So who exactly is Mazur?
Julia Mazur and her partner Jerome Stuart were the appellants challenging the decision of the county court that they should pay legal costs of £10,653. International firm Charles Russell Speechlys, which had carried out legal work for them, instructed another firm, Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (GBS), to recover the debt.
What was their appeal based on?
Mazur and Stuart, who were litigants in person during the appeal, took issue with the fact that the particulars of claim against them had been signed by Peter Middleton, head of commercial litigation at GBS, who did not hold a current practising certificate. There was therefore a dispute about whether Middleton was authorised.
Why was there such confusion?
Part of the problem was that the Solicitors Regulation Authority, following a complaint from Mazur, handed down a decision in December 2024 not to investigate the conduct of GBS in relation to Middleton. The SRA went on to say that law firm employees were permitted to undertake reserved activities under the Legal Services Act, adding: ‘We are satisfied that Mr. Middleton has not conducted a reserved legal activity without entitlement to do so, so are satisfied no further action is required on this occasion.’ During the appeal before Mr Justice Sheldon, the SRA accepted that position had been wrong.
What did Mr Justice Sheldon conclude?
On the face of it, this was a fairly simple decision. The judge quashed the order of the county court that Mazur and Stuart should pay the £10,653 and made no order as to costs.
So how are legal executives, paralegals and trainee solicitors caught up in this?
The key to this is in paragraph 49 of Sheldon’s ruling, when he asked whether Middleton was entitled to conduct litigation under supervision. The judge addressed the wider question of authorisation, saying: ‘Mere employment by a person who is authorised to conduct litigation is not sufficient for the employee to conduct litigation themselves, even under supervision. The person conducting litigation, even under supervision, must be authorised to do so, or fall within one of the exempt categories. In my judgment, this is the proper construction of the LSA.’
Which opened a can of worms?
To put it lightly. We cannot know how many firms would have been operating with unauthorised staff conducting litigation under supervision, but we can estimate that it includes a large proportion of the profession. Since the Legal Services Act, the legal services market has changed rapidly, with government policy on fixed and reduced fees placing pressure on firms to do work more cheaply. That inevitably means they have relied increasingly on people who are classed as unauthorised. We know that firms have had to remove caseloads from people and reassign them to solicitors, with some reports that departments have been cut because there is no longer work available. Courts have also barred legal executives from running cases and there remains the possibility of clients making similar costs challenges to that of Mazur and Stuart.
But firms knew they were breaching the LSA?
It is not as simple as that. There is an argument that the act is ambiguous on this point and does not define what exactly is meant by ‘conducting litigation’. CILEX and CILEx Regulation, the representative body and regulator for legal executives, also gave conflicting and changing advice in the years before Mazur. The Legal Services Board continues to investigate what went wrong but has already said that guidance and advice ‘was not always articulated with sufficient precision’. There has been widespread anger from members who believed they were acting lawfully but have now had to scramble to secure practising rights. CILEX has led the appeal but will face questions about its handling of this issue if the challenge is unsuccessful.
And what about the Civil Procedure Rules?
If anything they muddy the waters even further. The rules define a legal representative as a barrister, solicitor, solicitor’s employee, manager of a body recognised by the SRA, or a litigator authorised under the Legal Services Act 2007. This would appear to be contrary to the LSA as understood by Sheldon.
What do Mazur and Stuart say?
Both gave submissions in the Court of Appeal. They were keen to stress they did not want to prevent law centres from being able to advise people seeking access to justice – an unintended consequence of the judgment. But Stuart said it is a huge problem if unauthorised people are able to conduct litigation, adding: ‘Parliament was on top of this when it drafted the act, saying the employee and employer had to be authorised.’
Why does this matter so much?
Quite simply, this decision could dictate the futures of individuals and firms across England and Wales. Business plans depend on legal executives, paralegals and trainees having the right to carry out litigation activities under supervision. Thousands of people are employed on that basis. If the court insists that only solicitors can conduct litigation then costs are likely to increase and access to justice put out of reach for many. Expect a glut of costs challenges too from paying parties questioning whether legal work was done lawfully. The government has shown little real appetite for revising the act soon, but may change that position if the legal sector needs an urgent response.
