It would be ironic indeed if the demise of the late Robert Maxwell also brought with it, as a tangential consequence, the demise of the jury system.Like the late Harold Hobson, that eminent theatre critic who had the rather disconcerting habit of discovering the new playwright of the decade every other week, the tabloid media have a similar propensity for regular proclamations concerning trials of the year, the decade or even the century.

Nevertheless, it is true to say that the Maxwell case does have potential implications beyond the sharp end of the Crown's prosecution.We are told that the trial will last six months and that the 'random' selection of jurors were ultimately selected from a panel of over 700, most of whom excused themselves on the basis of their inability to stay the course.Whilst one has the utmost respect for the jury system in criminal trials, legitimate questions can be raised concerning the capability of those jurors who are able to make themselves available for six months to understand the undoubted commercial, financial and legal intricacies of the defendants' alleged dealings with the late Maxwell senior's publishing empire and the pension funds it controlled.The collapse of the trial due to complexity and incomprehension, for which a recent precedent was set in a case of alleged mortgage fraud, or even an acquittal, might well again bring calls for the abolition of the jury system in complex fraud cases.

This may be only the thin end of the wedge.

If trial by jury is abolished in cases where fraud is charged, why not in other complex cases such as those alleging drug trafficking or indeed any criminal case which involves convoluted forensic or other expert evidence?The campaign for retention of the jury has not been helped in recent days by a string of allegations of bizarre, inappropriate or improper activities in and outside the jury room.

A consultation with a ouija board (R v Young) and scientific experimentation outside the ambit of the evidence (R v Higgins) were but two cases from a long line of authorities which have led to quashed convictions, at least in the first instance.

The improper disclosure of information emanating from the jury room (for which the newspaper in question was found to be in contempt), involved allegations that in one case one of the jurors fell asleep and another voted in accordance, not with the evidence, but with his desire to go home.

A recent radio interview with anonymous jurors disclosed complaints which included women jurors being intimidated and jurors generally being abused and patronised by Crown Court officials with one juror vehemently asserting that the whole system should be abolished.In truth, the abolition of the jury would merely be the ultimate step in a long and rather tortuous road which by progressive legislation has already included turning 'either way' offences (those triable by a Crown Court or a magistrates' court) into summary only offences.

Examples include criminal damage, driving whilst disqualified, taking and driving away a motor vehicle and common assault.

The consequence of this erosion has meant an increase in the power of the magistracy and an inclination by prosecutors to reduce the severity of charges to avoid the ability of defendants to elect Crown Court trial.The peremptory challenge to jurors was abolished in England and Wales by the Criminal Justice Act 1988 after a previous reduction in challenges from seven to three.

Most significantly, the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973 set up the non-jury Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland following a report from the Diplock Commission which included the recommendation that 'trial by judge alone should take the place of trial by jury for the duration of the emergency'.

This recommendation found its way into the 1973 legislation in respect of 'scheduled offences' which included the most serious criminal offences including murder, robbery and kidnapping arising usually, though not always, out of terrorist activities.As a result of the failure rate of complex fraud prosecutions, the Roskill Fraud Trials Committee Report of 1986 recommended the establishment and running of a Fraud Trials Tribunal (FTT) composed of a judge and two lay assessors.

While this recommendation has yet to be implemented, others contained in the report already have been - for example the abolition of the peremptory challenge of jurors (recommended for simple fraud cases) and the more frequent use of pre-trial reviews and timetabling.

Also as a result, in subsequent legislation, defendants in SFO cases,are now obliged to provide a case statement setting out the basis of the defence - a substantial erosion of the right to silence and arguably a shift in the burden of proof.Arguments against jury retention include previous allegations of jury misbehaviour, the possibility of intimidation, personation and a general lack of comprehension.

However attractive jury abolition may be to our lords and masters, both for political and financial reasons, the way forward is not the amputation of the patient's head to save the rest of the body.There is no reason on earth why the present system cannot be improved without radical surgery, particularly a system which has served us so well, by and large, over many hundreds of years.The answer lies in improving the jury.

The protection of jurors and their education are simple practical steps.

Whilst many would think that the 'random' selection of jurors is incompatible with vetting, it may nevertheless be desirable, in complex cases, to empanel a jury which the court can be assured has a comprehension of the proceedings they are to try.But most important of all must be, in the first instance, an urgent amendment to s.8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which prevents the disclosure by jurors, or indeed by anybody else, of the views or votes of jury members.

Such an amendment need not be open-ended but can be restricted, at least in the first instance, to proper disclosure by jury members, after a trial, to legitimate researchers so that we can at least establish, in individual cases, the effectiveness of the jury system and the jury's facility to comply with the obligation of 'returning a true verdict according to the evidence'.