The Administrative Court’s judgment in DPP v Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh [2026] EWHC 540 (Admin) is a clear example of how the criminal process can unravel. This is not because of evidential weakness, but because of a failure to comply with statutory safeguards. The allegation itself, concerning a performance by Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh, better known as Mo Chara of the Belfast rap group Kneecap, generated predictable media interest. Yet the decision turned not on the defendant’s conduct, but on a narrow and unforgiving point of law.
The allegation was that on 21 November 2024, during a performance at the O2 Forum in London’s Kentish Town, he displayed a flag ‘in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion’ that he supported Hizballah, a proscribed organisation. If proved, the conduct would fall within section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, a summary only offence carrying up to six months’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine. Ó hAnnaidh denied the allegation.
However, the case collapsed not because of the evidence, but because of the statutory architecture governing consent to prosecute terrorism offences and the unforgiving time limits that apply to summary charges.
Statutory framework
Section 13 criminalises the wearing, carrying or displaying of articles in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion of support for a proscribed organisation. Parliament has long recognised that terrorism prosecutions with an international dimension require constitutional oversight. Section 117 therefore provides that certain offences, including section 13, may not be instituted without the consent of the director of public prosecutions (DPP). Where the conduct is ‘connected to the affairs of another country’, the DPP may only give that consent with the permission of the attorney general.
The purpose is to ensure ‘supervision by the attorney general of the use of criminal prosecution in many terrorism cases where there is a foreign context’. This safeguard is not decorative. It is a statutory precondition to the institution of proceedings.
Alongside this sits the six-month limitation period for summary only offences under section 127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. Proceedings must be instituted within six months of the alleged offence. If they are not, the magistrates’ court lacks jurisdiction. The time limit is strict and admits no discretion.
Section 30(5)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and section 15(2)(ba) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 state that proceedings are instituted when the written charge and requisition are issued.
Fatal chronology
The timeline was not disputed:
- 21 November 2024: alleged offence;
- 20 May 2025: Crown Prosecution Service authorises charge with DPP consent, but without attorney general permission;
- 21 May 2025: police issue a written charge and requisition;
- 22 May 2025: attorney general grants permission; DPP gives valid consent; a second written charge is issued.
The difficulty was that 21 May 2025 was the final day of the six-month period. The attorney general’s permission arrived one day too late.
The prosecution argued that the first written charge was sufficient to stop the limitation clock and that the lack of permission could be rectified later on. The magistrates rejected this and declared the proceedings were a nullity, as the requisite attorney general permission had not been obtained prior to the issuing of the charges. The date of 22 May 2025, when the permission was granted, was too late for the six-month limitation period.
The prosecution appealed to the High Court, which held that there is ‘no room for ambiguity’. Section 29(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that the moment of institution of criminal proceedings is when the written charge is issued. The Terrorism Act contains no alternative definition.
The first written charge, issued on 21 May 2025, therefore instituted proceedings at a time when the DPP did not have the attorney general’s permission. Those proceedings were a nullity. Once the six-month period expired, no valid proceedings could be instituted. The second written charge, issued on 22 May 2025, was therefore out of time.
As the court put it: ‘It would be quite wrong to adopt strained and unnatural constructions of plain words in primary legislation in order to save one summary only case from the application of that important time limit.’
The appeal was dismissed.
Implications for practitioners
The case offers several practical lessons:
- Written charges take effect immediately: the issuing of the written charge institutes proceedings;
- Consent requirements must be satisfied in advance: a premature charge is a nullity;
- Summary time limits are unforgiving: a single day’s delay can extinguish jurisdiction. There is no discretion to extend time.
Indictable and either-way offences differ, as without a limitation period, defective consents can, in principle, be remedied.
Ó hAnnaidh is a case which has underscored the importance and immovability of summary time limits, however unpalatable that may be, as Lord Justice Edis makes clear at paragraph 50. It is a matter of concern that a charge for which both the DPP and attorney general considered there to be sufficient evidence and a need for prosecution in the public interest was void due to a failure to abide by strict deadlines.
The judgment also hints at a deeper constitutional truth: a system that cannot reliably comply with its own safeguards risks eroding the legitimacy of the very offences it seeks to enforce. Ó hAnnaidh is a cautionary tale: the law will not bend to backdate a strict deadline, even in the face of politically sensitive allegations and where both the attorney general and DPP considered there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. For the next summary only offence, we can but hope that calendars and timelines are correctly calculated.
Vicky Lankester is an associate in the criminal and regulatory team at Brett Wilson
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