Family law

Child Support Agency - 'a confusing picture'

Flood v Flood (2002) 24 June (unreported), Mr Justice Charles

In Flood v Flood, Mr Justice Charles records the sad, though unsurprising, fact that a correspondence with the CSA 'presents a confusing picture'.

He records that the unfortunate Mrs Flood was involved in three simultaneous sets of family proceedings in four courts: a claim in the family proceedings courts now on appeal to the High Court, a contact application by her former husband in the county court, and a departure direction before the Child Support Appeals Tribunal.

How far away still is a unified family court (Finer Report, July 1974)?

The magistrates were wrong to give Mrs Flood a top-up order under section 8(6) of the Child Support Act 1991 (applicable only to a non-resident parent who is paying maintenance at the statutory ceiling).

The judge held that she could apply for a top-up education order under section 8(7); though in her absence (was she fed up with appearing in so many courts and needed to earn a living?) he could not make an order.

The agency had encouraged her, wrongly, to apply for the section 8(6) order.

Mr Flood could, therefore, consider seeking an order against them for costs (see section 51(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998: orders for costs against third parties).

Determination of issues

Re P (a Child) (Parental Dispute: Judicial determination) (2002) The Times, 7 November, CA

In Re P, Lord Justice Thorpe stressed the fact of a parent being entitled to a decision on the issue put before the court.

Here the circuit judge had directed that schooling issues be decided by the mother, after consultation with the mother.

This did not deal with the point the court was asked to decide - namely, which school the child should attend.

The parents had a right to a judicial determination.

Contribution not a pre-eminent factor

Lambert v Lambert (2002) The Times, 27 November, CA

Lord Justice Thorpe characterised Lambert v Lambert as a classic textbook case.

The important point in Lambert is that 'contribution' - especially the new concept of 'stellar contribution' (see Cowan v Cowan [2001] 2 FLR 192) - is not to be exalted above other section 25(2) factors.

Departure from equality must be justified by the court.

And in the week when gay couples stumble towards treatment which is similar to married couples (a consultation paper is promised next summer), what would have been Mrs Lambert's entitlement if she had not been married to Mr Lambert?

After a 23-year marriage during which she brought up two children (provided with a substantial trust fund for their benefit) she could have expected a half-share of the family home and no more.

By David Burrows, David Burrows, Bristol