Most inhabitants of the legal world must by now have come across the widening ambit of that exploding area of litigation known as judicial review.

Nearing extinction is the species of practitioner who dismisses judicial review as an area of law solely of interest to 'administrative lawyers' or to those who cross swords with local or central government on behalf of the homeless or deportees.

Few can have missed, for instance, RSC ord 53's increasingly frequent excursions into the world of commerce.

(See eg R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p.

Datafin plc [1987] QB 815; R v International Stock Exchange of the UK & Eire, ex p.

Else Ltd [1993] QB 534; R v LAUTRO, ex p.

Ross [1993] QB 17; R v Investros Compensation Scheme Ltd, ex p.

Bowden [1994] 1 WLR 17.)But at least as important as monitoring the new ground covered by ord 53, is recognising the old.

For the general practitioner, judicial review has always been close to home.

Take those everyday, local court proceedings.

Most, if not all, post-1977 volumes of the Weekly Law Reports or the All England Law Reports contain judicial review cases in which the 'public body' being challenged was a magistrates' court, juvenile court, Crown Court or coroner's court.

But judicial review of the county court? Now that is a better kept secret.As 'inferior courts' underpinned by statute, county courts are prima facie amenable to judicial review.

The County Courts Act 1984 has no place for the former 'ouster clause' precluding certiorari against county courts (s.107 of the 1959 Act (R v Leeds County Court, ex p.

Morris [1990] 1 QB 523, 530E (Watkins LJ).

Consider too CCR ord 6, r.11)(This section was repealed by sched 7 to the Supreme Court Act 1981).

Moreover, ss.83 and 84 of the 1984 Act 'give explicit recognition to the function of the Divisional Court, enabling it to review a determination in a county court and to deal with it by the issue of one of the prerogative writs'.

(R v Leeds County Court, ex p.

Morris [1990] 1 QB 523, 530E (Watkins LJ).

Consider too CCR ord 6, r.11.)It is also clear that certain special functions of circuit judges (eg powers exercised qua Crown Court) are reviewable (See eg R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p.

Rossminster [1980] AC 952, 968F-G (search warrants issued by a circuit judge, at the Central Criminal Court, under s.20C of the Taxes Management Act 1970)), just as others (eg powers exercised qua High Court) are immune from review (Skinner v The Northallerton County Court Judge [1899] AC 439).

Nor is judicial review of the county court merely hypothetical.

There are reported cases applying to county courts each of the trilogy of prerogative remedies the momentum of which gave us judicial review.Certiorari has been granted to quash the following:-- oral directions made by Judge Hurst in a voter registration case (R v Judge Sir Donald Hurst, ex p.

Smith [1960] 2 QB 133);-- possession orders made by Bloomsbury and Newcastle judges (by consent of the parties but without investigating whether statutory grounds were satisfied) (R v Bloomsbury & Marylebone County Court, ex p.

Blackburne [1985] 2 EGLR 157, affirming (1984) 14 HLR 59; R v Newcastle Upon Tyne County Court, ex p.

Thompson (1988) 20 HLR 430);-- Judge Pickles' refusal to consider an application to set aside an arbitration award which he had made (R v Keighley County Court, ex p.

Home Insulation Ltd [1989] COD 174);-- the retrospective issue by a chief clerk (in consultation with the registrar) of a business tenancy interim rent application (R v Gravesend County Court, ex p.

Patchett [1993] COD 12).Mandamus has been ordered to require county courts to hear:-- an application for apportionment of rents (R v Judge Pugh, ex p.

Graham [1951] 2 KB 623);-- a mortgagee's possession action (R v Judge Dutton Briant, ex p.

Abbey National Building Society [1957] 2 QB 497);-- an application for (further) suspension in relation to a possession order (R v Ilkeston County Court, ex p.

