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I am left wondering about the relationship between Article 50(1) and (2).
The judgement appears to establish that the prerogative cannot be used to terminate the treaty because that would automatically remove domestic rights, and by convention only parliament can do that. I also follow that absent clear evidence to the contrary in ECA72 there is no basis for concluding that in enacting that act parliament intended to exclude that convention.
This gets us to the position that when removing the EU rights conferred by ECA72 it has to be done by parliament.
But for me this leaves two questions unresolved. Firstly, are we to regard both the article 50(1) notice and the subsequent negotiations as a unity? Secondly, can the executive negotiate an exit deal and them come back to parliament for it to be approved?
The first question raises the subsidiary issue of what is the appropriate constitutional procedure. My reading of the judgement is that the procedure has to start with compliance with convention. If that's right, then since the consequence of service of an Art 50 notice would in all cases remove domestic rights, the convention demands that only parliament can do it. On that basis parliament must both serve the notice and undertake the negotiations, since only by doing that can the convention be positively asserted ( as we say about the ECHR provisions).
This in turn suggests that the job has to be done by cross bench committees appointed for the purpose in both houses.
It also suggests that the EU "UberAct" proposed by the government as the methodology for implementing Brexit is purposively redundant, since parliaments lead role now subsumes it's underlying intentions.
It looks like all the bricks are on the floor now. How our colleagues in Europe must be laughing at us.