On 11 September, a judge at Woolwich Crown Court had to acquit three suspects because the jury failed to convict them. This was their second trial; now they may be in line for a third. This was the special ordeal of these young Muslims – to go through the anguish of being tried for the same offence twice, an autrefois acquit plea being unavailable to them. One cannot omit noting that the jury had deliberated for 18 days and, on 4 September, after 11 days of deliberations, the judge had told the jurors that he was willing to accept a 10/2 verdict.

However, the director of public prosecutions, Keir Starmer, acknowledging the extraordinary character of a third trial, said: ‘One way or the other, I have concluded that, in this exceptional case, it is in the public interest to seek a further retrial.’

The precept of the rule against double jeopardy has been adopted by many judicial systems which have emulated us. The relevant clause of the fifth amendment to the US constitution reads, ‘no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb’. This clause is intended to limit abuse by the government in repeated prosecution for the same offence as a means of harassment or oppression. It is also in harmony with the common law concept of res judicata.

Inspired by the axiomatic truth that 10 guilty men may go free to protect an innocent person from a wrong conviction, one of the brilliant facets of our legal system is that an accused person is tried by his or her peers. I have read The Politics of the Judiciary by the famous Professor John Griffith, and have benefited from the views of many celebrated civil liberties commentators, such as Professor Zander, and cannot fail to see the power of strength in numbers –a juror may be devoured by prejudice against women, foreigners, disabled people, the aged or homosexual persons, but you still have a bigger chance with a jury than with a single judge.

Against the background of 9/11, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, the Afghan prison at Bagram and control orders, a background that has affected many good minds of renowned libertarians, we still sing songs of our great legal system. Section 17 of the Juries Act 1974 allows the acceptance of ‘majority verdicts’ in some cases but section 3(4) says that ‘in any event’ the Crown Court ‘shall… not accept such a verdict unless it appears to the court that the jury have had at least two hours for deliberation’. An additional protection is in section 17(3): ‘The Crown Court shall not accept a verdict of guilty unless the foreman of the jury has stated in open court the number of jurors who respectively agreed to and dissented from the verdict.’

The 12 ‘good and true’ peers are acknowledged to give the best protection to the citizens of this country. The British courts have confirmed the desirability of the trial by jury at every level, and the reports are replete with such pronouncements.

I have three personal reasons to be concerned about the whittling down of this crucial protection. I am Muslim; one of the accused who Mr Starmer believes should face the third batch of ‘good and true’ persons, Waheed Zaman, is a student at my university; and I share the borough in which Mr Zaman lives.

The judge has still to approve a third trial if the DPP makes a request for it. I very much hope that the judge rejects any such request and sees the ‘public interest’ in not subjecting these members of an ethnic minority to a third trial, when 24 ‘good and true’ peers of the accused could not agree on a guilty verdict – the second 12 of whom, in the last week of deliberations, were aware of the fact that they could return a majority verdict.

Dr Amir A Majid LLM DCL is a barrister and reader in law at London Metropolitan University. He is also a part-time immigration judge and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law