Town and country planning: SupermarketClaimant applying for planning permission for out-of-centre supermarket - inspector recommending conditional planning permission be granted - secretary of state disagreeing with inspector and refusing permission - whether he failed to give reasons - whether he applied sequential approach correctly - PPG 6 - claim dismissedTesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions: Queen's Bench Division: Administrative Court: Richards J: 21 December 2000Tesco Stores (the claimant) applied for planning permission to develop of a supermarket on a site out of the city centre.

The local planning authority resolved to grant outline permission, subject to conditions and a section 106 agreement, but the secretary of state called in the application, under section 77 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.An inquiry was held.

In his report, the inspector found, among other things, that the claimant had demonstrated that there was a need for such a development; further, that it had carried out the sequential exercise in accordance with the guidance in PPG 6.

He also concluded that in terms of the proposed level of parking provision and the likely reduction in travel, the proposal was consistent with the objectives of PPG 13.

He recommended that permission be granted subject to conditions.In his decision letter, the secretary of state disagreed with a number of the inspector's conclusions.

He accepted there was a need, but found that the claimant's approach to the sequential test had not been flexible enough.

He did not agree that the proposal was consistent with the objectives of PPG 13, and refused planning permission.The claimant sought to quash the secretary of state's decision, pursuant to section 288 of the 1990 Act, on grounds that: (i) he failed to state adequately or at all what his conclusions were on the need for the development, in terms of scale and location; (ii) he failed to state how he applied the sequential approach in the light of his conclusion as to need; and (iii) he failed to state his reasons for rejecting the claimant's submission and the inspector's finding that the application complied with the requirements of PPG 6 and PPG 13.

It was submitted that all these matters were principal, important and controversial issues; thus, it was incumbent upon the secretary of state to spell out why he disagreed with the inspector.Held: The claim was dismissed.

1.

The secretary of state was entitled to take issue with the inspector's conclusion about the sequential test required by PPG 6 and to take the view that the consideration of alternative sites should go beyond those capable of accommodating a broadly similar form of development.

He was entitled to find that insufficient flexibility had been demonstrated in the instant case.

The decision letter on that issue was sufficiently clearly reasoned and based on a rational interpretation of policy.2.

As to the separate issue of need, although the secretary of state expressed doubts about points of detail in the inspector's reasoning, he did not dispute the existence of a need sufficient to justify the proposed development.

His doubts were expressed sufficiently clearly and it was not necessary for him to state what level of need he considered to exist in light of those doubts.3.

The secretary of state's approach towards the related issues of car use and parking was adequately reasoned, rational, and in accordance with policy.

It would have been better for him to have spelt out to what extent he differed from the inspector on the details of the reduction in the length of motorised journeys.

However, that omission was not crucial.

There were deficiencies in his reasoning regarding the number of motorised journeys, but they were not so great so as to render the whole decision unlawful.

Overall, the decision was sufficiently reasoned and rational.Patrick Clarkson QC and Sasha White (instructed by Berwin Leighton) for the claimant; Nathalie Lieven (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the defendant.