A family judge dealing with domestic abuse and coercive control accusations in a case already running for 57 weeks has lamented the parallel process of criminal and family courts dealing with the same allegations. 

Court signs

Source: Monidipa Fouzder

In C, born August 2022 (Children Act 1989), Deputy District Judge Nahal-Macdonald, sitting in the family court at Bromley, described the length of the family proceedings as ‘invidious in the context of the child’s short life’.

The father, F, made an application for a child arrangements order at the end of February last year. He had been arrested for alleged domestic abuse against the mother a year previously and charged with two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He elected for a Crown court trial which is listed for October.

The fact-finding judgment dealt with the mother’s allegations of coercive control and physical abuse.

The judge said that, had the father not elected for a Crown court trial, the criminal case 'would almost certainly have been concluded by now. That is a matter for F, and of course the family and criminal courts apply different standards of proof. The part of the case before me today dealing with allegations, which include those before the criminal court, and it is self-evident that the parallel nature of the two processes is rather confusing for parties.

'Sadly, that is a function of the differences between the family and criminal courts.’

The judge did not find sufficient evidence of coercive control or in relation to some of the physical abuse allegations. However he found that in an incident where the mother's hand was trapped in a door, the father’s actions were ‘at least reckless'. The judge also found the father had smashed the mother’s phone on the floor in one incident and in another, grabbed the mother, ‘yanking her about, causing her to hit her head, and then pinned her to the bed, then made sexual insults’. The judge found the father placed his hands on the mother’s throat and ‘held her for some moments against her will whilst she struggled’.

Indirect interim contact ‘could be manageable,’ the judge said. ‘However, I have also heard that F is on bail until October, and that contact would be a breach of bail. I do not want to set him up to fail, and risks of harm must be manageable for me to make an order for indirect contact.’

The judgment noted the mother was ‘content for there to be indirect contact’. The judge allowed this, finding ‘this will maintain a bridge for contact’ as ‘in my view this is not a case where no order for contact will be made in the future’.