Recent anti-terrorism legislation is focusing too much on punishing 'thought crime' instead of tackling genuine threats, argues Tanveer Qureshi


It is absolutely right that any country should take the necessary measures to protect itself and citizens. But a number of recent high-profile cases have raised questions about what constitutes a crime under the Terrorism Act 2006, and whether the law is properly balanced between protecting its citizens and safeguarding the nation's rights and freedoms.



Last week saw the potential introduction of yet another layer on the ever-burgeoning anti-terror laws - the Counter-Terrorism Bill 2008. In introducing this Bill the government has arguably missed an important opportunity to clear up the ambiguities that currently plague existing anti-terror legislation.



Of great concern is the proposed introduction of a 'terrorist offender register' akin to the current sexual offenders register. Given that one can currently be convicted of a terrorist offence without even having a terrorist intention, a considerable degree of caution should be exercised before placing such a person on a register where he or she is then subject to notification requirements and possible travel restrictions.



There is undoubtedly a need for anti-terrorism legislation, but this must be based on the principles that it will: be properly drafted; respect individual and qualified freedoms; and be fairly and properly applied and free of any abuse by virtue of any poor drafting. On the basis of these criteria, it is questionable whether two current provisions pass the test. Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for any person without reasonable excuse to be in possession of information likely to be useful to a terrorist; and section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence for anyone to encourage terrorism.



In its first report a year ago, the parliamentary joint committee on human rights said 'the creation of the offence of encouragement of terrorism will have an inhibiting effect on legitimate freedom of expression and will therefore lead to disproportionate interferences with free speech'.



In relation to section 58, as the law currently stands absolutely anything is capable of being 'likely to be useful to a terrorist'. In recent cases, such information has included first aid manuals, Internet blogs and messages on social networking sites.



In the absence of any concrete definition of 'information', defendants charged with an offence contrary to section 58 can be prosecuted for possession of information that in many cases is readily available on the Internet. Consider a curious teenager who can download volumes of material at the click of a mouse. He or she may simply be keen to understand what all the fuss is about. Who is Osama bin Laden? Why is such-and-such a website supporting him?



So, over a very short space of time, a computer can be loaded with information directly and/or indirectly related to terrorism. Once the material is on the computer, possession is triggered and the user is one step away from being charged under the Terrorism Act.



The law cannot and should not be applied in this way. There is currently too great an emphasis on punishing this type of 'thought crime' as opposed to dealing with genuine terrorist threats. The Court of Appeal may well resolve this issue, but it is likely to be a long and arduous process. In the meantime, the obligation is on Parliament to satisfy itself that the law is clear and unambiguous in the first place.



The definition of terrorism is already a very broad one and it precludes any moral argument on what is and what is not terrorism. Undoubtedly the laws should punish those who genuinely compromise the safety of the public. But what about those who do not wish or intend to commit a criminal act?



Tanveer Qureshi is a barrister at 25 Bedford Row, London