The Bill to criminalise incitement to racial hatred could instead be a trigger for self-censorship and increased intolerance, says John Scriven

The government's Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill provides (in clause 119) for the extension of the crime of incitement to racial hatred to cover religious hatred.


Much of 20th century philosophy abandoned religious belief to a limbo outside the scope of objective knowledge, as being concerned either with questions devoid of literal significance or with purely subjective perceptions. Yet, to their adherents, religious world views not only explain reality but provide personal and collective moral imperatives.


Christianity teaches that man is made in the image of God with the freedom to make choices and this freedom necessarily entails freedom of expression. The concern is that governments see their role as merely regulating, or preventing, the conflict of ideas in the public square, rather than providing the conditions under which people can seek truth.

Which brings us to why an unusual mixture of secularists, Christians, politicians and Rowan Atkinson all joined together in one room in the Houses of Parliament last week to voice their opposition to the government's proposals.


Existing law already acknowledges that there are limits to freedom of action in terms of behaviour that is abusive or threatening. The difficulty with the concept of hatred is that both the expression and the perception of it are subjective. I may hate, but I may be both irrational and evil in doing so. Others may incite me to hatred without intending to do so, or while being entirely rational in their behaviour.


The law currently makes an exception in the case of racial hatred, recognising this particular evil in our society. The difference between race and religion, however, is that race cannot be changed while it may be entirely reasonable to criticise a belief, however offended a believer might be. There should be no legal right not to be offended. And the concern would be that to criticise a belief would be to incite hatred in a person. The law on racial hatred already protects Jews and Sikhs because they are ethnic groups, not because of their particular beliefs.


The Home Office maintains that the fears surrounding this proposal are mistaken, and that only the most extreme acts would satisfy the high threshold of religious hatred. However, it is difficult to see where the line will be drawn between criticising, even ridiculing, someone's beliefs and inciting hatred against them. Even if the courts do require a high threshold, there could be a damaging effect on freedom of expression from the fear of prosecution, especially since the maximum sentence is seven years.


The effect could be self-censorship, which is arguably worse than state-censorship since it is almost impossible to identify.


In addition, if such a high threshold is to be implemented, it is difficult to see what this provision will add to the existing law. The most extreme acts are already covered by public order offences. Incitement to violence has long been a criminal offence, and since the Public Order Act of 1986 it is an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment alarm or distress thereby.


Perhaps incitement to religious hatred will mean what the Home Office says it will mean, and as such will have little impact on the law. Alternatively, the test for this offence will be lower than the Home Office currently claims, and will impinge on everybody's freedom of expression and freedom of religion. If this happens, we could see attempts by religious groups to use the law as a weapon to silence criticisms, and this could only increase tension and intolerance.


Solicitor John Scriven is chairman of the Lawyers' Christian Fellowship