I read with great concern the article by Gregory Treverton-Jones QC and have the following observations.

There should be a cause of action against the SRA for negligence in publishing unproven allegations which are subsequently shown to be unprovable (that is, where the solicitor wins the case or where substantially lesser offences are proven).

There are conflicting duties of care at work here.

The SRA has a duty to warn the public and a duty not to harm the solicitor without good cause. Either of those duties can be breached, but it seems that the SRA is taking the view that it would rather breach the duty owed to the solicitor. However, if, on balance, publication leads the solicitor to suffer loss and damage where non-publication would not have harmed the public, either at all or to a material extent, then the SRA should face the possibility of liability for the damage caused.

Perhaps the SRA policy is based on its belief that there is a real risk of being sued for negligence by members of the public and a far lower risk of suit from damaged solicitors.

In these cases - and the range certainly covers all professional advisers and may extend across a much wider class of people - the balance must be set carefully between the ‘public interest’ in knowing of (potentially) ‘bad’ professional advisers and the interests of the adviser in keeping their business alive until they are proven guilty. (I think we are in a different arena if criminal, rather than conduct or regulatory, offences are concerned.)

As Mr Treverton-Jones points out, the SRA has various ‘tools’ which it can deploy to control the accused and protect the public until after the verdict is handed down. Not using those tools would seem to contribute to the charge of negligence - a bit like not using a safety belt or crash helmet to reduce or avoid physical injury.

I think this is all part of the rather hysterical current approach to ‘public interest’ issues. It seems the ‘public interest’ has come to override everything and, in particular, it overrides the ‘private interest’ in whatever context the point arises - celebrities, politicians, professionals, and so on. In addition, the term ‘public interest’ appears to have come to mean ‘whatever the public might be interested to hear about’.

This is very different from the definition which should apply: ‘does it help to protect the public to know these facts?; and, does that interest outweigh the private interest of the accused in not being punished without conviction as a result of due process?’ Here, I think we do come into the same arena as people falsely accused of criminal actions.

It would be good for solicitors to start to kick back and defend themselves!

Christopher Parr, solicitor (non-practising), City & Westminster Corporate Finance, London SW1