Kruza (1985) 17 HLR 539).Prohibition has been granted to prevent county courts entertaining:-- a breach of contract action (no cause of action having arisen in its district) (Clarke Brothers v Knowles [1918] 1 KB 128); and-- a 'judgment summons' (an inadequate undertaking having been given) (Ward v Nield [1917] 2 KB 832).Since these remedies are available under the unified ord 53 procedure too, there are cases deploying High Court declarations (Byrne v Herbert [1966] 2 QB 121) and injunctions (Johns v Chatalos [1973] 1 WLR 1437) in relation to county court proceedings, albeit that in each the respondent was not the county court but the affected adversary.The traditional ground for judicial review of a county court has been 'error as to jurisdiction'.

Thus, prohibition (or an injunction) has been endorsed where a county court is about to act 'without jurisdiction' (See Hedley v Bates (1880) 13 ChD 498, 502; cited in Johns v Chatalos [1973] 1 WLR 1437, 1440B-G; and note the reference to 'jurisdiction' in s.84(2) of the County Courts Act 1984), certiorari where it has done so (See R v Judge Worthington-Evans, ex p.

Madan [1959] 2 QB 145, 152), and mandamus where it has erroneously concluded that it was about to do so (See eg R v Judge Pugh, ex p.

Graham [1951] 2 KB 623; R v Judge Dutton Briant, ex p.

Abbey National Building Society [1957] 2 QB 497; R v Ilkeston County Court, ex p.

Kruza (1985) 17 HLR 539).Judicial review can therefore be seen as an established avenue for resolving 'jurisdictional' questions relating to the following matters:-- timing (is it too late to entertain an application for setting aside or suspending a possession order?) (R v Bloomsbury & Marylebone County Court, ex p.Villerwest Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 362; R v Ilkeston County Court, ex p.

Kruza (1985) 17 HLR 539);-- parties (can directions be made in relation to a non-party?) (R v Judge Sir Donald Hurst, ex p.

Smith [1960] 2 QB 133);-- subject matter (do actions for declarations/ possession of mortgaged property have to satisfy financial ceilings?) (R v Cheshire County Court Judge & United Society of Boilermakers, ex p.

Malone [1921] 2 KB 694; R v Judge Dutton Briant, ex p.

Abbey National Building Society [1957] 2 QB 497);-- geography (when does a cause of action arise within the county court's district?) (Clarke Brothers v Knowles [1918] 1 KB 128); and-- statutory preconditions (must statutory grounds for possession be satisfied notwithstanding the defendant's consent to an order?) (R v Bloomsbury & Marylebone County C ourt, ex p.

Blackburne [1985] 2 EGLR 157, affirming (1984) 14 HLR 59; R v Newcastle Upon Tyne County Court, ex p.

Thompson (1988) 20 HLR 430; R v Worthing Borough Council, ex p.

Bruce [1992] COD 42).The potential significance of this, in times of change in the High Court/ county court division of labour, is obvious.Judicial review of county courts has been associated with the search for flaws which 'go to jurisdiction'.

This is reflected in the presence of the old statutory ouster, it being long-established that such 'no certiorari' clauses did not preclude challenge in respect of a 'jurisdictional error' (Ex p.

Bradlaugh (1878) 3 QBD 509).It was against this background that intervention for error of law was born.

As any administrative law student will tell you, the landmark case of Anisminic (Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147) opened the door for 'mere' error of law to be treated as a 'jurisdictional error', so as to allow judicial review notwithstanding the existence of a statutory ouster.

Sure enough, a Denning-led majority of the Court of Appeal seized the opportunity in the Pearlman case (Pearlman v Keepers & Governors of Harrow School [1979] QB 56) to quash a county court judge's rent determination for error of law (as to whether a new central heating system was a 'structural alteration').What has become of judicial review of the county court for mere error of law? This is an interesting question, albeit perhaps an academic one.

Post-Pearlman, the House of Lords has favoured Geoffrey Lane LJ's dissent, showing a clear distaste for intervention on grounds of 'mere' error of law, where:-- the decision-making body is a court; and-- there is a statutory ouster clause (See especially Re A Company [1981] AC 374, 382G-383H; O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 278D-F; R v Hull University Visitor, ex p.

