34(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (driving without lawful authority on common land) cannot be relied on to establish enjoyment of a way for 20 years so as to found a claim that the way has been dedicated as a highway under s.31(1) of the Highways Act 1980 (Robinson v Adair [1995] The Times, 2 March).-- Laboratory specimensThe choice of a specimen of blood or one of urine is essentially a matter for the police, but if medical reasons are established for not supplying a specimen of blood, a specimen of urine must be called for (Road Traffic Act 1988, s.7(4)) and a comment by a motorist that he is 'taking tablets' (in the absence of further clarification) should prima facie be regarded by the police as a plea of medical reasons (Wade v DPP [1995] The Times, 14 February).

Up until the point when the motorist has complied with a valid requirement to provide a specimen of blood for analysis, the police office may change his mind and require a specimen of urine to be supplied instead of a specimen of blood (DPP v Garrett [1995] The Times, 3 February).-- London lorry banThe prohibition on the use of certain roads in Greater London by lorries during prescribed hours is subject to exemptions for certain vehicles granted subject to conditions.

When the conditions specify that vehicles using roads which would otherwise be prohibited must (in certain circumstances) use the shortest possible route, such route is determined by reference to distance rather than to economic/commercial considerations (TNT Express (UK) Ltd v Richmond upon Thames LBC [1995] The Times, 27 June, where avoiding the use of restricted roads would have resulted in additions of 40 or 45 minutes to journey times).-- Motor manslaughterA conviction for motor manslaughter as such (ie as opposed to causing death by dangerous driving or by careless driving) is only open if it is shown not only that the case was very bad but that the ris k undertaken by the driver was such as to endanger life (R v Adomako (John) (1994) 99 Cr App R 362).-- ObstructionIn certain circumstances a constable may arrange for the removal of a vehicle which has broken down and which is causing an obstruction to persons using the road (reg 3(1)(a) of the Removal and Disposal of Vehicles Regulations 1986 (SI 86/183)).

For these purposes the term 'obstruction' must be construed widely and should not be equated with the same term as used in s.137 of the Highways Act 1980 or in reg 103 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 (SI 86/1078) (Carey v Avon and Somerset Chief Constable [1995] The Times, 7 April).-- Perverting the course of justiceA car owner was convicted in his absence of a number of road traffic offences, including driving without insurance and failing to produce a driving licence to the police.

He was fined and later a warrant was issued for non-payment.

At that time, it came to light that the owner had not been the driver at the time of the offences; the driver had been his brother.

The owner was then charged with perverting the course of justice by reason of allowing informations alleging offences committed by his brother to be proved and sentenced in his name.

He was convicted, but his appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal as his conduct did not constitute the actus reus of the offence (embarking upon a course of conduct which had a tendency to and was intended to pervert the course of justice) (R v Headley [1995] The Times, 15 February).-- PoliceWhen the police have custody of a vehicle and keep it in a secure yard, they have no greater liability for its safekeeping than that of any other common bailee, ie, they must take reasonable care of it having regard to all the circumstances (Sutcliffe v West Yorkshire Chief Constable [1995] The Times, 5 June).-- PracticeIn R v Beckford [1995] The Times, 27 January, in which the defendant claimed that a mechanical defect was the most likely explanation for his driving, the Court of Appeal expressed concern that the vehicle had been scrapped before the defence had had an opportunity to examine it (albeit no injustice had been done in the particular case).The House of Lords has ruled (in relation to a charge of interfering with a motor cycle with intent to commit theft or of taking and driving it away without consent) that the presumption that a child between the ages of 10 and 14 years is doli incapax, ie incapable of forming a criminal intention, is still enshrined English law (C (a minor) v D P P [1995] 2 WLR 383).

The presumption is rebuttable.

The House reversed the decision of the Divisional Court on this point.-- SentencingIn a bad case of dangerous driving where the only arguable mitigation is a plea of 'guilty', but the driver had been caught red-handed and the charge is incontestable, the court might properly impose the maximum sentence (two years on conviction on indictment) (R v Hastings (Lance) [1995] The Times, 5 May).-- Special reasonsSpecial reasons such as to justify a convicted person not being disqualified may be founded on an emergency or a personal crisis, such as the threat to a male driver by a female passenger to report him for rape if he refused to drive her to her destination (DPP v Enston [1995] The Times, 17 February, where the threat had terrified the driver).