Page [1993] AC 682, 693B-D & 703E-F.

Note too South East Asia Fire Bricks v Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employers Union [1981] AC 363).

The irony, of course, is that in the mean time, Parliament was removing the 'no certiorari' ouster in relation to county courts.What makes the point rather academic is the existence of appeal from the county court (See s.77 of the 1984 Act).

This means that judicial review of a county court on the ground of error of law is likely to be rare (See The County Court Practice 1993 pp.80-81), whether because it 'should not be allowed to supplant the normal statutory appeal procedure' (R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p.

Preston [1985] AC 835, 862F (Lord Templeman).

See too R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p.

Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146, 177-178), or because it is simply unnecessary (Cf Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, 709A-B).It may be these considerations which permit the return to the pre-Pearlman analysis as to challenging county courts: that 'jurisdictional errors' in the narrow (pre-Anisminic) sense are for judicial review and 'mere' errors of law for appeal (See Oscroft v Benabo [1967] 1 WLR 1087, 1100D-G).

There do, however, seem to be loose ends, notably in relation to:-- situations in which appeal may be unavailable;-- the observation that 'the existence of an alternative remedy has never been enough to oust jurisdiction in judicial review' (Leech v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1988] AC 533, 562D (Lord Bridge)); and-- the policy question as to whether it is more convenient to supervise county courts via the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal.So much for county courts and 'illegality'.

What of those other Diplock categories (See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410D-411B), 'procedural impropriety' and 'irrationality'? Again, there are reported cases which help.

In the Judge Pickles case, mandamus was granted (ordering the case to be transferred to another judge) on grounds of the appearance of fairness (R v Keighley County Court, ex p.

Home Insulation Ltd [1989] COD 174).

Indeed, even in the days of the statutory ouster there were obiter hints that judicial review would lie against a county court for bias (Oscroft v Benabo [1967] 1 WLR 1087, 1100D-E (Diplock LJ)) or fundamental procedural irregularity, reflecting no doubt the insight that breach of natural justice could render a decision 'a nullity' (and thus akin to 'jurisdictional error') (See eg Lord Reid in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, 171B-E and Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578, 1584E-F; also South East Asia Fire Bricks v Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employers Union [1981] AC 363, 370D-E (Lord Fraser)).As for 'irrationality', a decision of Otton J (R v Brighton County Court, ex p.

Westminster Press Ltd [1990] 1 QB 628), reported in 1990, proceeds on the basis that it was open to the applicant to raise a Wednesbury (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223) challenge to a county court judge's decision (declining to release his notes for use in a defamation action).Finally, quite apart from the notion that county courts are amenable to judicial review, there is the suggestion that they may be called upon to apply judicial review principles.

In one case the House of Lords concluded that in hearing an action for wrongful arrest, Portsmouth County Court ought to have applied precisely the kind of 'two-tiered' approach which is familiar in judicial review: hard-edged review of a 'precedent fact' (reasonable cause) and deferential Wednesbury-review of an 'executive discretion' (Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] 1 AC 437, 442H, 443B-C, 446B-C).More obvious, perhaps, is the O'Reilly v Mackman (O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237) 'exclusivity' dimension.

In cases having a public law flavour, county courts will need to consider whether the exclusivity rule applies, so that a claim is to be struck as an abuse of process (for failure to use ord 53).

This is precisely what their Lordships held that the Thanet County Court should have done in the Cocks case.

(Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286.)Conversely, where it is appropriate to disapply the exclusivity rule, county courts will have to assess the strength of the 'public law'-type challenge, applying established judicial review grounds.

Thus, the exception enunciated in Winder (Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder [1985] AC 461) (Cocks v Thanet District Council [1983] 2 AC 286) meant that a judicial review-type challenge could properly be raised in proceedings in Wandsworth County Court, by a defendant.

The extent to which a county court plaintiff can pursue a judicial review-type challenge depends largely on what is left of the restrictive Cocks after the more permissive (and rather exasperated) Roy.

(Roy v Kensington & Chelsea & Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624)